THE GREAT LIE
What
is the great lie?
Let’s
start with an illustration. Here is a hint: it is woven from the fabric of
modern ideologies, and there is no singular great lie unless one considers
‘modernity’ per se, and hypermodernity in particular, as the great lie itself.
Let
us say one is working an hourly job at fourteen dollars per hour in the year
2000 with an average of 2300 hours worked per year. According to BLS numbers,
the CPI estimates inflation over the period from 2000-2016 to have averaged
about 2.5% per year. The total rate of inflation in that period is about 46%.
Thus the person in this example would have to be earning over twenty dollars at
the end of that period for their earnings to remain roughly equal, assuming the
rest of the compensation package and average hours remains the same. If we
assume that other forms of compensation diminish, then their wages would have
to rise even more.
This
is just an example. If one wants to find numbers relevant to the field one is
in, one can do so; if one wants to adjust the time period slightly, one can
also do that. We should also note that the CPI is deliberately crafted to
downplay real inflation. If you take the CPI and fudge it up by about at least
20-30%, you’re getting a more accurate picture of actual consumer price changes. Things like medical costs, college
or university tuition, rent and housing, and stock prices have risen the
fastest since 1985, with all of these things rising between 300-500% during a
period where official inflation figures are slightly less than half of the
upper bound (~235%).
What
one will find in this example, is that most workers in 2016 (or 2019) are
underpaid if one looks at historical wages and adjusts for inflation even based
off CPI numbers, and it gets more dismal when you add a fudge factor to bring
the CPI closer to real inflation. If you presented this data to employers, many
or perhaps most of them would balk at paying employees the same real wages as they were 20 years ago (or in the case of
2016, a mere 16 years prior). This either means that employers are pocketing
the difference that workers lose to inflation, or the economy is worse than
most indicators present and they are actually unable to absorb the costs now of
the real wages they paid in the past.
When
one adds that the stock market for the past 40 years has largely tracked monetary
and credit expansion and that there is, in fact, very little (if any) genuine
economic growth, things start to look even worse. Real growth comes from a
number of factors, those being largely increases in available energy supply,
technical innovations, demographic growth, and the diffusion of extant
technical-engineering solutions. The thing with demographic growth is that
while it does grow the economy, those people have to be employable in the
economy that exists. Expanding the money and credit supply, unless it is a
means of driving incentives for some change that can move fundamental growth,
only results in rewards for whomever receives the monetary ‘stimulus’, for
purchasing power of inflated money/credit decreases as it is repeatedly spent
in the economy, and ultimately there is price dislocation over time. [1]
Thus
I get around to naming the first great lie: the myth of endless growth and
prosperity.
To
expand on the point on demographic growth, this is worth elaborating because I
don’t think that many people sufficiently understand this. At all points in
history, there is essentially a behavioral-cognitive work fitness curve. What
this means, is that to be suited for certain tasks, one must meet certain
criteria of, for instance, punctuality and intelligence. Smarts as proxied by
IQ is really the most important single trait, since it correlates with all
sorts of other traits weakly or strongly, and best evidence so far is that an
IQ of around 115-120 (along with physical attractiveness) is an indication of
general genetic health. Intellect is a polygenic trait and deleterious alleles
often hamper IQ. An IQ of 140 or above is highly exceptional and there aren’t
any sub-populations which have an average IQ that high. Similarly, world-class
intellect is limited by a confluence of genetics and upbringing such that even
in the best of cases very few of these people can be made.
In
agricultural society, the IQ floor of most work was fairly low because most
work available was directly or indirectly tied to farming. Those who were more
capable were often pushed to managing more land, or into crafts and trades or
religion and state. This meant that full employment was possible in a
population with an average IQ of 90 and a normal curve more or less like the
European one, and I mention the shape because in reality the shape of
distributions of populations sometimes differs. Outside of famines and other
major stress events, almost no one wants for work in the pre-industrial society.
If
you jump ahead to early industrial society, for instance most of Western Europe
1800-1900 (but particularly England/US), what you find is that IQ 90 population
will start to experience some amount of frictional unemployment. The IQ floor
rises enough that full employment is impossible even in the best of times. By
the late industrial society, or hypermodern state, one finds that more and more
people are completely incapable of finding a place simply due to their
cognitive-behavioral traits. There is only so much work available for the left
side of the bell curve, and frankly those on the right side are far more
flexible in the types of work they can do and their readiness and effectiveness
at work [in general]. Indeed if automation goes half as far as its advocates
wish, it will effectively result in permanent frictional joblessness for most
of those below 115 IQ. (Note: this is neglecting resource limitations and
political conflicts for the moment.)
This
makes for an interesting point: you have this rising curve which is essentially
a supply-demand curve but fitted to the work available, both in terms of
variety and volume. Once you add widespread automation, which at a certain
point largely targets the left side of the bell curve, it becomes worse for
those of submarginal intellect. Once you add in the additional actual policies
of mass migration and migrant work forces, you further displace those largely
on the left and middle of the bell curve. The thing is in this case we are not
necessarily talking about a third-world country in isolation or a theoretical
construct; this fact is true essentially everywhere the hypermodern economy
takes hold, and especially everywhere the whole hypermodern globohomo policy
suite dominates in full. Western countries have largely displaced those native
born or founding stock folk who fall on the left side or middle of the curve by
automation and outsourcing and migrant workers at the exact same time as the
so-called developing world looks to shunt its excess population to any port in
a storm.
Obviously,
if your population has a worse set of cognitive-behavioral traits, they are
less useful in modernity or hypermodernity. Frankly positive
cognitive-behavioral traits are just generally useful and highly adaptive (but
costly), even before the industrial revolution; but the industrial revolution
introduced dysgenics and frictional unemployment by the end of what I called
‘early industrial society’, which would be marked around 1880-1900. By that
time (1880-1900), reproductive success is no longer tied to cognitive-behavioral
or physical traits as much as it was even a hundred or two hundred years
before, and the IQ floor on work was constantly but slowly rising every
generation. The frail survive, but so too do the stupid – in fact those who are
most fruitful for the past hundred and some years are those with the lowest IQs
and often lower general genetic fitness in terms of the ancestral environments.
As
a brief aside, I do have a problem with the first-, second-, and third-world
terminology; as I’ve discussed before, it refers to spheres of influence from
the Cold War, where the first-world was the US and allies, the second-world was
the USSR and allies, and the third-world were unaligned countries. Third
worldism, especially Maoist third worldism, became a vehicle by which China
expanded their influence in fact and useful idiots in the West were exploited
by Chicoms to this end. Moral loading of third worldism is a device and no one
outside the useful idiots are wedded to it. I’m not going to go into this here
as I’ve treated this multiple times in the past directly or obliquely.
Aside
from the direct human factor, there is also energy availability. Note that it
is more important that it is available
for use than that the raw material merely be there somewhere. Coal, oil,
and uranium have been around for far longer than human society, but it is only
within the past 250, 150, and 80 years respectively that these materials are
prospective forms of energy for performing work, usually in the form of
internal combustion or steam.
I
touched automation above tangentially. In some sense everything from draft
animals to windmills and watermills can be seen as forms of automation. These
technologies allow men to perform very labor intensive work, for instance
plowing or milling grains, with input from beasts or the environment which
allows for men to take their hands elsewhere. These types of solutions are
often cost intensive up front and may have limited spaces where they can be
effectively built; and in the case of draft animals, the cost is borne more
over time and in having to set aside farmland for fodder. What should be noted
is that energy and work came from either living things or the environment, and
there wasn’t really any ability to store energy.
Chemical
energy sources upend the earlier forms of automation which were all highly
labor intensive even as they were labor-saving. These chemical sources all
require more specialized machining and technical expertise, as well as a wide
division of labor capable of supplying all the necessary components – consider
the materials that go into a steam turbine or internal combustion engine – but
once produced, the amount of labor necessary for a kilojoule of work is far
less than the primitive automation and can be harnessed to a wider variety of
ends because of the ability to scale. It is also important that one can build
these newer work-performance devices with interchangeable parts and mass
production, where other devices were all generally craft-made. Chemical energy
encompasses all of the primary energy sources of late (1880-2018). Energy
storage, efficiency, and scalability are the critical factors, as the first
coal-powered steam engines were used in mine pumps, but quickly men saw the
wider set of uses possible.
I
should note in passing that we do have modern sources of environmental energy,
for instance solar panels and hydroelectric turbines, but these things all rely
on a supply chain made possible by the chemical energy sources. If oil and coal
were to disappear within five years, the solar panels and hydroelectric
turbines would fall apart within twenty to thirty years as upkeep could no
longer be performed. At the moment, there is no ability to replace chemical
(largely fossil fuel) energy entirely.
For
the third factor, we have innovation. In technical innovations I include both
engineering and basic science. They are both tied to the other in a positive
feedback loop. Engineering or applied science enables further basic science
research, and vice versa. What we see in the past one hundred years is, over
the course of that time the pace of basic science has slowed dramatically and
progress thereof is relegated at this point largely to a few domains where
brute force quantification and automation makes the most sense and the most
gains. It is striking that, for instance, basic chemistry and physics changed
far less between 1950 and 2015 than between 1885 and 1950. Areas like computer
science and robotics, genetics, and astronomy continue to see year-over-year improvements
where many others are if not stagnant certainly moving far less. The same is
true obviously of applied sciences, but the decline is not as obvious in
applied as in basic science. [2]
There
are a few explanations one can make for this fact which seems to be obvious and
less controversial as we get further into the 21st century. The
first is the exhaustion of low-hanging fruit. The second is that we are merely
closer in present models of reaching approximate truth, and in conjunction with
the first, every incremental gain in improving present models requires far more
effort, insight, or capital than one or two hundred years ago. The third is
that modern science is rife with institutional rot, the same as everything
else, and the rot has gotten worse along with bad incentives. The fourth is
that, tying in with the last, science in 2018 is as bureaucratic and hemmed in
as everything else is, and maybe more so; whereas science in 1900, or
especially 1800, was far freer and less subject to the rigors of institutional
and international politics.
No
one of these explanations is mutually exclusive with the others necessarily,
and I think there is probably truth in all of them. One should note that the
fields moving most are those which are essentially new fields where low-hanging
fruit may still lie in wait, and where the bureaucracy is far less entrenched
than in the legacy fields. Astronomy is one of the oldest sciences. It is also
highly bureaucratic and regulated, but modern advances in astronomy are moved
largely by heavy computerization and automation along with improvements in
radio and visual light telescopes. Young scientists in 1800 often struck out on
their own with a mentor’s guidance; many failed to achieve much of note, or
merely moved the bounds of their science a fractional step. Nonetheless, the
loss of that independence and the enthrallment of the modern young scientist is
as noteworthy as the rest.
Although
very important, social technologies are another thing which stick somewhere
between innovation generally and the men themselves. Social technologies will
determine group cohesion, trust, and forms a large part of the environmental
stuff that goes into making someone who can live up to their genetic potential.
An obvious omen of decline is that social technology has either fallen by the
wayside or has become a tool of degeneracy. I believe to some degree both are
true – that social technologies, by which I mean institutions and cultural
customs and the like, have become a tool for social control and disintegration
of the Western Faustian man rather than tools to keep him good and to insure
the chains of past to future. It's also obvious that social technology has not kept pace with other forms of technology, especially transportation and communications. Most people do not spare thought to just how much rapid transportation and fast wireless communications alter society, and we have clearly not developed any social adaptations to these new pieces of tech.
The
last factor is tied to the third, and it has to do with the diffusion of
present technologies. When something novel is discovered or invented, it takes
time to diffuse throughout society, and in some sense the act of diffusion is
growth. Indeed, the economies with the most growth over the past 40 years have
been those which have sufficient human and social capital that they aren’t
unmitigated disasters, but otherwise started out in the early-to-mid part of
the 1900s struggling to catch up or outright undeveloped. It is far easier to
spread present knowledge and solutions, especially with outside help, than to
strike out somewhere new.
If
one cannot understand the fundamentals of economic growth and how it ties to
all of these more basic elements, it merely seems that growth ‘happens’ or it
doesn’t. In some sense, it becomes more a magic than emergent phenomenon. Let
us say for argument that social technologies have decayed, and applied and
basic science have largely stalled and most improvements now are engineering
ones which are generally confined to a handful of domains; let us also say that
demographic growth has stopped or reversed among the people that matter, and
within the next ten years there will start to be a mass die off as what was
once a generational pyramid has been inverted; and let us say that the energy
supply and natural resources more broadly are stressed and several vital
resources among them will reach the point of breakeven cost within ten to
fifteen years, and even more will reach that point over the next thirty years.
