Fourth grand post: Small Unit Tactics and Managing the Decline

I.                   Further comments on Decline

            I am presently of the opinion that Western civilization as such is dead. If we look around us at the current state of Western civilization, or the ruins thereof, we see nothing worth fighting for. We see very little redeeming about it. This essay is going to be a bit grittier than the prior ones. Excuse coarse language – such are the times.

            The oligarchs and plutocrats rule with malice and deceit. They claim we are “free” but strip from us our customary rights. They claim we are prosperous but one finds it harder to get by for the rump middle. Meanwhile, the margins succumb to nihilism, hypermodern ideology and distraction, and to drug-induced stupor and suicide. To borrow a turn of phrase, we are sick unto death and we haven’t the strength of will or mind to speak truly.

            Sixty-thousand dead from opiate and opioid overdoses alone this past year, about fifty-thousand the year prior, and averaging forty thousand a year for the previous ten years. When one combines that with an additional average of thirty to forty thousand suicides, and thousands of disappearances every decade which are due to political hits or elite predation, and adds to the toll the thousand or so white Americans killed by minorities (and thousands more beaten, robbed, and raped) for about twenty years running, things start to look grim. When one adds the number of murders, unnecessary suicides, rapes, and other anti-white acts in the rest of the white world (including Afrikaners), the picture gets even worse. None of this is talked about. I implore everyone to look at some of the pictures of those who’ve died – to needless suicide, to anti-white violence, to political violence, and so on.

            If we want to talk briefly about promising developments, it is a return to talk about interests that first catches the eye. Morally loaded talk does not benefit us – insofar as morality is not determined by us. What is good is ultimately God, as well as beauty, truth, and what is in our interest. More people are waking up to the vacuous pile of dreck that is the bipartisan liberal humanist consensus and realizing that their morally loaded talk and clever propaganda disguises a wide range of political acts which are against our interests. That wealth is concentrated amongst financiers and particularly amongst the Other is against our interests just the same as the Other being invited in our midst in ever growing numbers; that we are weakened in our rights, in our standing, and in our arms is against our interests just the same as dysgenics and simulacra. Once you divorce yourself from the rotten worldview bequeathed to you by your enemies and acquaint yourself with some strategy, it becomes apparent what one should be doing.

            Another promising development is that the deep state insofar as the administrative state and permanent government, like in my prior discussion on nominal versus real power, is becoming more apparent to more people. Like with many tricks of modern power politics and espionage, these things work so long as one does not know of them. As soon as the principal is aware of their existence, they cease to function as effectively. Once a broad part of the public, especially the smarter-than-median section of the public, is aware of the difference between nominal and real power and the fact that elected officials are mostly in the former category, the ability of democratic republics to function as very elaborate polls to measure public opinion and as lightning rods for vast amounts of energy and effort goes down. That is a huge part of the post-war social control scheme.

But if you know that most of the elected officials beyond the county level are hobbled by the cooption-destruction-subversion cycle and by party echo chambers which separate officials from their voters, there is no reason to engage in the system and one might as well find every opportunity to sidestep it. You cannot win within the Western democratic republic as an outsider and any genuine attempt at doing so will find you either out of the good graces of normal party politics and the material support that entails, or on the wrong side of a cooption-destruction-subversion scheme. Either way, most political races of even modest consequence require tapping into decently deep pockets which most outsiders cannot, and at any rate require name recognition or media favors which will be denied of outsiders. The average congressman represents hundreds of thousands of people and winning a primary generally requires about half as many votes as is necessary in the general. Neither party will welcome young men of founding stock, nor will parties in most of Europe. The polls are closed.

            I’ve mentioned before the importance of ‘managing the decline.’ My last few posts have been basically odes or laments to decline. There are really two major schools of thought on decline. One could throw in a third, but it really isn’t thought per se so much as denial and ignorance. This is where one claims everything is still upward and onward despite all evidence to the contrary. The first school is the fire sale school. One cares not about the far future, but gears everything toward success today and within the next few years. The second school is, as mentioned above, about a managed decline. This means that one should look to ways to decrease the severity of a decline and position ourselves toward the further future.