Quickly,
‘breakeven cost’ means that it costs a barrel of oil to extract a barrel of oil
out of the ground, or that one is paying the spot price of a metal to dig it
up. After one hits breakeven, one will rather shortly hit the downward slope
where extracting oil, gold, aluminum, or lithium, will all cost more to find
and get than they are worth at present. At that point, one is effectively stuck
with what one has on hand. At that point, either the cost of minerals rises
enough to cover further mining or cost efficiency must rise. ‘The generational
pyramid’ means that normally there are more people in the zero to thirty age
bracket than in the fifty-five and over bracket. This is not the case among
people of European or Northeast Asian stock pretty much anywhere – hence an
inverted pyramid.
So
if all of these factors have substantially slowed, stopped, or outright
reversed in the past hundred years, how can there be fundamental growth? Well,
there really can’t be. Further, there are two very obvious problems with
endless growth and prosperity: entropy and resource limitations. Every single
one of those factors presumes the recent availability of resources. More
worryingly, the present rate of consumption of these resources is made worse by
grift, waste, and the attempt to develop the whole planet. Mass consumption
market economies are themselves an inherent problem, as most of the economy is
geared toward volume production rather than producing enough. It isn’t
profitable for most businesses to only sell people what they need; production
and consumption must be constant to drive the economy. Entropy is rather
obvious in that any system experiences energy loss, usually in the form of heat
or light. Therefore there is, all things equal, less energy present on Earth in
2020 than in 1700. Ostensibly this fact is true of the universe as well, and
even if the universe is a completely closed system it may be the fact that some
forms of energy are lost to time and cannot be recovered once that energy takes
a certain form or scatters widely enough. [3]
I
will note that there is constant input from outside the energy system of the
Earth by cosmic debris and the Sun. Yet while the Sun is seemingly immense and
endless, projected over a long enough timeline it is in fact finite. Cosmic
debris also fails to supply enough stuff to
replenish that which we use, waste, and cannot at this point economically
recycle. Crude oil and coal take thousands of years to produce from organic
material in geological strata, and those thousands of years of geological
production can be consumed by the modern economy in a span of five or ten years.
[3.5]
This
doesn’t really touch on environmental degradation, and I’ve only briefly noted
the socio-cultural decay aspect as well as I’ve gone at length on that
elsewhere. These are tied intimately with hypermodernity just the same as
current geopolitics and mass migration. The Post-War International Order is
kept orderly by bribes of money and the daughters of Westerners to foreign
elites, as well as the promise that one has a safe bank and safe haven away
from potential vengeance at home. Thus the corrupt Gambian or Nigerian leader
banks in Switzerland or the Caymans and vacations in Marseille or Barcelona.
All while the daughters of Westerners are turned out as street whores and
pornographers (a different form of whoredom), where in combination with
degenerate Western tourists the image of the West is indelibly degraded. The
Western woman in the eyes of the rest of the world is at once the beautiful
actress on film, the naĂ¯ve touriste, and the whore spreading her legs on
camera.
Mass
market economies are a problem in themselves for the reasons above – combined
with a drive toward asymptotic or at least exponential growth, it quickly
becomes absurd. There simply isn’t enough stuff on the planet to give everyone
a million dollar lifestyle the way that Western millionaires circa 1980 could
enjoy it. The raw materials aren’t there, and when you combine that with the
insufficiencies of humans and systems, particularly non-Western men and
systems, things become still more dismal. Copper wire for instance can be
substituted, but all of its substitutes are limited, as optical fibre wire can
transmit light data but not electrical energy and it is expensive to produce
and lay, and the other substitutes which are electrically conductive are almost
all more expensive per unit weight than Cu. (I will note here that much of the
communications lines are in fact optical fibre or in the process of being
switched to that.) One finds a similar phenomenon with oil, where many
individual substitutes can be found for petrol products but they are often
expensive, inefficient, or lower quality, and none of them has the versatility
of crude oil.
Resource
depletion is something that should worry every thinking person. We aren’t
really that great at recycling all sorts of materials, and resort to landfills,
exporting waste (in the case of Western countries exporting certain plastic
waste), or burning the waste outright. There is not much effort or priority
placed right now on recycling materials as much as possible, even as we face
the fact that most of our strategic raw materials will be sharply limited in
supply, namely for oil and mineral reserves. We also face issues of path
dependency, and we are seemingly stuck with all sorts of shortcomings rising
from decisions made in the past from expediency or money interests that damn
the longterm viability of the industrial system. A good example of this is the
reliance of Americans on automobiles as basic daily transport, something which
came about to stimulate auto manufacturers and mass consumption, but which
makes no sense in a world where oil prices are ever rising and land and housing
are no longer cheap. This has also resulted in an incredibly overstretched
network of physical infrastructure which cannot be properly maintained, as most
infrastructure repairs and improvements are funded by a combination of federal
and local or municipal debt, and the debt crisis is starting to hit home as the
bond ratings of numerous cities, counties, and states are being down-graded. [4]
One
of the resources in short supply is not a natural resource in the sense of a
mineral or chemical which we can mine or extract from the Earth. It is healthy young people. Military
recruiters in the US especially, but elsewhere as well, lament the lack of healthy
young recruits. Many are barred from military service by obesity, health
issues, or history of mental illness. All of these things have had secular
increases. In the early 20th century, autism prevalence was
estimated at less than 0.5 per 1000; since 2010-12, it is estimated to be about
16 per 1000. Autoimmunity has shown a less marked increase in that same period,
from less than 2% prevalence before 1960, to 3.2% between 1965-95, and a
further increase to at least 8.3% more recently. Comorbidities complicate both neurological
or mental disorders like autism, which has a correlation with various comorbid
neurological disorders including types of retardation and cerebral palsy, and
with autoimmune disorders which also have relatively high rates of comorbidity
between some autoimmune conditions and certain others (with autoimmunity,
certain comorbidities cluster). These autoimmune disorders include such things
as Crohn’s, celiac disease, psoriasis, rheumatism, and diabetes type 1. [5]
The
most common explanation put forward for the rise in autism is expansion of
diagnostic criteria. This probably plays some impact, but even if we would
expect a thirty to fifty percent increase, nonetheless we should note several
things: one, autism was sufficiently rare before about 1940 that it did not
warrant epidemiological study. Two, that
few individuals were ever noted as being characterized with autistic traits. Three,
it was not sufficiently problematic to warrant notice and the increase is over twenty fold. Edward Dutton characterizes these disorders as spiteful mutations. That is a partial
explanation for these secular rises in these disorders; industrial society has
an increased mutational load as a result of decreased selective pressure. Just
the same, 4-5 generations is enough for some
of these spiteful mutations to become manifest in individuals and in certain
sub-populations, but not enough to become commonplace or express a twenty to
thirty fold increase in a particular disorder which was once rare and bordering
on nonexistent and is now fairly common.
Lack
of immune stressors is another explanation for autoimmunity. In an excessively
sanitized environment, especially one with high antibiotic prevalence, it is
probable that the immune system will target tissues. This is a partial
explanation. [6] Antibiotic usage
for infants is a potential partial explanation for autism, as it disrupts both
gut flora and immune development. In utero exposure to high levels of
testosterone seems to be another correlate for autism, and it should be noted
that prenatal testosterone levels and later post-pubescent testosterone levels
do not really correlate. Environmental toxins are another potential and likely
partial explanation for both autoimmunity and autism, as there are plenty of
vectors for toxins to influence development and longterm health. Some areas
have substantial air pollution (e.g. O3) that aggravates pulmonary
conditions or can lead to chronic toxicity given longterm exposure. Most people
in developed countries are exposed to food grown with petrochemicals as
fertilizer and pesticides and herbicides. It is likely that plants grown in
this manner uptake synthetic compounds into root and xylem structures, and
moreover that many do not sufficiently wash away surface pesticides and
herbicides. Additionally, factory farm meat is given feed largely in the form
of soy and corn (laden with petrochemicals), and is subsequently dosed with antibiotics
on a preventative basis as well as synthetic hormones. To put it another way, some large portion of calories in edible farm plants and animals come from petrochemicals.
The
burden of environmental toxins get worse as plastics themselves frequently
leach high amounts of xenoestrogens and other toxic compounds under adverse
conditions (e.g. 160 C heat, sunlight), and many or most leach at least some of
these compounds even under nearly ideal conditions. The problem is that the
hypermodern global supply chain integrates petrochemicals at so many stages,
including in logistics, that plastics are used to store and transport food and
water. Many residential pipes are now made of polyvinyl chloride. Plastics
degrade as a function of weathering and time. Microplastics are common in
Western water supplies, especially America, due to the presence of these PVC
pipes, microplastic beads used in bathing products and cosmetics, and
degradation of other plastic containers (frequently food and drink containers);
indeed there are few aquifers in the world where one can find no microplastics.
Some areas even suffer airborne microplastics. Xenoestrogens are found not just
in plastics, though plastics are some of the worst sources, but they are also
found in water supplies due to hormonal birth control usage and naturally in
certain foods like soy. [7]
The
overall picture is that median health is severely degraded as a result of a
combination of factors: increased mutation load and advanced parental age, decreased immune health,
environmental toxins, poor social and cultural habits, and endocrine
disruption. Among the poor social and cultural habits I include ‘automobile
culture’; reliance on automobiles as daily transportation correlates with obesity.
Relative abundance of calorie dense food, and aversion or simple lack of
physical activity including walking or physical work, are other correlates of
obesity which I still lump under that category of ‘poor social and cultural
habits.’ I highlight obesity because it and obesity comorbidities like sleep apnea and diabetes type II are major epidemiological issues, as obesity and its comorbidities drastically increase health costs and reduce life expectancy. Endocrine disruption is a result of the aforementioned xenoestrogens,
meaning that puberty in adolescents does not proceed per nature, and after
puberty all sorts of abnormalities tend to become more frequent (things like
ovarian and breast cancer as well as lack of sexual development, overproduction
or underproduction of certain genital tissues). If one has the impression of
being poisoned by elites and by short-sighted corporate interests, one is
entirely correct and justified in this impression. It is not merely humans who
are affected either, as environmental toxins like xenoestrogens have disrupted
reproduction faculties for various lower animals from frogs to birds.
Down-graded
bonds foreshadow insolvency. All great debt bubbles must either burst or be
sustained by means outside the bubble itself. The hypermodern mass consumption
economy, which grows in proportion to indebtedness, would try to grow until it
has consumed everything. In a catabolic fit, it would then eat itself and
everything under its decrepit wing until there was nothing left. Thankfully, I
do not believe that things will be that awful. Merchants lack that sort of
apocalyptic power at this point, though they be powerful, and there are enough
people who put up enough resistance to the system even if much of it is token
resistance or measured noncompliance that it doesn’t always get its way
perfectly. Moreover, the various problems above seem to be hobbling it, and we
see the first deep cracks in the Post-War International Order forming as we
approach the first fourth of the century.
In
the past, they often dealt with debt crises not by soaking the poor, but by
soaking the creditors with a debt jubilee,
or forgiveness of current debts. That there hasn’t been one of these in most
Western European countries or the colonies in over 200 years is a marker of
stability. Just the same, the levels of debt are hitting historical levels and
foretell that something is going to give; either you reinstate a form of
slavery for indebtedness, to which I foresee a massive amount of popular
resistance, including material resistance; or you actually allow limited or
wholesale debt reliefs in the not-too-distant future. If one thinks a debt
crisis and subsequent jubilee is imminent, one might as well use debt to
finance asset purchases and put off repayment until such time as the debt is
forgiven. In other words, you end up with real things – say, food, clothes, or
tools (land property and transportation don’t work as well because of how
foreclosure, eviction and repossession work) – and they end up with an empty
bag.
To
wrap it back around to the example of the worker I started illustrating, one is
told to expect to keep going up. One should always earn more and more money. To
be fair, one would have to see annual wage increases of at least 2.5% per year
to hope of even staying at the same real wage, and really that would fall
somewhere short as something more like 3.5% would be necessary merely to check
average annual inflation. But one is a failure if one is not receiving raises,
bonuses, and better compensation packages; if one cannot improve one’s
lifestyle substantially every four to five years, one is clearly failing or
doing something wrong. The reality of course is that even in the West, not
everyone can earn six figure wages or better; if everyone did, it would be
because their money would effectively be worthless and they would be the equal
of Zimbabwean billionaires. At some point, the mask has to be peeled off the
lie of mass consumption, endless prosperity and growth, and that vague thing
hyped in media as “the American dream.” Most people should expect to get by,
not to ‘make it.’
Striking
it rich, like the American dream, is a slightly smaller lie that keeps people
going in the hypermodern grist mill in order to feed that first great lie.
Endless growth and prosperity sound nice, but it’s ultimately unsustainable and
impossible, and those who win most in the longrun over the past hundred or so
years have been plutocrats and merchants. Inequality is a fact of society and
yet the modern West is subject to some of the most striking socio-economic and
power inequality ever in human history.
The
second great lie is boundless human ingenuity and the general myth of progress.
What does this entail? Well, the precise nature of this lie is difficult to pin
down, but basically it states that the mind can achieve anything and that we
have been on an arc of progress since the dawn of man.
Let’s
start with the second part and wrap around to the first after. The second part
is about the arc of progress, essentially a linear conception of history
introduced by Judaism and the Hebraic faiths. Christianity took this Hebraic
conception and perfected it with a vision of the first time and the end time.
In the Christian worldview, the world is on a track from creation to the final
revelation and the second coming of Christ. So-called enlightenment liberals
took this view and turned it into a historical and political conception; rather
than the world beginning in perfection and ending in horror, it was essentially
the precise opposite. Outside of Rousseau and his followers, liberals viewed
early man as primitive and suffering, where the more modern men are enlightened
and joyful. The world would not end with rapture but with ‘the end of history’
as first spoken by Hegel and renewed repeatedly since – essentially a permanent
stasis once liberal secular society reached its zenith of enlightenment.
This
stands in stark contrast to older views of history and older religious views.
Indo-European religion viewed the world as series of epicycles, and we see this
theme present both in Greek philosophy (e.g. Ptolemy) and in the Dharmic
faiths. You also have the myths stated by Hesiod. This view was shared by most
of the other major world philosophies of the time from the Near East to the Far
East. In the northern most Indo-European [Aryan] ways, that of the Germanic
folk, the world began in fire with giants, cows, and Old Gods and would end in
cold and chaos with most of the men and most of the gods perishing in the
course of Ragnarok. These themes – a cosmic or galactic cow, ancient giants,
Old Gods, and a cycle of birth in fire and death in ice – appear repeatedly in
part or in whole in Aryan cosmological myth.
Repeatedly
we hear of a golden age in the past. This marks either the time before
civilization, or during the formation of the Aryan tribes and then their spread
throughout the world. You then had a silver age following, where the Aryan
tribes settled and consolidated rule, and the last of them spread into the
furthest corners. Then one has an age of bronze, and after Bronze Age one of
heroes. Lastly, there is the Iron Age – the basest of all ages, where common
folk and king are both baser than those in the last ages. These ages in Greek
myth, spoken by Hesiod, correspond more or less to the Yugas in Dharmic
religion where the Kali Yuga is the last and basest age before a return to
better times. One should note out of interest the fact that the names of these
ages given in Hesiod’s semi-mythic telling correspond to what archaeologists
claim, and that the Germanic variant of the general Indo-European cosmological
myth corresponds loosely to modern scientific conjecture. However, in the
Dharmic variant, one should be wary not to perceive the cosmological time in
which the yugas are supposed to manifest as being literal numerology (e.g. 6000
or more years for the Kali Yuga), as that has more to do with cosmology or
astrology than the cycles of human civilization. My interpretation is that the Kali Yuga will last a long while, but an
ultimately indeterminate length. Numerology will not yield the proper
answers.
The
course of historical civilizations seems to bear truth for the cyclical view.
Technology has more or less linearly increased since the Neolithic with a
recent slightly parabolic curve. Yet, we should note that this parabolic curve
over the past 200 years is not constant; if my contention prior is true, then
technical growth is no longer exponential and has begun to flatten back into a
gradual linear increase. We should also note that getting bogged down in the
appearance of progress via technics is a pitfall that one must avoid.
Civilization since the earliest days holds to a rise and fall pattern, and some
(i.e. Spengler) believe that even civilizations have seasons. The main purpose
of technological increase since the Neolithic has been to increase carrying
capacity and to gain advantage in war. Everything which does not enable
increased carrying capacity or favor in warfare is to some degree a nicety, and
to some degree extraneous.
In 1650 BC or near about, there was a fairly sudden sequence of events which led to what is called the ‘Late Bronze Age Collapse.’ Most of the major Bronze Age civilizations of the Mediterranean either shrunk considerably or fell outright in a sixty to hundred year span. Most of the places which did not completely collapse would end up never recovering and come under the thrall of their neighbors in the next age. A similar but slightly less dramatic thing happened in Late Antiquity. Between 450 and 650 AD, most of the Mediterranean empires fell to outside invasion and barbarian kings. In the background in that period (450-650) was also a massive series of Völkerwanderung which affected virtually every corner of Europe and most of Eurasia as well. This is a longer span than the Bronze Age Collapse, but still a similar pattern emerged where by about 670 AD, the only Mediterranean empire left was a substantially reduced Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, as Western Rome, Sassanid Persia, and most of the client states of the Near East fell. Even China experienced convulsions in that period before the Tang dynasty.
We
will note however that many civilizations, tribes, and kingdoms rise and fall
even between these crisis periods. Prehistory and early history whisper of
ghosts and tales of long dead peoples, the fate of these peoples either being
total death and loss or cultural-linguistic replacement and assimilation to
some larger or more powerful group. While the ethno-linguistic map of 800 AD
and 1900 AD were fairly similar, there were large changes on either side of
that period. Both the period from 100 to 750 AD and the period from 1900 to now
had huge migrations of people and border shifts which completely altered the
ethno-linguistic and political landscape. We still live in the midst of one of
those eras of migration. The major difference is that many of the prior eras
and patterns of migration were driven by our people, by the Aryans riding off
the Pontic-Caspian steppe and their children. Those of today are driven
essentially entirely by the Other, and to the benefit of the Other and the
dispossession of the children of Aryans.
Boundless
ingenuity is the other aspect of this great lie. I addressed before the myth that
science is still churning as it once did. I believe there is ample evidence
pointing the other way on that. The majority of cultural, scientific, and
engineering feats are ultimately formed by a small intellectual elite of
society. The largest shifts often come from world class geniuses, who, as I’ve
discussed before, are rare in any society and their presence and productivity
in a generation can only be fostered and encouraged, but their development is
too unlikely to be forced or heralded. Other bright people who fall short of
that mark still push the bounds, but do so in a largely linear and continuous
fashion.
There
are two obvious problems with the myth of boundless ingenuity: one, that not
all peoples are capable of the same level of discovery and development; and
two, that over the past hundred years, the influence of these people, that is
Europeans generally but especially world class genius, in art and in the
sciences has fallen substantially. I believe the reason for the latter is
precisely the stifling nature of bureaucratization and social control, as well
as the general rise of mediocrity and the lesser in all things. One must look
at the background of artistic, cultural, and scientific developments, at the
underlying things which enabled these developments in the first place. You
don’t get great symphonic or choral works as we had from the late Renaissance
through to the late Romantic and early Modern period without a culture heavily
steeped in choral and marching music.
Again,
tying with my prior discussion of science in the first section, we find a
phenomenon I call “sciencefagging.” What this amounts to is using the
semi-religious and magical mystique of science institutions and the aura of
prestige of scientists and doctors, and bending results to service power. The
“sciencefag” is essentially a court researcher, and in the quest for money and
social rewards like status and prestige, they will doctor their findings to
benefit the left establishment, and some of them are willing to outright fabricate
results. The overall result of the array of sciencefags, the institutional
gatekeepers, and moneyed interests is the elimination of open inquiry and
discussion. Even those who don’t stoop to this low level often self-censor, and
many are only willing to publish things in accord with the dominant
semi-religious ideology of modern progressivism. It’s worth noting that modern
progressivism is perceived by its followers and its court intellectuals as a
scientific ideology, much like communism was in its heyday.
That
is part of the social control of society as a whole and of the men and
institutions of science. The left establishment rightly sees maintaining the
illusion of a scientific foundation as bolstering its legitimacy, in
combination with its allegedly sterling moral record. Some disciplines are
worse than others, but we should note that there is a general replication
problem in all of science. Some amount of error is expected and likely. Yet
when some fields have replication rates between 15-25%, meaning that 75-85% of
published work is either highly fraught with error or outright fraud, we have a
deeper problem. The quest to satisfy money and power concerns, to obtain
funding, to gain prestige and fame, and to find positive results with a high correlation
and p-value (disparagingly known as p-hacking), stands against the truth.
One cannot juggle that many-fold ‘quest’ and a genuine search for truth.
The
replication crisis and academic fraud like p-hacking
are two aspects of sciencefagging. Laziness is one more insidious complement.
Another aspect is that certain subjects are censured, or the way in which they
are approached is highly controlled. All the best data suggests man causes
climate change and I believe that the impact of this is fairly substantial, but
climatology is being used by plutocrats for a decidedly political agenda and
not to further truth. Egalitarian attitudes are promoted on the other hand
everywhere they can be, in psychology, microbiology, medicine, and population
genetics. This hurts the replication and truth value of research in those
fields, and also forces genuine researchers to find work-around methods in how
research is conducted and how it is presented as well. Theoretical physics has
a problem too where many of those promoted to the top of the field aren’t
necessarily top-class intellect, or innovators in science, but marketing and
sales people with some knowledge of the field.
This
should concern everyone. It is harder than ever for young men of worth to
invent and discover new things. Many who would in another time and another,
less sick society be pushing the envelope of knowledge forward, are instead
servicing court ideology and creating useful fictions and gilded lies. Most of
the technical innovation in the past 30 years has been in computers broadly,
but especially in software and appliances designed to distract and entertain.
Given
the lies addressed above, what could be next? My contention for a third great
lie at the bottom of modern ideology is meritocracy of some sort.
To
the degree that meritocracy ever existed, it is certainly not the case in the
West for the past three generations at the least. The greater the
financialization of the economy, that is the percentage of income and revenue
generated by the FIRE sector, the greater the privileging of social networks
and ties. It is fundamentally untrue that those who are wealthy today are the
elect; the Rothschild family, like many Jewish fortunes from the Bronfman
family to most of the Silicon Valley Jewish plutocrats, was built by dishonest
means.
Nathan
Rothschild, whose family was supposed to watch over the wealth of the Holy
Roman Empire (essentially Austria) which had been secreted out of Europe during
the First Napoleonic War, instead began issuing loans including one
particularly profitable loan to fund the Duke of Wellington’s armies (with
advance knowledge of the win at Waterloo), and thus built the seed of the
Rothschild fortune with fraud atop the borrowed resources of European nobility.
The Bronfman fortune was built by bootlegging and rum-running during
Prohibition, as the elder Bronfman bought out a minor Canadian distillery
(Seagram’s) shortly after the passage of Prohibition with plans to increase
production to the (now illicit and tightened) American market. Seagram’s, under
its new ownership, became one of the major suppliers of illicit booze during
prohibition. Jews were instrumental in “American” organized crime during the
first half of the 20th century under the Syndicate, a largely
Catholic and Jewish organization, and continue to steer organized crime from a
higher position of power and from Israel. Most of the Silicon Valley
plutocrats, Jew and gentile, built their companies based on cooperation with
California universities (especially Stanford and the UC system), and with help
from DARPA and the broader military intelligence sphere who saw an interest in putting
money behind potential electronic warfare and surveillance-social control
efforts. These public moneys were then converted into a series of
“public”-private ventures where the profits were largely internalized and the
“public” side was an ever-increasing range of surveillance and social control
methods for intelligence apparatuses to employ. One might call most of these
Silicon Valley companies public-private trusts.
Note
with the Bronfmans: the Bronfman heiress has been implicated in the NXIVM cult.
Jeffrey Epstein and Leslie Wexner were also tied to the Bronfmans and to NXIVM,
as well as to a separate kompromat, prostitution, and pedophilia ring run by
Epstein and the Maxwells (Robert and Ghislaine) and funded by Mossad and Wexner
in cooperation with others in the Mega Group.