            These schools are obviously at odds. To the extent one places oneself in the fire sale school, one is putting off the ability to manage decline and to capitalize on a future silver or golden age. At the very least, one is putting the silver or golden age further off. Short term thinking might be great for quarterly or yearly profits; it might even be great for the success of a firm in the context of the world-as-it-stands, but it is utterly ruinous for a society geared on this mindset. The West broadly was ascendant between about 1460 and 1914. That ascendance had to do with a number of factors, but one of which was long-term thinking at the helm of broader Western civ. Much of the West was beginning to decline between 1918 and 1938, and the decline became interminable by 1965. The US was ascendant by 1890, reaching an inflection point by 1990 or thereabouts. That peak of broader Western civ is known somewhat pretentiously as ‘the long 19^th century’, and this relatively rapid decline and death throes period in the midst of which we stand might be characterized as ‘the long 20^th century.’

            The Crimean war is a great example of short-term thinking. It made a lot of sense for Britain and France in the 1870s to check the rise of Russia. Russia was of course trying to bite off a chunk of Ottoman territory. Yet just twenty-something years later, Britain and France were both allied with Russia and against Austria-Hungary, the Ottomans, and Germany. By that point, the British and French likely wished that the Ottomans were as small as possible and Russia had the most strategic ground. Russia might have stayed in the war longer, or potentially not surrendered at all, had they held more strategically advantageous ground on the Ottoman front.

            Long-term thinking is characterized by continual investment in the future. This means good upkeep, it means sound infrastructure, it means building up capital. ‘Capital’ here means not just physical industrial capital but social and human capital as well. That we see secular declines in all of these things, in general maintenance, in infrastructure quality, and in capital investment all heap on to my prior essays to herald decline. [1] One could point to other things as well, as I’ve stated before the erosion of social capital as embodied by institutions like the law, informal associations, professional and trade associations, universities, and science and research bode ill. Social trust whether measured by neighborhood association and participation in informal associations and professional and trade associations has gone down dramatically in the past thirty to forty years. Trust in political institutions has also dramatically declined, and the institutions being hit hardest and most recently are the arts-media-entertainment complex and academia. Trust in established religion as marked by church attendance and donations is also dramatically down from fifty years ago. There is a growing sense that all of these institutions are hollow, having been bent toward money and power interests such that they no longer serve the public good that they were supposed to.

            This is exactly what you would expect from short-term thinking. It is also exactly what you would expect from a loot-and-pillage operation run largely by the Other with cooperation from antisocial cosmopolitans. One of the many lies is that modern Westerners are the most educated people of all time. Yet the average Westerner is completely ignorant of all sorts of pivotal events in the last two hundred years and sees recent history through a series of largely mythic lenses. Another lie which I’ve put to bed plentifully is that the US is some beacon of democracy, freedom, and totally not an empire guys. We could characterize the US as an imperial project since at least 1810 with the Louisiana Purchase and continuous expansion in the Western half of the North American landmass. Certainly by 1846 after the conclusion of the Mexican-American War, it was obvious that it was an empire, though the character of this empire would change dramatically between 1870 and 1938.

The growth phase of the American empire lasted from 1784 with independence until 1929 or thereabouts. Even in this growth era there were two distinct phases, the antebellum years from start to around 1857 and that from 1859 to 1929. The years leading up to the actual war were fraught with tension, with small scale skirmishes in the territories (i.e. ‘Bloody Kansas’) and senators beating the shit out of each other. The war itself, along with Reconstruction, the ‘Gilded Age’, and the Progressive Era were all part of a consolidation of power among the US federal government and among plutocratic interests. If we follow my demarcation, that makes one hundred thirty five years in the growth phase, and ninety years from 1930 to now in the ‘international order’ phase. There was no UN nor most of the other machinery we are familiar with that makes up the soft power empire, formed by the US, known as the Post-War International Order. Yet the groundwork was laid in the ‘30s in the halls of a failing and ailing League of Nations and among liberal internationalists who saw the Comintern and thought it was a damn fine idea. These people would form the UN, EU, World Bank, and IMF among other projects of the liberal international. (Coudenhove-Kalergi was one such liberal internationalist.)