One
finds this pattern recur across many wealthy people generally, but especially
among elite Jews. Left progressives during the early 1900s found Jews useful as
propagandists, financiers, and organized crime; by the second half of the
1900s, however, it became clear that the old Protestant establishment was on
the outs, including the left Protestant establishment, to be replaced by a
cosmopolitan-Jewish elite which was far more Catholic and far more Jewish on
its face. Jewish wealth was built and secured by a combination of dishonest
means as discussed above and aggressive social networking, where most Jewish
ventures try to employ as many Jews at the helm and to serve important functions
of organizations they run. This is true of everything from AIPAC, ADL, and SPLC
to the Kushner family and various Rothschild and Warburg ventures. As I’ve
discussed prior, average Ashkenazi IQ is about 105 to 107, and the claims that
it is 1 SD above the European mean is riddled with problems including sampling
bias. Thus claims that they achieved status through high IQ alone ring hollow.
Even
before Jewish domination, meritocracy was questionable. Those who won in the
railroad business in the US between 1870 and 1910 were largely those who
acquired favors from various legislators, both national and regional or local.
In the arms business, state contracts were as important if not more important
than private sales, and the most successful and most viable arms companies
basically from 1880 to the present are those with the highest portion of sales
to states, whether for security and law enforcement agencies or militaries. It’s
important to note that the quality of a product or service was often about as
important as ties to state officials who could ensure fair hearing, and
sometimes the latter is far more important in determining who wins a bid for a
contract.
The
increasing regimentation of society since the 1880s and early 1900s has many
side effects. One is that many aspects of it are dreadful. It is great when
public services run on time, but having to accord one’s whole life with clocks
and schedules is grueling and soul-crushing. With all of the associated ethnic
and socio-cultural problems I’ve raised here, and will bring in later, it’s not
really true that we can expect timely and orderly products and services as a
matter of course. Another side effect is to reduce social mobility and help
build a sort of social stasis. Someone who falls catastrophically or
unexpectedly ill with net income under $200,000 per year or net worth of less
than $100,000 is usually devastated. Similarly, long periods of joblessness
cannot be sustained. Thus pressure on middle and lower class people is largely
further down, especially as they go deeper into life, as the probability of
“breaking through” or “making it” or “striking it rich” are very slim, where
the probability of costly bad luck is far higher. Those in the elite caste, and
the managerial class more broadly, are shielded from error and bad luck both
legally and financially, and thus live in a world where they have far more
freedom in fact than those beneath them because there are few consequences to
nominally criminal acts and few consequences for debt or insolvency. The
2007-08 TARP bailouts, the S&L crisis of the ‘80s, and various other
‘economic stimuli’ served in fact to deepen social inequality by transferring
wealth and assets from the socio-economic middle to the top.
The
modern FIRE economy and the merchant-managerial class which runs it subsists,
in effect, on a glut of rents from productive people. No different on that
front from elites from 800 to 1700 AD, they acquire resources first from taxes
and subsidy, as inflation is a tax in effect, and then most of their business
or “labor” is either directly collecting rents or managing productive people.
We should note that birth or worth in human capital terms have very little to
do with social status anymore, as status is determined mostly as a function of
income and net worth.
Harvard
is the most egregious example of a Jewish-dominated Ivy League school. The Ivy
League is technically a sports federation between private schools, but it marks
the most prestigious private schools in the US for some time. Basically all of
these schools from Harvard to Princeton to Yale have a very marked
overrepresentation of Jews. Even accounting for an average IQ of about 105 to
107, Jews should make perhaps 3-6% of most of these schools as they are about
1.5% of the US population. Official numbers are hard to come by, but they are
about 25-30% of Harvard’s student body, and a similar number of faculty and
administration, and in most of the other Ivy League schools Jews are between
10% and 30% of the student body. This is at the same time that white
(especially Protestant) students, whose forebears founded most of these schools
are dispossessed and essentially prevented from attending these places (only
one of the Ivy League schools was founded for Catholics, and none for Jews or
other non-Protestant religious groups). [8]
I
don’t think that Ivy League schools make for good education anymore. I don’t
think most universities generally make for good education. An Ivy League degree
does two things: it signals that you are likely part of the elite political
consensus and have been trained on how to be a good manager or functionary, and
it gives one access to high dollar social networks which one can leverage for
opportunity. What an Ivy League or other university education does not do,
anymore, is signal that one has a good educational foundation like liberal arts
degrees circa 1840 to 1900, where one would have been steeped in history, math,
literature, and the classics (i.e. Ancient Greek and Latin). It also doesn’t
mean that one is scientifically or technically competent.
To
some degree, one might consider themselves spared by the fact that they are
excluded from these ‘institutions of higher learning’ and the debt and pieties
to power that entails. Nevertheless, I must reiterate the aforementioned point;
Jews have co-opted these traditional elite institutions and bent them to their
purpose.
In
order for meritocracy to work, there would have to be mechanisms to determine
one’s competence. Experience is one thing, but it is clearly possible for
fairly inept and mediocre people to gain much experience. Yet demands on
experience, including for entry-level positions, has roundly gone up. The
average entry-level job demands between two and four years of experience now,
where thirty years ago you could walk up to a manager and get a similar
entry-level job with little to no real experience. Aptitude tests are another
metric, as is education. The problem with aptitude tests is that one cannot
[legally] discriminate for employment or school placement based on IQ, or on
race; the problem with education is that there has been a clear decline in the
quality of education per se and credential inflation. Thus a bachelor’s degree
today is worth less than an associate’s degree fifty years ago, and to get the
equivalent value of a bachelor’s degree fifty years ago, one must obtain either
a master’s or doctorate. This at the same time that university costs have far
exceeded inflation, so one is sinking two or four more years and likely
somewhere between five and twelve times as much money in real terms to obtain
the same value as that old time bachelor’s degree.
All
of this so far has not factored in the exact extent of white displacement. The
left’s punish-reward tactics come to the fore here: diversity programs,
affirmative action, and anti-discrimination laws all service the left’s clients
and punish founding stock of various Western countries. To some degree, once
you have built up effective universities, it becomes a zero sum game. One can
only expand university enrollment and university teaching by degrading quality
and increasing cost. Much of the modern economy is this way; rather than
“growing the pie” as naĂ¯ve libertarian economist hacks purport, the left
establishment takes past and present wealth and divvies it out to their
supporters and denies it to their political enemies in a series of zero sum
games. That they win more seats at universities and at middle to high wage jobs
does not mean that there are more opportunities for whites, but rather that
there are on net less – and less not in proportion to what they take, but
beyond what they take as systems degrade by their very presence. It’s also
important to note that these punish-reward tactics have no expiration date.
One
also has to factor in aforementioned dysgenics into so-called meritocracy. On a
whole range of traits from intelligence to health and attractiveness, the
average American and average Westerner more broadly is akin to a degenerate dog
scrambling amongst the ruins of their betters. We find that g has declined likely by the equivalent
of at least ~10 IQ points in native European populations at the same time as
the Flynn effect. The Flynn effect was a combination of nutritional and
educational improvements which have since been exhausted entirely, and the
Flynn effect is less noticeable in g-loaded
subtests. Health and attractiveness are obvious, and the basic contention here
is that people who would have died in past eras are kept alive and often
reproduce, and as I noted before, the less intelligent, less attractive, and
less healthy people are the most fertile in hypermodernity. This is potentially
also an indicator of increased mutational load as mentioned prior, as
deleterious mutations which would have washed out three hundred or more years
ago [sometimes] now linger. [9]
IQ
has a fairly good correlation (.3) with general success and income. It has very
little correlation (.1) with actual wealth and net worth because of mean
regression. Building a high net worth and massive wealth relies more on social
ties and luck than smarts and talent.
Thus
dysgenics, white founding stock displacement in economic and social terms, and
Jewish-cosmopolitan privilege all doom the myth of meritocracy. You cannot
merely obtain skills and have smarts and talents and somehow rise to the top,
especially in an economy where the managerial class and elites are hand-picked
rather than cultivated, and one needs prior social ties to rise to that level
which are impossible for most people to acquire. Most people have neither the
ability nor the potential if they wanted to, to gain favor and climb from the
lowest rung to the top.
America
has a bunch of founding myths. Some of them were myth basically from shortly
after the country’s founding, and some of them have been formed in the past
hundred years. What we see is the character of these myths have changed over
time, and the lies and distortions have grown in proportion to the fading of
the hour and memory, as well as the need to press ideology as unifying force in
lieu of ethnicity and religion.
Every
country or nation needs founding myths. Some are truer than others. Some are
useful fictions. Thus the ‘founding myth’ is our fourth great lie.
What
is said of early America is an odd mixture of fiction and truth. At one time,
the first settlers were seen as brave and hardy souls breaking a nearly
untouched land. Now we are told that they would have died but for Amerindians
in the Thanksgiving myth, and that early America was built on the corpses of
Indians and labor of black slaves and Chinamen. The land which was held in natural splendor was ruthlessly exploited later. The peaceful Native was
mercilessly slaughtered by heartless colonists. In reality, it turns out that
“indentured servitude” really tended to be more akin to white slavery, and this
form of servitude or white slavery was common practice in most of the original
13 colonies up until between 1760 and 1800. Some estimates are that between
1640 and 1740, as many as half to sixty percent of everyone in the colonies
wound up there as slaves of one fashion or another. The original telling was
also frankly truer as regards the settlers. [10]
The
reality of settlement is that it included a mix of corporate interests,
criminals and pilgrims, and white slaves. Black slaves were of little import
anywhere north of Virginia. By the time that English and other NW Europeans
arrived on the shores of the East Coast US, the Indian population was decimated
and would not rebound until the mid-1700s. [11]
Yet even in this relatively depopulated state, Europeans had fairly frequent
contact with Indians, and this contact was decidedly mixed. For the largest
part, it consisted of trading and keeping distance outside trade, but
communication breakdowns and raiding did occur, and this would usually lead to
punitive raids until one side was too bloodied to go on. The general pattern
was that Indian raids would often result in the slaughter of a small village,
or of a group of families who lived on a common plantation, and in response to
the murder, rape, and mutilation, the Europeans would retaliate by either
destroying their Indian neighbors outright, or killing so many that they could
not pose a threat.
Even
in the colonies and later states where chattel slavery was more common, black
slaves were only a substantial portion of the population in the Carolinas and
the Deep South; even Virginia was majority white from the colonial time through
to statehood, despite its large slave population toward the latter antebellum
period. Black slaves were largely farm labor on large plantations (largely cash crops like tobacco, indigo, cotton, and sugar) and domestic servants, where white
slaves and poor white workers did everything from forestry to trapping and
tending farms (largely foodstuffs) and livestock to militia and military duty. Blacks, for obvious
reason, were not routinely armed. They also did little in terms of trade and
craft work. The extent of miscegenation has also been overblown; American
blacks are about 1/5th white taken on the average as a population,
and this is considering the 20th Century black and not blacks of the
1700s and 1800s. It is worth noting too that most of the ‘accomplished blacks’
as inventors, activists, and so forth have tended to be half or one-fourth
black. Less admixed blacks are over-represented in crime, social dysfunction
(incest and crime/drug ‘culture’), and groups like the Nation of Islam
(ironically founded by a mulatto, and its most famous members are mostly
mulattos) and Congressional Black Caucus.
(Note:
I cannot find reliable numbers on the internet for Amer-Indian deaths in North
America from 1620 to 1880, nor of settlers in that same time period. Most of
the estimates of Indian deaths are preposterous in terms of the base population
estimates or include deaths from transmitted disease, and there were no
estimates available of white Europeans killed. It’s likely that the population
of North America was between 1 and 2 million in 1480-1490, and the population
of South & Central America and the Caribbean were between 6 and 10 million.)
The
Europeans had the benefit of a more robust tradition of warfare and a supply
chain that stretched to England and the northwest shores of mainland Europe.
Tragic though they were, losses could also always be shored up by settler
births or new arrivals from Europe. American Indians (or whatever name one
gives them) did not, with lower birthrates and no outside support base to tap
at the ready. The claim that American Indians were great stewards of the land was a false narrative from the mid-20th century, and one can merely look to their current holdings and to anywhere they were numerous to test that lie. One can even look to the fact that it is likely that the American Great Plain was greatly expanded by repeated intentional burning.
Amer-Indian
accounts of this history (1600-1780), or of later history (1785-1890) should be
disputed by any thinking person. Many of these tribes assimilated mythology
surrounding animals and crops they acquired in the Columbian exchange; we know
that American equids were extinct since at least 12,000 BC and that their
stories and mythology involving horses dates entirely from after about
1520-1650 AD depending on the tribe and location. Phylogenetic study of horses
have also yielded that they were initially domesticated in a single area, the
Pontic-Caspian Steppes, and [slowly] spread from there to the rest of the world
after about 4000-3500 BC. Most tribes were also illiterate until
Christianization and heavy Western influence, and even those who had literacy
such as in Mesoamerica yield fairly little in the way of contemporary documents
during Spanish and Portuguese conquest in the southern part of the American
continents. One should note that because of the relative population density of
Central/South America as compared with North America proper, the Spanish and
Portuguese advance through their part of the Americas was actually far slower.
By 1600, Iberian settlers and colonial administrators had firm grasp on coastal
ports and those immediate coastal plains but tenuous grasp of the vaster
hinterlands, and less welcoming terrain such as hills, mountains, and jungles.
By 1700, they had established nominal control over most of the land area of
Central/South America under the flags of Iberia, but this involved leaving many
Indios alone for the most part and with relatively little administrative
pressure.
Some
Americans also have an imaginary picture of the Revolutionary War, where it
involved American regulars and militiamen taking the British alone. The cause
was onerous taxes and legislation. In reality, the war occurred at a singular
moment of vulnerability in the British Empire. Onerous taxes had some
contributing factor, as did an increase in British administrative presence
following the Seven Years’ War (known as the French and Indian War in the
States), but an upstart domestic merchant elite and a fading common bond and
interest with England were also important factors. The American merchant elite
saw their opportunity and seized it. French assistance, largely in supply and breaking
British naval superiority proved pivotal. The Continental Congress was
ultimately forced to inflate the paper money to nearly worthlessness and incur
huge amounts of debt and liability to finance the war. The French supplied
materiel and credit. So bad was the Colonial scrip that most soldiers were
never fully paid during the war or its immediate aftermath, and the bonds which
soldiers were issued went unpaid for several years until Hamilton and several
of his banking cohorts connived to buy them from war veterans at a discount and
then make good on them at last.
Note
that this mythic view of the American Revolution is basically a post-WWII construct.
Before WWII and before the Cold War, a more accurate picture was better known.
Even now, among historians and well-informed amateurs, this more accurate
picture is still more-or-less the norm. But the popular history is that simple,
storybook narrative leading in a linear path from the Boston Massacre to Lexington
and Concord and then to the British capitulation after Yorktown. Amusingly, the
Boston Massacre is also distorted, as in reality several of those in the potentially
riotous crowd had weapons ranging from cudgels to muskets. Unfortunate as it
may be that the garrison fired upon them, one can easily see the logic and it
wasn’t simply coldhearted butchery. Indeed, the soldiers were acquitted at
trial, and they were defended by an American lawyer (John Adams) in front of an
American jury.
The
merchant elite is an important aspect of the American bedrock. Part of that is
also a deeply Masonic tradition. For anyone who questions the impact of Masonry
as perverse and of merchants as a class beyond their rightful scope, this
undermines that foundation. One cannot look at the American founding documents
or founding principles and take them wholly at face value or wholly from
interpretations handed to us. Indeed, from a reactionary view, any constitution
is fundamentally inadequate, but the American constitution and founding
tradition has particular flaws which allowed the rot of hypermodernity to
fasten quickly and deeply.
One
might counter that Masonic institutions were merely a means by which the
revolutionaries organized in private, and maintained group cohesion. This is
likely true. Yet the Masonic lodges continued strong after the Revolution and
after the founding. They only petered out in influence and scope substantially
after the 1960s and ‘70s, having essentially achieved most of the stated goals.
[12]
The
Civil War has also become part of the founding myth. Abraham Lincoln, it is
said, was fighting a righteous war to keep a nation together and to end slavery
and indignity. He was living up to the ‘Battle Hymn of the Republic.’ In
reality, Lincoln was more concerned with unity per se and with maintaining or expanding federal power than
anything else. Ending slavery was a means by which he sought to undermine the
logistical and economic system of the Confederacy. His tentative post-war plans
were to send the vast majority of American-born black [ex-] slaves to Liberia
to live thereafter.
Lincoln
and the new Republican Party represented the first major consolidation of
federal power over the separate American states, leading in a few generations
to a point where the ‘states’ became less a series of federated but independent
entities to governing provinces dependent on the federal state. The Republican
Party was a consolidation of the old Whigs, but with a broader coalition from
abolitionists to industrialists and plutocrats to urban upstarts of all types.
They followed the broader Whig tradition in the rest of the English-speaking
world, and espoused many of the same policies. The Democratic Party circa 1850
was the party of Southern planters and slaveholders, immigrants, and farmers
who were not ideological abolitionists. The election of 1860 was highly charged
and fraught with tension, and the election of Lincoln was one of the moves
which put the country on the path to civil war.
One
should note that abolitionism was pushed largely through certain organizations
and churches. I suspect that Masonic lodges were loci of abolitionists, as well
as the Episcopal and Methodist churches. There were also a mix of motivation
behind abolitionists. Some were nutty racial egalitarians similar to the sort
we see now, only with a heavy Christian evangelical fervor behind them. Most
were opposed to the ‘scab labor’ and the element of the Other which slavery
represented, and wanted negro slavery and the slaves themselves gone from the
land to raise wages of farmworkers and to remove that racial problem. There was
also the fact that slavery represented a massive concentration of wealth in the
South, where Southern plutocrats were virtually all slaveholders, many of them
massive slaveholders with enormous plantations, and a disproportion of those
were Jews. Judah Benjamin was a Jew installed in the cabinet of the CSA and
represented Jewish interests; during that time, most Jews in America lived in
the states of the CSA.
In
proper fashion, the next of the founding myths is the progressive era and the
Great War.
The
Progressive Era is supposedly a time where the excesses of the ‘Gilded Age’ were
confronted, and various plutocratic interests were overcome by the power of the
people. The people received assurances and benefits. The system sees itself in
the following light: We’re not socialist, nor a social-democracy – we’re just
realists who see that there’s no other way to do things. The Progressive Era
from 1895 to 1939 saw the establishment of national parks, the Social Security
system, and greater public works efforts to alleviate poverty in the midst of
the Great Depression. In all, it was a time of flux and occasional hardship,
but the end results were worth it.
The
reality is that the modern US is a social-democracy, as well as plutocratic and
deeply corrupt. The roots of this plutocracy, corruption, and social-democracy
all stem to around the Progressive Era. Corruption was rife
following reconstruction but really flowered during Prohibition, which also
coincided with a marked rise in Jewish and Catholic power. Bismarck pioneered staatssozialismus in an effort to erode the support for communists
and socialists. This gambit worked fairly well. From the late 1880s until the
turmoil of the erosion of the Deutsches
Kaiserreich in the wake of the Great War amidst the creation of the Weimar
government, socialists were effectively controlled by aligning their interests
with national interests. Most other Western governments followed suit in the
next twenty odd years. In Britain the Liberal party coalition broke, and the
socialists formed the Labour Party under the banner of Fabian socialism.
The
US followed a similar path. The Republican Party formed the spearhead of the
Progressive coalition, but by 1920 both the Republican and Democratic parties
had been brought into aligning substantially with plutocratic interests.
Plutocratic interests explicitly included Progressive causes. There were still
naysayers, dissidents, and wayward elements in both parties. These would be
brought into line over the course of the next twenty to thirty years. By 1950,
both parties were expressions of
plutocratic power and interest, and represented a bipartisan consensus.
Theodore
Roosevelt had affinities for early English and [English-] American
conservationists like Madison Grant. Roosevelt was a big hunter and
adventurist, but clearly saw preservation of nature as an important expression
of European progress. Thus was the conservation movement and the Federal Park
system born in that era. Yet he was also a Morgan man and worked at least
partly on behalf of plutocrats. Thus the pretense of ‘trust busting’ was to
reduce the influence of these plutocrats under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
whereas in reality it gave them license and means to expand their operations.
All of the anti-trust efforts of the 20th century were deliberately
compromised, as we can see that firm size exploded from between 1900 and 1990.
To
be fair to the plutocrats of that era, including from Reconstruction (1867-1876)
to the end of the Progressive Era (1939), they were far more publicly oriented
and expressed a far healthier attitude including a noblesse oblige than those of the present day. Part of this can be
attributed to social attitudes. One was expected to do things with money other
than aggressively pursue self-interest. The modern plutocrat may contribute
vast sums to “charity”, but it’s worth noting that most of the latter-day
charities are combinations of slush funds, political interests, and social or
virtue signaling bubbles which achieve little effect by way of their nominal
mission statements but nonetheless gain substantial wealth and employ high
dollar individuals. I think there is also an element of degeneration – that the
grandsons or great-grandsons are not worth the same stuff as their forefathers
– and the fact that so much of the cosmo-Semitic elite is Other, which is to
say in this case, Jewish.
How
do I mean? Foundations started by industrialists, robber barons, and oligarchs
from that time (or whatever one’s pet name for them is) donated funds to found
museums, churches, botanical gardens, and genuine anti-poverty efforts
including infrastructure improvements. You see essentially none of this in the
past two, or perhaps three, generations of oligarchs and plutocrats. The mere
act of conservation of extant power, or extending it if they can, combined with
the carnal pleasures takes all of their concerns day and night. They have made
Holocaust museums and contributed to Jewish and politically left charities –
indeed leftist activists turned out the Ford and Carnegie foundations after the
deaths of those men, converting them into de
facto leftist causes – but most startling is the lack of contribution to
genuine culture, preservation of history, or improvement of infrastructure or
other things that improve the lot of the everyman.
Wilson
was also a notable progressive. Theodore Roosevelt barked from the sidelines,
baying for war from its outset in 1914; it was resisted initially likely not
due to deep objections, but rather because the war was unpopular and some
maneuvering was necessary to gain entry. A true jingo, Roosevelt and other jingos
of that era never saw a war they didn’t like, and unlike modern ‘chicken hawks’
of the disproportionately Jewish neo-con variety, Teddy put his money where his
mouth was and fought on the frontlines during the Spanish-American War. His
son, Theodore Jr., would also fight in both World Wars and was noted as being a
brave officer, and he made the rank of general before his death.
Moreover,
one thing we should note about jingoes of the classical variety: they advocated
plentiful war, but at least some of them had
the potential of being in national interest insofar as empire-building, opening
markets, and gaining resources. The recent crop of jingoes do not care about
American welfare, or American wealth, or American national interests; they are
wholly disposed toward their personal or cliquish interests, namely Jewish
affairs, and toward the national interests of Israel. (If I’m being too subtle:
the old time oligarchs were better stuff than the present ones, full-stop, even
with their problems and failures. The Roosevelts were one such oligarchic
family.)
The
narrative on the First World War is that America stood on the sidelines,
praying for peace but that Germany was eager to take on the world. America was
dragged in against her wishes by events spurred chiefly by Germans and was forced to join the eventual winners in
1917. Like the other founding myths, this is total hogwash. Wilson was clearly
won over to the cause of war by mid-1915 at latest and the subsequent years
were spent trying to find a casus belli and
not on agonizing about how to steer away from war. Wilson allowed munitions and
other war supplies to flow across the Atlantic under various flags, sometimes
American flags and often British. The important thing is that American supplies
and credit were going almost exclusively to the Entente powers and not to the
Central Axis powers.
By
1916, Germany was finding the war increasingly costly and desperate. The
Eastern front was an almost sure victory, but the Western front was a quagmire.
Verdun consumed hundreds of thousands of lives for little strategic advantage
on either side. This was to some degree intentional, as from the beginning it
was conceived as a battle to strike at a symbol of French prestige and force
them to commit to a battle of attrition. The problem was that the battle went
too long and some German officers (including a prince) lost sight of the
initial strategy. Other battles that year proved no more decisive, the front
moving less than 15 km in the span of a year-and-change. By the midway point of
Battle of the Somme, it was clear that it too was doomed to be an indecisive
battle which only contributed to the charnel house. New tactics were showcased
on the Somme, with Canadian and German units pioneering storm trooper and infiltration
tactics; chemical weapons were deployed plentifully, but this wasn’t
particularly new; and tanks were deployed for the first time there by the
British and shortly thereafter by the French as well.