By my math, that’s two hundred twenty-five years as an empire. One could subtract thirty years to account for the lack of immediate imperial ventures. Nonetheless, what we should note is that within that span we have had one massive civil war relatively soon after the founding (i.e. grandchildren and great grandchildren of the founding generation were still alive). We will probably have either another civil war or total imperial collapse within the next twenty years. The Roman Republic lasted from 500 BC to 150 BC with fairly minimal inner conflict, being essentially a backwater kingdom at the start of that period with some republican institutions, to a full republic by 150 BC and expressing vast imperial ambitions. Rome in 500 BC was basically a city-state and only controlled the city proper while by 150 BC, it stretched the whole of the Italian peninsula including Cisalpine Gaul, the Mediterranean coast of Spain, and most of the Balkan coast. One should note that there were various plebeian riots, but nothing on the scale of what happened from 120 BC to 20 BC with frequent inner conflict from the Social War to the two civil wars which rose out of the dissolution of the triumvirates.

Roman plebs arguably had more control over their society than American commoners do. Part of this likely is simply an artifact of scale, but part of this is also an artifact of the lay of the land of hypermodernity. The board is stacked against the rump middle and they don’t even know it. Roman plebs had all sorts of places reserved for them, like tribune of the plebs and plebeian assemblies, and could still achieve the consulship. Indeed, after the Lex Sextiae one of the two consuls had to be plebeian (though the law was short-lived). Marius and Crassus were equestrians and other consuls and proconsuls came from either the ranks of the equestrians or plebs as well. Plebs in their stations were expected to vouch for plebeian interests and largely did so (consequently they were vastly over-represented in the Popvlares; Pompeius was one exception, being nouveau riche but remaining lifelong Optimate). One could see their complaints in that plebs formed the maniples which broke the back of the Servile Wars, yet overwhelmingly as a class plebs owned very few slaves. They also owned rather little land, and land reform was a constant hot issue.

Meanwhile, we are equal in the West, where equality dons a thousand scare quotes, and because of this no one voices common interests truly. Some people mouth them but betray them the instant they achieve office. In a static society as I’ve laid out past, there is very little social mobility and the reality is you’re almost certainly not going to ascend to the upper class if you hail from the rump middle; you are, in fact, far more likely to fall further because of the way most Western countries are set up. This is a process described by Keith Preston as proletarianization where the erstwhile white middle classes of Western countries are a class of increasingly downwardly mobile servants with little opportunity or freedom in fact. Iacta alea est.

A managed decline goes toward addressing the things in my last post, The Great Lie. In part, it means recognizing that you won’t be able to maintain living standards as we had at the height of industrial society throughout the 1900s in the West for the whole planet. Even so, one does not compound this problem with endless lies and deceits and the destruction of what is left of Western civilization. On the current course, by 2050, the West broadly will be Brazilian or African archipelagos mired in socio-cultural dysfunction and dysgenic decay and falling health and wellbeing. This isn’t merely depressive raving or pure conjecture; unless something changes, those presently in power intend for exactly this to be the case, and all indicators point that this will be the case.

To return to Rome, in some ways the fall of Western Rome was a managed decline. In the midst of longterm fiscal issues including inflation and debasement, socio-cultural decay and dysgenics, and peripheral wars which strained the outer provinces, Diocletian reorganized the empire into a tetrarchy. It would last in some modified form with Diocletian’s innovations for another 150 years before the decline was in its final terminal stage. A ruling body of four co-emperors probably wasn’t the most stable relationship, but it was clear that the empire was too big for one guy to run everything from Rome or Ravenna or Milan or wherever they moved the capital to. The principle thing is that he divided the Empire into separate administrative districts which were governed by separate emperors and that he militarized government much further than it was already in, say, 270 AD. The ideal model would have been an emperor with three or four direct subordinates who were powerful regional administrators but ultimately responsible to the emperor and to the broader interests of the Roman Imperium. In a crisis, one is generally not thinking of the ideal, or what would keep things together for three hundred years – one is looking for the fix now.

Obviously, Rome in 288 AD was far from what it was in 288 BC. Augustus had spent most of his reign introducing the imperial institutions and a détente between Populares and Optimates which would last down until the end. In the end, it was likely that the Empire had grown too complex and unwieldy and the institutions did not continue to adapt as scale expanded. Yet it was not rival factions of blue bloods and rabble rousers which killed the Empire.* Additionally, by 400 AD, the Empire was multiethnic, multilingual, and held a profusion of faiths in its borders including Christian denominations from Arianism to Gnostic sects to the eventual Nicaean creed. Rome lucked out in that its successor states were largely run by Germanic invaders or generals-turned-kings in the West. Germans had a common ancestry with Latins, particularly with upper class Latins, in the Aryan or Proto-Indo-European tribes which would eventually dominate most of Europe in the Bronze Age. Indeed, Germans had (and have) purer steppe ancestry than the average Latin, and to this day Northern Italians who have a closer affinity to Celtic and Germanic Europeans than Southern Italians have higher IQ and income and other markers of good genes and eusocial behavior. *(I should note that really the Optimates and Populares were rival factions of elites, the former being generally the old upper elites of Rome proper, patricians; and the latter being equestrians, provincial elites, and a few Roman patricians who made their bed with these people. Sulla epitomized the Optimates and G. Julius Caesar the Populares though both had successors and forerunners.)

All of the major successor states were heavily influenced by Germanic tribes. Suebi and Visigoth war bands ruled for a time in modern Spain; Lombards in the northern half of Italy; Burgundians and Franks in France; Hochdeutschen in most of the ‘Confederatio Helvetica’ and Oesterreich; and a confederation of tribes including Franks, Saxons, and Swabians (and others) in modern Germany. Ostrogoths even migrated for a time through Osteuropa, and Vandals through [western] North Africa. The Franks adopted a Vulgar Latin tongue because of influence from the vulgate (that is ecclesiastic Latin) and to bind together three linguistic groups into a more cohesive whole. The other Germanic kings who adopted Latin tongues had similar reasons, though in Italy and Spain there were even more substantial populations of people who spoke proto-Italian or proto-Spanish as compared with France. All of these Germanic kings ended up following the Roman Church and abandoning whatever pagan or heretical beliefs they held before.

            I’ve laid out the general case for decline. Specifics are in order now. We have been witnessing over the past twenty years the free fall collapse of Boeing and several other defense contractors. Lockheed seems likely to follow. In 1992-93 there began a wave of consolidation wherein Boeing ended up buying McDonnell Douglas. The Pentagon was paying for merger costs of these defense contractors, including Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. Lockheed-Martin was also formed in 1995 by one of these mergers between Lockheed Corp and Martin Marietta. What followed in Boeing’s case was the mergers and acquisitions model of business, pioneered in the ‘70s and really ruthlessly exploited in the ‘80s and ‘90s, where the goal was to reduce input costs and output quality but somehow maintain customer base and market share. In a capital intensive business like aerospace this becomes appealing, all the more if technology or engineering seem stagnant or too costly. All of the major Boeing designs today are variants on those ‘50s and ‘60s jet liners. [2]

            Quickly, the ‘mergers and acquisition model’ was basically pioneered by people at firms like DWG (Posner), Bain Capital, Berkshire Hathaway (Buffett) and KKR. Large amounts of publicly traded stock are acquired under a publicly traded holding company. This publicly traded holding company, usually referred to as private equity or asset management, allows the controlling interest to easily acquire capital through investment or debt, and also to limit liability. It also allows one to delegate duties to lawyers, accountants, and clerks under the corporate name. Wide swaths of stock which are suspected to perform well long-term will just be held by the holding company like any portfolio. In certain industries or in certain firms, however, there are perceived arbitrage opportunities, and in these places one pursues a leveraged buy-out (LBO). An LBO entails tapping into some vast network for leveraging (which is to say debt), often Jewish nepotism or laundering dirty money for instance from the Mena, AR network or other dirty money affiliated with the deep state. Jews with any business sense and often with no business sense can receive credit lines beyond their nominal credit-worthiness and below market interest (often at or near zero interest). [3]

The Israeli behind WeWork is a great example of this, as was Madoff. Both the WeWork guy, Neumann, and Madoff are or were fundamentally scam artists who conned others by various means. Neumann’s con was by shopping an unviable real estate scheme under the guise of an office space rental company whose business model was based on the likes of NetFlix and Amazon. That is, to operate at a consistent loss for several years until a near monopoly status could be achieved and then to steadily reduce quality and therefore input cost and increase price. Madoff’s con was a simple Ponzi scheme the likes of which we’ve seen plentifully on Wall Street and by Jewish financiers, and the only reason Madoff was notable was because of the sums of money involved and because of some of the people he scammed. Jews implicitly trust each other, and the ethos is supposed to be that one can screw the goyim but not other chosen. Both of these guys got huge amounts of money from goyim and from other Jews on their tribal basis.