As
I mentioned in an article on military strategy, the problem with Germany is
that time wasn’t entirely on their side. If every battle ended up in a bloody
game of attrition and losses were at or near parity nearly every time, they
could not keep up as long as the Entente powers could. They had conceived several
gambles to address that shortcoming. The Schlieffen plan was the first, but it
was outdated by 1910 and should have been abandoned; unrestricted submarine
warfare was the second, but between the inability of Germany to field
sufficient numbers of subs and the deployment of merchant marine convoys, the
impact of unrestricted submarine warfare was diminishing quickly as 1917 wore
on to the point that it had almost no impact by the latter half of the year;
and the Spring 1918 Offensive was the last gamble. It had major operational
successes, but the Germans ran into two failures; namely, their depleted
manpower and materiel reserves, and a wholesale collapse on the
Austro-Hungarian front.
Viewed
in this light, things are more complex. The problem is that to a large degree,
perceptions in the English-speaking world are still horribly tainted by
war-time propaganda from the World Wars. Even after the Lusitania was sunk in
1915, it took a further year and a half for war propaganda and political
leverage to combine in an effective declaration of war. At the point when war
was declared in April 1917, the war was still deeply unpopular in most of the
country outside of portions of the English descended upper class and the new
Jewish bourgeois. Jews and their propaganda arms were vital to moving public
opinion in both wars, but still the general public had to be dragged into both world wars kicking and screaming.
We
see that modern political ideologies are essentially post-Christian. By this I
mean that they at their root developed largely from various Christian strains.
One might call this a perversion of Christianity and the proper or true
principles – but nonetheless the one is the outgrowth of the other. I am not
calling into question Christianity as a whole here, which I’ve done previously.
I am casting doubt on the modern adaptations thereof; that is the modern progressive forms of Christianity and
the modern secular religions which stemmed from the liberal tradition.
Original
sin is a doctrine which started as far as I can tell with Christianity. In
Judaism, the notion of the chosen people takes
precedence over any general fable of a fall. Judaism is at heart a belief
structure in service of the collective ‘I’ or collective ‘self’ of those
people, and not toward any universal notions. Christianity in many of its forms
and denominations states that the fall of man out of the primordial golden age
affected everyone; in the Catholic
tradition, no one receives grace but
by penance, belief and works. In the Protestant traditions, works are less
important or trivial, and grace is given by
God alone to his flock.
Modern
original sin is different. It has to do with historical grievances, and a
measure of whose ancestors did worse – allegedly. I put that modifier there
because, frankly, the Other is both lacking in self-reflection and unwilling to
self-flagellate. Thus the Christian and descendants of European and formerly
Christian lands and peoples are the only ones afflicted with modern original
sin. Every category of the other, be it Jew, Northeast Asian, Arab-North
African, Sub-Saharan African, or Central Asian or what – is unmoved by claims
of original sin, religious or secular. The Turk told that their ancestors
committed horrible acts yields only silence or laughter, but not ground and
certainly not self or national interest.
Original
sin – old and new – is the next big lie.
I’m
not the first to see this. It’s obvious really. Every form of hyper-liberalism,
be it anarcho-capitalism, communism, or modern prog social democracy is
informed both by the original liberalism and the general Christian and
post-Christian worldview, even if the founders of that ideology are largely
Jewish (as is the case, in fact, with many forms of hyper-liberalism). The
reach of Christianity is everywhere in anything remotely Western. Even secular
humanists or other atheists still kneel to various dogmas, some of them clearly
influenced by Christian modes of thought.
The
problem with old conceptions of original sin is that one is made to feel
perpetually guilty for acts which likely
did not occur in the first instance, and secondly even if they did one had no influence over their happening.
Original sin is a way for rotten churches like the Catholic Church to keep
asses in seats via a cheap theological trick. The only way to achieve grace is belief, penance, and constant
reinforcement through works and rites dispensed by our Holy Father Church. As
bad as that is, it at least has the benign side effect of keeping people more
religious and more righteous even if by fear or bad argument.
To
be fair, the allegory of the fall reminds one of the nature of man and the
limits of dreams and utopianism. Even if it be fictive, it at least reminds one
of truths.
New
original sin is worse. One has to shop around for social approval or moral
affirmation from the Other – that is, one is always dependent on non-whites for
benediction from this new original sin. One is guilty by blood and no amount of
belief can alleviate it – only the willful act of self-dispossession and
ultimately suicide can atone. One must allow one’s natural rivals, enemies, and
outsiders to gorge upon riches and the flesh in penance. To be frank, there is
no up-shot to new original sin. Some make temporary wealth, but without weal;
most however find that there is no reward but that the Globohomo gaze is cast
elsewhere for a moment. They too will ultimately find only ruin and loss, but
those things come atop their utter humiliation.
Indeed,
one could characterize the rituals that surround ‘new original sin’ as a series
of humiliation rituals. One is expected to be feal toward the most loathsome
creatures, toward homosexuals, transsexuals, feminist harpies, spinsters,
pedophiles, Jews, mestizos, and blacks. One is expected to debase in their
presence, and to offer one’s things and
one’s children. Note that thing here
is used in the sense of material possessions and governing bodies. One is
supposed to forget about notions of such silly things as prosperity,
ethno-cultural interests, or a future for one’s family or extended kin group.
This
‘new original sin’ is both pure lies but also a weapon against Europeans, and
there is nothing redeeming about the ideas represented therein. The same goes
for other post-Christian ideas like a universal brotherhood of man, or total
equality, or personal and subjective truth and morality, or atomistic
individualism. The truest things in that list are the notion of a subjective
truth, which while partly correct it’s also notable that there is a referent; and for atomistic individualism, the problem
is the degree to which it is taken or its ideological pretense and not the notion of the self per se. Scientism as a whole, that is the formerly
discussed partly religious nature of modern science, has contributed to this
breakdown of community and ways of life. Science holds the principles of
materialism, methodological individualism, secularism, quantification, and
probability and fractional or provisional truth as all foundational to the
method of science; scientism holds several or all of these principals up to be
the basis of ideology.
The
purpose of science is to construct increasingly accurate models of the world without invoking gods or supernatural
elements to see how far one can explain things. There is nothing wrong with
a general worldview engrossed in probability or certain foundational
assumptions. Yet science cannot disprove God (yet – or possibly ever). It also
doesn’t naturally form an ideology or tell us what we should do. The further
problem created by all of the above is a paradox of atomistic individuals
making better consumer and marketing groups and forming an easier group to
rule, and as a consequence society composed of these units becomes stiflingly
monotonous, tedious, conformist, and obnoxious.
What
could be the sixth great lie? This shall be a short one, as I’ve explained in
part in the past how it is fraudulent. I’ve gone into real and nominal power,
and I’ve gone into the Post-War International Order. I’ve gone into various
other lies and deceptions perpetrated for the cause of social control.
The
concept of the “open society” claims that one is allowed free inquiry, and that
the Truth is the foremost object of our intellectual efforts in society. The
reality of course is that this is all exactly wrong, and that with the
ascension of cosmopolitan-Semitic rule in the course of the 20th
Century, one sees that rule is conducted via deception, delusion, fraud, and
force on the margins. All efforts are made to keep opponents of the
cosmopolitan-Semitic elite fooled, embroiled in illusion and delusion, weak and
divided, and to bring force whether legal or extra-legal against those who make
efforts despite all means employed against them.
The
lie here is that ‘society’ wants open
inquiry, or that the rulers want actual
churn. They want none of this. What they want is to set the tone of discussion,
to tell everyone how to speak and behave, and which questions to ask; what they
want is various types of churn amongst the middle and lower elements to keep
them from challenging power on high.
Society
wants nothing, but ‘society’ does –
the difference is Society is the broad unsorted mass of everyone seeking to
cooperate to varying degrees in the organism of civilization. ‘Society’ in
scare quotes is a collection of push-pull factors from controlled court
intellectuals, controlled opposition political parties, false consensus, and
various means of exerting pressure horizontally or vertically on dissident or
challenging elements. One tries first to get the nominal peers to get the
problem in line, and if this doesn’t work then one brings force from on high.
One
of the things I haven’t really talked about before is practices of
disinformation. This includes controlling media and entertainment and seeding
narratives one wants to bear fruit in that way. Only approved narratives and
stories tend to gain traction. Another practice is the ‘limited hangout.’ This
often involves planting misleading bits in stories whose secret elements have
been compromised, and in any case it always means exposing as little as
possible to light and keeping vital or important details out of the public eye.
Examples of limited hangouts include the Church Hearings on the MK ULTRA
program, the Pentagon Papers which ‘exposed’ the PHOENIX program, most journo
and news media coverage of Jeffrey Epstein and the Franklin Cover-up or similar
cases, and pretty much all of Seymour Hirsch’s ‘exposĂ©’ work. The last practice
is chaff (misdirection). It works on the same principle as anti-RADAR chaff,
and it involves throwing multiple contradictory narratives with very little
actual information in them for the purposes of generation confusion. Conspiracy
and anti-war communities are rife with this sort of thing, as elites see an
interest in signal boosting delusional and schizophrenic elements at the same
time as they implant their own misleading bits.
If
anyone believes that Gary Caradori or Michael Hastings died in the way
specified on the death certificate, or that Seth Rich was killed in a robbery –
you are hopelessly naĂ¯ve and probably a helpless idiot. The establishment can
kill a man blatantly, and then go through a few steps to cover up their death
with fraudulent medical examiner reports or other falsified evidence, and
present that to bleed away suspicion around that person’s untimely demise. Even
if those who know better still know
better, the vast masses of credulous dolts will believe most of what
they’re told. The CIA isn’t supposed to
operate within the US, but they do and have since their inception. They use
combinations of official and non-official cover, where official cover means
assuming the role of a ‘CIA analyst’ or embassy staff when one is in fact an
operative of some sort, and non-official cover (NOC) means that the agent is
given corporate/NGO or university credentials or a wholly different flag
(posing for instance as MI-6 instead of CIA). They also do joint operations with
other intelligence-surveillance agencies. Most of the CIA by volume are
analysts whose job it is to process open source intel or whatever their
department happens to be. Actual operatives or agents are a diminutive but
important part of the organization. Whenever direct action must be taken, or
HUMINT assets leveraged, operatives and agents are necessary.
One
can’t overstate the extent to which the mass of idiots and fools which make up
civilization are eager to appease power, whether unknowingly or with full
knowledge. In game theoretical terms, it’s generally in the individual interest
of members to do so – doing so confers temporary benefits in the form of
socio-economic ascension and keeps one insulated from loss of wealth, status,
or privilege. After all, it is largely elites who distribute these things.
However the Nash equilibrium for a selfish strategy leads to overall group
dysfunction, and allows the elites to do
as thou wilt – but with very little consequence for antisocial behavior.
Many people who are allowed to do whatever they want, more or less, but to have
no ill effects for violating group norms can be expected to abuse this position
to its maximum. This is exactly what present elites do. The result is a society
which is rife with rot and the sort of corruption that might be more pernicious
and soul crushing than normal banana republic or African dictatorship types of
corruption.
Suffice
it to say, politics is a way of avoiding war. It is negotiation over power and
resources in society, about how civilization should be steered. When you
isolate substantial numbers of people and deny them the ability to press or
appeal their interests, and you deny any compromise or conciliation and demand
that some continuously yield until they have essentially yielded themselves out
of power, wealth, and being altogether; when you do all of these things you
have subverted the raison d’Ăªtre of
the civilizational organism and make
war inevitable. I see elections as
extensions of opinion polls and ultimately another means of social control by
wasting energy and managing dissent.
One
might characterize the rampant abuse of our kultur
and civilization both as chutzpah
by the Other. They assume that the host is so cowed and meek that it will let
the parasite fatten itself until the host is dead.
Our
seventh great lie wraps around to something I’ve discussed prior. It is one of
the core lies of various streams of hyper-liberalism, and of hypermodernity as
a whole. It is, of course, the French revolution formula – ‘libertĂ©, Ă©galitĂ©, fraternitĂ©.’
Liberty
is the first great lie. A robust conception of freedom is concerned with giving
freedom to those who can wield it, and this means the freedom to be able to
form brotherhood, work, to develop human potential, and in climbing social and
power pyramids. In short, it is the freedom of the yeomanry which counts first.