            That doesn’t get into what is done after the buyout. What is done then depends, but the usual pattern is a big party followed by swarms of accountants coming to take stock and see what value is in the company that was just bought. They either pursue a partial or total fire sale, which entails selling off valuable assets to pay down debt incurred in the leveraging process and to pay off investors and executives. Whatever assets aren’t sold off, everything else is looked at for reducing input costs; generally the critical factor is labor, with materials and QC cut where ever possible as well. When someone like me talks about ‘financialization’, this is the blunt instrument. From 1980 through 2010, thousands of once-viable companies which employed American workers and created quality products were subjected to this process, where after a LBO under a PE firm they would usually end up off-shoring all production and cutting quality standards, or essentially do the same but keep production domestic and just cheapen it with migrant workers and lower quality, or lastly with wholesale liquidation. Most of these companies went under either because they were intentionally liquidated or because of aggressive cost cutting leading ultimately to vanishing market share. It turns out there is low demand for shit products at a high markup. The result has been a wave of mergers and acquisitions over the past 40 years and a nearly static and monolithic economy. M&A is a monument of failure and capital consumption but it does reap massive earnings for executives, directing boards, and high dollar investors.

            The largest PE or capital management firms today have between ten and five-hundred billion dollars in assets under management (edit: BlackRock has over $7.4 trillion in assets under management, Vanguard over six trillion - though their actual owned assets are somewhat lower in the tens of billions range). The ratio of [average] executive to worker pay has gone from about 20:1 in 1965 to 30:1 in 1980 and 383:1 in 2000 and slightly down again more recently to about 296:1. [4] Executive pay doesn’t seem to track corporate earnings, job performance, difficulty, or aptitude so much as corporate scale and financialization measures (i.e. the aforementioned cost-cutting and administrative-managerial rent-seeking). “Productivity” is a buzzword in the modern FIRE economy toolbox, just as all of PR and marketing fundamentally revolve around gimmicks, buzzwords, and emotional manipulation. Naïve economists claim that market economies seek efficiencies and equilibria, but the problem is that it seems what these efficiencies and equilibria serve depends on the values and core members or elite players of institutions. The extent to which this is true at all is also in doubt as we see all manners of inefficiencies in the modern global market which exist but seem insoluble either in spite of alleged market mechanisms or to serve specific interests (power, ethnic, class, etc.). Lately, even PE and capital management firms are showing mediocre returns and the whole PE concept seems to have become a recursive scam, where once they were depriving pensioners by liquidating viable companies (and screwing creditors of those companies), and now many pensions and [e.g. university] endowments are invested in PE companies which are posting average returns for the last 15-20 years substantially under what most index funds yield and sometimes under inflation. [5]           

Despite all of that, the PE model shows no signs of going away. We also have no reason to believe that pay for traditionally Jewish jobs are a result of ‘pure market processes’ as opposed to an ethnic racket.

The public-private distinction matters far less than libertarians or conservatives believe it does, as to the power elite public and private are merely nominally different but actually blended modes of operation. Public employees often serve private interests, and often sit on private boards or enter lucrative private employ as compensation immediately after “public service” while private corporations and NGOs deliberately seek to profit at the public coffer and in law and legislation and deny competitors access to both public funds and regulatory capture. Modes of organization are merely ways of shifting resources, both in terms of man hours and in terms of money and materials. How this is accomplished, be it under a nominally “public” or “private” heading is irrelevant to the organization at hand; the ends are of vital importance, and how it is accomplished is secondary. Thus the modern American economy: government spending has floated around 43 to 46% of GDP for about 25 years. Yet a substantial remainder of GDP/GNP is made up of government contractors and NGOs. Some private companies exist whose sole business is regulatory compliance. When you exclude contractors, NGOs, and regulatory compliance companies, the list of firms and individuals who actually produce things more or less independent of central authority gets rather slim (obviously, these people must still comply with codes, regulations, etc.).

As I’ve said in the past, the modern Western economy be it in the US or the rest of the English-speaking world or most EU members, bears a striking resemblance to the modern Chinese economy. Economic activity is based on patron-client relations, where oligarchs and the de facto governing party, which is not always the same as the nominally governing party, are responsible for divvying out favors and resources. Many firms, utilities, and resources operate in effect as a system of rents and petty fiefs. Consider the example of Pacific Gas & Electric or GE. Both of those corporations, public-private trusts truly, have been horribly mismanaged by the petty tyrants who run them because wealth extraction in this part of the civilization cycle is more important than stewardship. Since about 1985, GE has been run partly or wholly on the PE model outlined above, and their books have been subject to systematic fraud; PG&E has been likewise neglectful in the utility infrastructure of California, and the result of this is excessive load on the grid and high risk of brush fires (several brush fires have indeed already been caused by faulty electrical equipment or overgrown brush encroaching on high voltage lines). When one looks into the recent management of GE one sees the usual suspects there. [6]

GE went from manufacturing electronics, consumer appliances, electric motors, engines, and lights to ‘diversifying’ more under Jack Welch running from the mid '80s through the early 2000s. This meant, of course, financialization. As was typical of financialization, personnel and expenses were cut and various sundry assets were acquired in a bid for short term profits which ended up resulting in GE hitting its first major dip in the Panic of ’07-’08. I suspect that when the books of the Federal Reserve and other financial institutions are thrown open, the nature of this Panic will yield that it was in fact worse both in terms of the financial and fiscal mismanagement and the subsequent theft of the productive classes for which these actors screeched and shouted. Dividend yields dropped by about a third in the ’07-’09 period. Stock prices fell to about a fourth of their ’07 highs by ’09 as well. They began climbing on an almost linear trend (with noise typical of trading) over the next eight years to three-fourths of their former high until 2017 where they began falling with news of fraud and mismanagement to roughly the former ’09 low. Since 2015, they have been selling both productive assets, including the consumer appliances division, and the financial wing of the business.

            How does that relate to Boeing? Well, the classic model applies to Boeing almost entirely. Up until the early ‘90s, Boeing maintained fairly high quality standards in engineering, safety, and production. It was a profitable company, but not one where executives made fifty or one hundred million dollars regularly (2018 USD) year over year. With the ingress of McDonnell Douglas executives and other finance big shots, Boeing began outsourcing production, cutting union labor, and relying increasingly on offshore suppliers and chicken shit contractors. Some of the contractors Boeing used for domestic assembly paid (and pay) low wages and hire migrant workers. Quality assurance protocols starting in the early 2000s began to relax and this loosening worsened until Airbus finally caught up in market share. The impetus of competing with Airbus drove the sickly and comically inept Boeing board to double down on their short-term visions. Rather than addressing the production, quality control, and engineering issues, they preferred to explode them with the 737 MAX which is the first ‘smart’ plane to drive itself into the ground repeatedly. Various critical modules were offshored, including angle of attack correction software, and among the shortcuts was also a stark lack of stress testing. Experienced and well-trained pilots realized quickly that the module was defective and shut it off, while those who didn’t, often non-white pilots with minimal training, ended up panicking and not understanding how to deal with the aircraft. By this point, most airlines which had pending 737 MAX orders cancelled them in exchange for Airbus aircraft, and a struggling FAA grounded all 737 MAX units in service (as of Sept-Oct 2019).

            Sadly, Boeing isn’t the only one. You see essentially the same pattern happened to Colt, only fifteen or twenty years earlier. Samuel Colt pioneered early cap and ball revolvers, and the company lasted strong into the ‘50s with the purchase of Armalite’s AR-15 patent and the military contract for the at the time ongoing M16 trials. Armalite couldn’t meet DoD production demands, but Colt could, and the purchase proved to be incredibly lucrative. After 1981, Colt developed very little. By that time, the M4 and the M16A2 were either in development or already on the market. Except some of their revolvers which were popular with collectors, their other products had been around since 1920 or before. Their 1911 series had some variations which had been modernized, but the original model was designed by John Browning between 1909 and 1910 and adopted by the US Army the following year. The M16A4 is in every way an M16A2 only with the Picatinny rail which was developed for the M4A1 then slapped on every viable surface. In 1988, they lost their contract for M16s to FN Herstal; by 2013, they lost the contract for M4s, their last big source of sustenance through the dog shit years of the ‘90s and the assault weapon ban. The halcyon days were over and Colt declared bankruptcy by 2014. [7]