A perverse conception is concerned primarily about maximizing utils or hedonic pursuits; as I’ve said
prior, it is more about license and upending social mores and stigmas against
wanton hedonism or self-destructive behavior. It is ultimately about giving
certain individuals the means to seek maximal pleasure free from perceptions of
judgment or material impositions.
There
are two ways one can pithily describe the latter case. They are either libertines or slaves to passion. The utilitarian concern is somewhat dissimilar,
but ultimately comes from the same school of thought. Utilitarianism is usually
one of two things: either an ideology in service to hedonism and the libertine
mode of life, or it is in service of oligarchs and plutocrats wearing the
disguise of “society.” Ultimately, utilitarianism can be an apology for both at the same time because it is generally
framed as ‘maximizing happiness’ on the ‘behalf of society.’ Ultimately who
determines what goes on in ‘society’ is disproportionately oligarchs and
plutocrats. My contention is that the radical centralization of society through
the course of the 20th Century has led to an even greater distortion
of social functions and of culture, to the extent that for the most part elite and managerial class influence is all
there is except on the margins.
As
with the sixth great lie, one is given the illusion
of freedom without freedom in fact. This is the case as with the illusion of the open society. The
illusion of freedom means that one is free to spend one’s life on trivialities,
on being a wastrel, and on parasitic social causes – but one is not free to
build social networks independent of the establishment, and one is not free to
challenge the ruling elite. Perchance one does manage despite the odds to build
wealth against the grain, one generally receives a buyout offer or demand that
one be coopted into the system outright, and refusal to allow the buyout or
coopting take place will result in financial ruin. One is not even truly ‘free’
to be a wastrel; there are all sorts of nominal prohibitions against drug use,
prostitution, and other vice-related activities in most of the West such that
one’s vulnerabilities can be tactically
exploited and leveraged by power.
Real crimes can be exaggerated and false charges can be invented for the
purpose of leverage (the go to leverage for fictitious crimes employed by
elites, ironically enough, is child pornography and drug possession). Virtually
everyone is a criminal to one degree or another merely in the course of life, and the habitual crimes of some are
worse than others. To actually make it to a position of real or nominal power,
one is generally required to hand blackmail material over to higher powers in
order to ensure that one will cooperate fully.
Equality
is the second element of the formula. This is something that the new dissident
right hammers repeatedly. The races, sub-species, population groups, ethnic
groups, or gene clusters of man – these being all equivalent terms – have
wildly differing sets of Gaussian curves for all sorts of abilities and factors
which are distributed in that way. In terms of muscularity and physical
strength, speed and flexibility, height and stature, fat deposition, sexual
dimorphism, attractiveness, and cognitive-behavioral traits like IQ and empathy
the races all vary in where they
normalize and the breadth of a standard deviation.
In
terms of IQ, men have more variance than women as well as a slightly higher
baseline and certain populations show the same trend as well; and the average
IQs of populations are normalized at about 60 for Australian Aborigines, 75 for
Sub-Saharans and low caste Indians (including Dravidians), 85 for mid caste
Indians and Southeast and West Asians (including Mideast/North Africa) as well
as Amer-Indians, 90 for Central Asians and Mestizos and Inuit, 100 for
Europeans, 104 for Northeast Asians and 106 for Ashkenazi Jews. Brahmin Indians
cluster around an average of 110. When one looks at national data for most of
these groups, these trends hold give or take a few points from the broader
average. IQ correlates with innovation, wealth (by means of income), health,
and artistic and cultural achievement. One can ask whether environmental
factors depress IQ in some of these cases, and in some they might; nonetheless,
across the board IQ has a heritability by adulthood of about .5, and if environmental
noise is not that substantial the heritability climbs to between .65 and .7. [13]
In
terms of sexual dimorphism, you see that Northeast Asians and Europeans are
most sexually dimorphic. With Amer-Indians and Sub-Saharan Africans, there is
less sexual differentiation as compared with the above groups in women. With
Jews and some other West Asians and Southeast Asians, there is less
differentiation in men. The result is that in the first comparison, those
groups appear masculinized as
compared with NE Asians and Europeans, and this is because their women are less
feminine. In the second comparison, those groups appear feminized as compared with NE Asians and Europeans, and this is
because the men are less masculine. Sexual dimorphism is one factor in
attractiveness, so these distributions also overlap with how the races are
normally distributed based on aesthetic and sexual appeal. Europeans score most
attractive (normalizing, say, at 6/10) with NE Asians slightly behind (at
5/10), Southeast Asians slightly below that (4.5/10), and Central and West
Asians which includes Jews are somewhat below NE Asians (4/10), and
Amer-Indians slightly below that (3.5/10), with Sub-Saharans falling between
(3/10 and 2.5/10) depending on region, and Australian Aborigines and
Australasians and related peoples being the lowest (1.5/10). The average
difference between any one population and the next lowest isn’t that big, but
it produces a huge impact on the margins, especially on for instance how many
Europeans are bottom-rung ugly versus Sub-Saharans or Australasians (fully most
Sub-Saharans and Australasians are ugly, and only the exceptional look somewhat
attractive). Conversely, the number of highly attractive individuals is
affected by this marginal or outlier distribution. [13.5]
One
can plot curves for innovation and cultural achievements as well. [14] If one does this, one finds that
European achievement objectively lies
furthest ahead by leagues, and the only group that is remotely close are
Northeast Asians and still they lag far behind. All other groups fail to even
register as achieving much of anything in comparison, in absolute terms or in a
per capita basis. As well, one finds differences between these groups in
physical attributes. The tallest people in the world (on an average basis) are
Europeans, and the shortest are pygmies followed by Southeast Asians and
Indios/Amer-Indians. The physically strongest people in the world are
Europeans, followed by Australasians and some Sub-Saharan groups (largely West African).
The best sprinters are West Africans, followed by Europeans and East Asians.
The best distance runners are East Africans, followed by Europeans and NE
Asians. American blacks, both in the US proper as well as in South America and
the Caribbean, also do well at running sports. [14.5]
This
establishes that equality does not exist on basically any metric between populations. What about within them? The only
thing we could have, therefore, is some prescriptive equality. Equality before
the law is impossible but at least laudable; while there are always going to be
legal benefits to power and wealth, holding this principle to some degree at least makes society less horrid. What we see in
fact is that there is no equality before the law in the hypermodern state, and
that this principle has been abused and thrown aside as bad or worse than
others. Material equality is another potential prescription. While I have a
problem with the degree of inequality manifest today, one will never find a
real condition of material equality outside of the communist pipe dream. Even
eusocial insects have unequal distributions of resources. Real communist and
socialist societies have borne out inequality as well. It’s also important that
I was speaking this entire time above about comparing group averages and distributions which inherently means that these
factors, traits, and abilities are unequally spread across individuals in those
populations.
An
even worse outgrowth of utilitarianism is social justice. This was pioneered by
men like John Rawls. Social justice seeks to use the basic frame of utilitarianism
with an egalitarian and fundamentally anti-Western or anti-white frame. It thus
forms one part of the equality lie. One seeks to redress present and past
grievances through schemes of wealth transfer and adjustment of perceived
social status. Thus the founding stock [white] men of the West who would
normally form the top of the social hierarchy are instead pushed somewhere
lower, quite artificially, as there is a checkered attempt to redistribute
wealth and status. Of course, the oligarchs and plutocrats get to siphon off
some of the wealth that goes through these redistributions, and they do not
suffer any loss of status. Many things have to be adjusted on the basis of
‘disparate impact’, especially when it is disparate to various ethnic and racial
groups, and this includes punishment for crime, wages, and government benefits.
The so-called minority must be given leniency in criminal punishments, higher
wages, and greater share of government benefits; indeed this invading ethnic
must be allowed all of these things even if it comes to be a fiscal net drain.
Basically
every assumption at root of social justice, like much of the utilitarian
outgrowths, are fundamentally wrongheaded egalitarianism. It is assumed that
man’s nature can be radically transformed, and that extant differences are
largely a result of these historical circumstance. These historical
circumstances lead to diverging socio-cultural environments, but ultimately the
root biological potential of the two manifestly
unequal humans remains the same. I labored above to show how this is false.
Moreover, this is false not just between populations
but within populations as well.
Regardless of the ‘amount of variance’ which differs in any given trait, the
fact is that two individuals within a population are highly unlikely to be
equal on most traits. This likelihood drops even further if you’re comparing
two individuals from different populations. Genetic similarity also drops, such that if one is using even 100 SNP loci to compare two individuals from different [self-described] races, the likelihood that they are more similar than two individuals of the same race is less than one half of one percent. [Note: a formulation of this
argument about ‘variation within/between’ is known as Lewontin’s fallacy by the
HBD community.]
There
are a handful of points wherein the social justice advocates are not wrong. The
first is that, as mentioned above and in other writings, the hypermodern
economy is not good for most workers. Hypermodernity is rife with all sorts of
dysfunction which is papered over by food surpluses and entertainment. The
second is that mass migration from the so-called developing to the developed
countries of the world results in a massive drain of the talent in these
countries in terms of athletes and intellect. A third is that mass media which
comes largely out of a few countries (US, Western Europe, Japan, Korea, and
China) is detrimental to the norms and contentedness of populations in
developing countries. All of these challenge the current global Post-War
International Order, something which was an explicit political aim of the
social justice crowd, and therefore when they mention these problems they
generally do so to attack white, Western people and society rather than the
political order or the attempt to turn the whole world into export and credit
markets.
The
biggest empirical problem with radical egalitarianism is that every good twin
study, longitudinal study, and meta-analysis to date shows the opposite of the
egalitarian lie. IQ, height, and other physical and cognitive-behavioral traits
are all highly heritable. It is not the case that one can easily change human
nature, and attempts at heavy social engineering, such as exists in the
hypermodern world, usually result in wasted resources and paradoxically bad
outcomes. Spending disproportionate resources on non-white school children, or
pursuing intensive early childhood programs such as expensive pre-school, and
most attempts to shore up the non-white achievement gap generally all fail to
yield expected results. Benefits are always short-term and pale in comparison
to resources wasted; by ages 9-11 any short-term benefits are gone, and by ages
14-16 the child is more reflective of their genetic potential and the unshared
environment than they are of SES markers and the shared environment or of
social engineering experiments such as these.
Another
issue is the assumption that more equal
representation results in better outcomes in sex, or in race, or in
socioeconomic terms, or whatever the terms set for ‘equality’ are in a given
context. In some part, this is a beatification of women or of the Other. To the
extent that a given social space has problems, introducing more women, or more
xenos can fix extant problems (rather than adding more problems). Some shills
assert that economic inequalities, criminal abuses, and state misconduct
(things like sex and pedophile rings, human trafficking networks, etc.) could
all be fixed by adding more women and non-white representation in nominal and
real power, and at high levels in corporations. The numbers of female chairs
and CEOs in corporations has increased dramatically in the past 70 years, yet
corporate corruption is at an all-time high. The same is true of nominal and
real power positions, and of intelligence-surveillance agencies in particular.
Women who often have tenuous holds in power are often some of the biggest
lickspittles and lackeys, and they are willing to aggressively and eagerly
service those above them. In many instances, women are more apt to abuse power
and to abuse the people around them. Some women participate in these pedophilia
and sex trafficking rings, as well as other criminal and immoral activity, and
many more women are willfully blind to those activities. [15]
Brotherhood
is the last lie in this formula. Given the prevalence of international and
inter-ethnic violence throughout history, but even in the so-called “long
peace” of the past 80 years, we see this cast into doubt from the start. Given
data which suggests that ethno-cultural and religious diversity in an area
reduces civic engagement, social trust, and general well-being, the claim of a
‘universal brotherhood of man’ is even more dubious. The fact that black and
Hispanic (mestizo and Indio) population in the US, and Sub-Saharan and
Mideast-North African population in Europe, all correlate strongly with violent
crime and very high social dysfunction is more worrisome still. One must crown
those doubts with the ongoing loot-and-pillage operation which seeks to strip
European-descended folk of their wealth, power, and future, which is being
committed on behalf of the cosmopolitan-Semitic elite and non-Western ethnics.
This Jewish-led coalition hell bent on reducing our homes to ash casts the
final and lethal doubt on the ‘brotherhood of man.’