            Colt wasn’t the only small arms manufacturer. Remington, established 1816, went bankrupt in 2018 after years of decline. Remington was acquired in 2007 by Cerberus, a PE firm. One of the moves made by Cerberus among all of the small arms companies it acquired was to sell off its productive real estate in the northeast, largely because the real estate was fairly valuable and because most of the employees were represented under unions. Production was then shifted to ‘right to work’ states, where wages were cut, veteran workers left, often migrant workers hired, and other input costs cut which led to a cascading decline in quality. Product costs were maintained but quality was steeply cut over time, leading to waves of complaints and stagnating sales. Colt, Remington, and other American firearm companies used to have factories in Connecticut and Massachusetts. None of these companies manufacture anything in the northeast anymore, and there has been a process over the past 40 years of manufacturers largely trying to edge out union production workers in the northeast and Midwest. On the flip side, FN Herstal is going strong and European workers seem to enjoy better labor protections on average than American workers do, and unsurprisingly FN Herstal, a Belgium based firm, doesn’t suffer the same American Jewish mindset even at its American branch. Thus FN, H&K, and Beretta’s American divisions are all healthier than heritage American companies.

            At this point, there are three major small arms companies in the Western world, and two are bigger than the others. They are Beretta, Heckler & Koch, and FN Herstal. The latter two are the biggest and most major small arms contracts go to one of those companies. Smaller firms like SIG, Walther, Glock, Knights Armament, and Daniel Defense exist but don’t have quite the capacity or diversity of product lines. None of the biggest firms are American companies because of the rise of the private equity firm in the ‘70s and ‘80s and the whole Jewish-saturated American culture, especially American finance and business culture. The rot is absolutely fucking everywhere in major American business, especially in defense contracting. The American small arms and aerospace industries are only weathervanes of that deeper disease. Small arms is a highly capital intensive business and there really hasn’t been much groundbreaking innovation since Armalite engineers designed the AR-15 and subsequently the AR-18. Further innovation in firearms, as in many other things, would require substantial bounds forward in materials which we have not had since essentially the 1950s. Consequently the M&A process is sometimes used to fuck these companies in the ass after they are put in the crosshairs of finance; financialization is conceived of as a way of milking water from the stones of stagnant companies and industries through the aforementioned means.

The Bath Iron Works used to employ a lot of people in Maine, and now they employ far fewer and produce far less. Over five years, the shipyard has produced three destroyers and nothing else. This is also symptomatic of capital flight out of the northeast, including Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, where now there is far less production capacity in that part of the country and far less employment. The FIRE economy was supposed to employ all of these people as something and it hasn’t done that. In fact, none of the promises of the FIRE economy have been sustained, except the payments of executives to themselves. Even the claim that we can hawk shit to idiots and design dildos for big bucks turns out to be fake and gay, since the Chinese will tire of American marketing and PR people shortly if they haven’t already, and we’ve already lost massive amounts of manufacturing and engineering expertise (as I’ll elaborate slightly later). To add insult to injury, these places with neither mill nor factory works in the great American rust belt have turned to drugs like methamphetamine and opiates. Hundreds of thousands have died from overdoses in the past thirty years, many of them centered on that rust belt that stretches from Maine to Illinois and every state in between.

By the numbers, we totally make a lot of shit and there has been no fall in production nothing to see here, wink and nudge. The reality is that the usual statistics hide a decline of at least a third in total production by volume when you disregard fake shit used to fudge stats like qualitative assessments. A car in 2020 ultimately does the same thing as a car in 1970 even if the former has a longer service life and less intensive maintenance schedule; the assertion that a 2020 car is worth 3 cars in 1970 is a joke, and it’s another shell game played to paper over metrics of decline and graft, where these qualitative metrics also fudge inflation numbers artificially down. Similarly, total employment in all US-based production is down from the 1980-high by about half. [8] Substantial numbers of production employees are now migrant workers, and many are employed through temp agencies regardless as temp agencies keep wages and benefits low, and allow employers to fire certain employees (largely white men) for no reason. This is also the problem with the right-to-work and ‘at will’ laws which dominate the southeastern US, but de facto gut the labor protections of white men (and to a lesser extent white women) but no one else. The ‘real economy’ is increasingly low pay and heavily infiltrated with migrant workers regardless of skill level, and the M&A model is the model de jure. Pay in Western countries is to be driven more toward the world median. White, Asian, or otherwise high ability people manage and supervise proletarians (often ethnically Other proles in manufacturing; white proles in maintenance and service). This process is captured by ‘proletarianization’ and ‘the race to the bottom.’ [9]