No
one is interested in this brotherhood of delusion except for ideologues and
idiots. The idiots are used because the delusional poison allows them to be
abused in a myriad ways without
questioning the abuse or its perpetrators. These ideologies inoculate those
who craft them against backlash and against upstarts. Anything counter to
Jewish interest is anti-Semitic – frankly doing something a Jew doesn’t like is anti-Semitic – and there is no like term to
describe something counter to white, European interests. Anything counter to
white, European interests is something between kosher and fair game, and is
encouraged and celebrated.
There
is the line in the Schiller poem and consequently in the movement Ode to Joy, ‘Alle Menschen werden brĂ¼der…’ Much as I like Schiller and
Beethoven, I don’t take these words as gospel and I certainly don’t take them
literally. ‘Humanity’ is a taxonomic category. Race or sub-species is the
outermost kinship group which means anything
and it means very little to most people, only taking center stage when one
is outnumbered and surrounded by xenos. The closer kinship groups get to the
man, the more intimate one’s contact with them and the more they mean as a
matter of course. This being the case, any dreams of uniting humanity as it
exists with its ten major population groups and various smaller sub-groups and
further divisions is a foul joke (one can divide humanity in as few as 8 major
population groups credibly or as many as 13 depending). In its current state,
humanity doesn’t have the genetic affinity or phenotypic ability to coordinate
and cohere in a formal empire that stretches the whole world. The Post-War
International Order is the closest thing, and it is an informal soft power
empire which is showing the first major cracks and fissures which may lead to
its undoing.
How
many people have been thrown on the pyre of this deceit? How many have died or
had their lives wrecked by non-white violence in the West? How many have sought
to disprove so-called ‘bigotries’ and ‘stereotypes’ only to fall to depredation?
I’m thinking in this latter case of tourists who go places they shouldn’t and
rationalize away that instinctive sense of danger and thus put themselves in
jeopardy, and I’m thinking of people who biked or hitchhiked through
treacherous lands only to find themselves defiled and dead before their journey
ended. I’m thinking of naĂ¯ve activists who’ve been raped or murdered by the
subjects of their pet causes in foreign and hostile lands, and whose parents
and social circles cast their name and memory to the wind and allow similar things to keep happening in order to perpetuate lies.
That is the nasty face of ideological zeal and the useful idiot – someone who would throw away their children or the
children of their neighbors for the sake of social and virtue signaling.
The
French Revolution was mostly a net negative in the final analysis. While there
are aspects that I can appreciate, from the liquidation of corrupt elites to the
rise of a figure like Napoleon Bonaparte and their repeated military success
from the early revolutionary phase through to the Battle of Waterloo, I have to
recognize that things like the UN and modern conceptions of ‘human rights’ are
essentially continuations of the French revolution. These things have a
decidedly non-European, non-white tinge, and a heavily Jewish head – but
nonetheless they take clear and direct inspiration from the events and thought
currents of that time. Two hundred and some years later, we are still battling
liars who believe in this formula – or want others to believe in it for social
control – and yet we seem to be further behind in finding truth than they were
then.
A
serious society would address some or most of the things above. They would at
least attempt to answer questions relating to the so-called ‘fiscal cliff’ –
that is, looming unfunded liabilities, debt crises, and economic malaise which
combine to create a situation where pension schemes and state provided
healthcare are not going to be financially viable in most Western countries
within fifteen years. Part of this lies at the feet of demography, both the
issue of importing shoddy xenos to replace natives, and the inverted pyramid
described earlier. Pension schemes, like other constructions of mass
consumption capitalist economies, presume endless growth in order to be
sustained. A pension scheme where there are more recipients than payers is
doomed from the outset. Large portions of Western welfare states will have to
be abandoned within a generation or two hence; what remains will have to be
scaled down. You can’t afford to import the aforementioned shoddy xenos and pay
them just to breathe and breed forever.
This
fictional ‘serious society’ would also try to address other things. The
resource limitation issue is another thing which seems to evade notice. Part of
the problem with tackling resources while trying to maintain living standards
close to what we have now, is the fact that as described before we are locked
into path dependencies which are not good going forward in terms of energy
efficiency and maximizing use of scarce strategic resources. Another issue tied
to that is the highly unequal asymptotic distribution of wealth and resources
in the hypermodern world and the issues of a society which now fails to find
places for the young and instead foists on them masses of debt and a lifetime
of mediocrity. There is supposed to be a mutual obligation between generations.
The younger are supposed to learn, work, have families, and care for elders who
become infirm (obviously, not all necessarily at the same time or in the same
person). The elders are supposed to teach, set good examples, care for youth,
and provide resources and opportunities for all forms of success. This mutual
obligation has broken down, and universities (and older people generally) do not
see themselves responsible for wasting years of young peoples’ lives for poor
employment prospects and massive debt, or conditions which generally hobble
family formation.
What
of addressing the Gordion knot of lies which forms mainstream modern
ideologies? Both the nominal right and left are guilty of perpetuating lies
which harm most of the people who genuinely believe them, but help to further
goals of those who created these ideologies and lies in the first place.
High-functioning and high achieving center-right or left people are high
functioning and achieving usually in proportion to the degree that they
disregard their ideological dogmas in practice. The nominal right is controlled
opposition to the nominal left being the explicit marching orders given by
plutocrats and oligarchs. Looking to either for leadership or resistance
against these established interests is folly. As I said elsewhere, established
religions and parties, and most of one’s elders (anyone over 35-40) are useless
for the project of founding something new.
Lies and deceit are made worse when tools of the intelligence-surveillance
agencies leak out, for example malware and software used for deepfakes. Most of
the high-grade professionally developed malware out in the world was developed
by or for intelligence agencies, and deepfake software is another example of
something which was likely used by the intel milieu before it proliferated.
Spread wide enough, deepfakes will render all digital evidence suspect, and the
threshold required for genuine digital evidence will be far higher. [16]
There
is also the problem of secularism, scientism, and general loss of religion and the death of God which this ‘serious
society’ would address. Secularism is not a stable equilibrium, and attempts at
creating secular ideologies usually result in secular religions. What of the fact
that one is prevented from speaking one’s
mind and from basic social
advancement by way of hypermodern constructions? One will be silenced by
peers, or from on high. One will often be kept from high achievement unless one
has certain tokens like Ivy League degrees or connections to the right high
dollar people. The problem here isn’t just that meritocracy is dead and gone but that it’s a fake and
malign lie at this point. Believing in the meritocracy blinds one to
institutional and economic perversions which lie at the very heart of wealth
concentrations. One must also keep in mind how much of the hypermodern economy is fake and fundamentally built atop scams and unproductive rents.
Issues
of political crises also loom: as I mentioned prior, politics is a way of
mediating the civilization and avoiding war and constant bloody infighting.
When the proverbial ‘you’ lock the vast majority out of power, out of politics,
and out of any say on their future, you are not achieving this end of politics.
‘You’ might be maximizing your own take from the zero sum game of wealth and
power distribution, but in so doing you are also assuring warfare therein. When
one is told that mere existence is immoral and advocacy for vital self- and
group interests are forbidden, terrorism, rebellion, and subversion become viable prospects.
It’s
also worth noting that all of the worst aspects of hypermodernity are usually
enforced by willing collaborators. Without their lackeys at various levels, the
plutocrats would be naught but pompous windbags crying out for power. However,
we find that they enlist help from police, NGOs, the administrative state, intelligence-surveillance
agencies, militaries, financiers, and the arts-media-entertainment complex
among others. They need not control all of
these people, they merely need have grasp on enough of the critical actors in
these institutions and organizations, and so long as they can set policy and
have the underlings follow, they will find their will be done. Those underlings
follow their policy, and in case of a
critical event which involves their interests, they get to impose the standards of conduct. Ultimately, men enforce a feminized society which
ruins education for the gifted and genius production, and which results in
feminist laws and further dysgenics.
That
is ultimately the place we find ourselves: xenos used as weapons against the
founding stock folk of Western nations, and those founding stock folk have
little to no power, little wealth, and no ability to influence the future by
conventional means. Additionally, you have all of the problems mentioned above
stacking. Even the anti-fragility of the system falls apart at a point; it’s a
system which resists or adapts to shock until all of these factors aggregate
into such a catastrophic series of errors that it cannot cope. That shock, or
cluster of shocks, will end the global Post-War International Order as it
stands. I cannot predict what that will look like. I can say only that empires
do not last forever, especially ones as rotten as this.
The
‘great lies’ listed:
1.
Endless
growth and prosperty
2.
Boundless
human ingenuity and the myth of progress
3.
Meritocracy
4.
Founding
myths
5.
Original
sin – old and new
6.
The
open society
7.
The
French revolution formula, ‘liberte, egalite, fraternite’
(mega.nz link is a pdf showing a graph
which I created using data from market tracking sites and FRED. If you’re leery
of files, don’t get it, but I promise it’s a clean .pdf)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0149206308321549 (same as above)
(important thing noted here by subject of
this article: most of the ‘digital
revolution’, that is computing and software, has relatively little impact
outside of entertainment and communications.)
(specifically on pharma R&D, but
broadly applicable)
(this article candy-coats something which
is obvious: a static and calcified economy full of entrenched interests gets in
the way of genuine innovation,
because that sort of thing has the potential to ruin the dinosaur industries)
(this might be a repeat of the JSTOR
article, but it hammers the point home)
Peter Thiel and some other guys also have
talks on this subject.
(this is about the institutional side)
https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01649
https://www.resilience.org/stories/2013-09-27/mineral-resources-and-the-limits-to-growth/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Limits_to_Growth
(The Limits to Growth is a good read, and
fairly accurate. Their predictions have held fairly robust since the ‘70s when
they were first made. John Michael Greer admits we should be weary of their political
motives, that is the Club of Rome promotes a global technocratic elite as a way
of trying to mitigate economic and environmental disaster. Nonetheless, the
data and framework for thought in Limits is essentially correct.)
[3.5] https://knoema.com/vyronoe/cost-of-oil-production-by-country
https://www.businessinsider.com/timeline-155-year-history-of-oil-prices-2016-12
(all about oil: the basic picture is that
peak oil already happened, and every five or ten years more and more oil fields
are going defunct. The number of ‘reserves’ which are unproven either because
they are technically unfeasible or horribly expensive to tap are fairly large,
but economical oil under $100/bbl is a commodity with a limited shelf life.)
https://www.thebalance.com/us-debt-crisis-summary-timeline-and-solutions-3306288 (this is an overly optimistic picture,
but it gives the basic framework of understanding)
https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/world-news/sovereign-debt-crisis/the-municipal-debt-crisis-begins/
(All of these address obesity)
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2783422/
(all of these articles deal with
autoimmunity and/or autism)
https://academic.oup.com/biolreprod/article/72/6/1344/2667099
(all
of these deal with xenoestrogens and toxicity inherent to most plastics,
and reading a few of them gives a good picture)
https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2010/07/16/kevin-macdonald-jewish-overrepresentation-at-elite-universities-explained/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4404736/
(On white slavery, two books are of particular note: They Were White and They Were Slaves and White Cargo. The former was written by a white nationalist, but the latter wasn't, and both are fairly well-documented and ultimately come to the same conclusion.)
https://faculty.weber.edu/kmackay/statistics_on_slavery.htm
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~webfac/cromer/e211_f12/LindertWilliamson.pdf
(above is not about demography but
wealth, state-by-state in early US)
(above includes American Indian
population estimates)
(There isn’t much interesting said about
Skull and Bones except that a bunch of high dollar people are and have been on
its membership rolls. Hack journos either don’t know shit or aren’t willing to
say anything.)
https://www.gwern.net/docs/iq/2007-strenze.pdf (Intelligence and SES meta-study)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/147470491301100316
https://www.pnas.org/content/100/16/9103 (slightly gay article but still notes
human sexual dimorphism)
https://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2016/12/21/the-evolution-of-sexual-dimorphism-in-humans-part-2/
https://genomebiology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13059-016-1035-8
https://www.gwern.net/docs/sociology/2003-murray-humanaccomplishment.pdf
https://www.brookings.edu/research/new-evidence-raises-doubts-on-obamas-preschool-for-all/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4270739/ (genetics and intelligence differences)
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3617178/ (correlation between height and IQ,
heritability estimates for height and IQ also provided)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0191886910005933?via%3Dihub (Interesting find: some correlation
between physical attractiveness and muscularity, and asserting natural
inequality. In other words, SJWs and ideological egalitarians tend to be
somewhat weaker and uglier on the whole.)
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3995507/
https://internethealthreport.org/2019/deepfakes-are-here-now-what/
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/our-work/topics/deepfakes
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