            The DoD is pissing razor blades and its foot rotted off from ulcers. Everything’s totally OK though, because we can paper over anything with enough money. The contractors aren’t really independent actors so much as appendages of the state. The state can’t afford to have these contractors go under, so all of the completely vital ones – Boeing, Lockheed, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and BAE for instance – are shielded from insolvency and market failure. Even if the executives of those companies get them into hijinks and bullshit which leads to completely avoidable failures, ultimately the taxpayer will be roped in. Those other contractors named aside from Boeing I can’t comment on specifically, but it’s likely given the F-35 debacle that Lockheed is in a somewhat sorry state as well. The F-35’s cost overages and development hiccups are somewhat spectacular, but that general set of problems is not unusual for modern defense acquisitions. The Littoral Combat class of ships has been canceled after four deliveries, with unforeseen delays, performance shortfalls, and quality control problems as the stated reasons. [10]

            Tying in with my last piece, Americans conceive of themselves as free of substantial amounts of bureaucracy, servility, and petty bickering, when in fact Americans and American society are subject to some of the most inane levels of all of these things.

            There are a host of problems with modern defense acquisitions. The first is the ‘no-bid contract.’ More broadly, most major contracts either have a no-compete clause, or else we see that companies agree to stick to their sectors. Often, there is no potential competition due to an established monopoly. Some of these monopolies were created specifically as a result of DoD policy. The next problem is a horribly incestuous milieu where contractors employ lobbyists who are often former senior officers. Contractors also strategically place production, distribution, and lobbying sites all over the country to have maximum leverage over elected officials. Those who test and evaluate these products are also often compromised or hampered in giving critical evaluations at early stages, so often flawed products are allowed to continue through the trials process and often problems are solved down the line. Lastly, many projects are conceived of as a combination of wish lists and specific features. Thus rather than handing project managers or designers a set of reasonable requirements or criteria, one receives an often fanciful list of things that should be included in the project as well as things that more or less must be included as specific features.

            We used to be able to design nuclear reactors. We can no longer do this. We cannot build or design nuclear reactors, ICBMs, Saturn V rockets, various support systems for those rockets, and so forth. More and more we are finding that things Americans could put together in 1960 or 1970 are impossible now. It is not merely a thing of political will, though that is part of it, it is also a matter of total loss of skill and knowledge. We could also throw up a forty story building in the span of sixteen to twenty months with a decent safety record. We believed the finance scam, and in so doing hollowed ourselves out faster than mere dysgenics could have. No one bothered preserving all of these important skills or knowledge because it was assumed that someone else would, or did, and in any case, robots or someone smarter would take care of it. The only way American production is even remotely good in 2020 is with a heavy dose of automation. Without robots, PLCs, and CNC we couldn’t even crank our peckers let alone do precision machining. [22]

            AI will probably never happen both because it is an incredibly hard problem to solve, and because at this point we are too fucking stupid. There is only so much you can do by brute force computation and through machine learning permutations. We can design incredible specialist machines, but none of them has anything like a g factor and none of them can learn (beyond algorithm training). We can’t teach a machine grammar and we don’t know how. Fording that gap is very hard. Someone smarter won’t do it because every generation is dumber than the last, and by a hundred years out on the current trend we will be probably be incapable of sustaining even half of the present world population. The upshot is that history is starting to return, and dysgenics can only last so long until it reaches a criticality and along with history, selective pressures return as well.

            American companies used to produce things as basic as liquid crystal displays and light emitting diodes. They used to make printed circuit boards and microprocessors in the US. Most of this production capacity has been farmed out to Taiwan, Korea, and China. I said before in my last military article that the US edge on total production hadn’t been edged out yet. We’re reaching a point where the rot is advancing enough, thanks in part to M&A and financialization, where those gaps are vanishing and between 2025 and 2030 will be completely gone. The amount of industrial espionage China engages in simply to catch up is incredible, and the disease of the West disarms it from any sensible reaction.

The obvious point is that Western powers never should have agreed to share tech with anyone. Ideally, even the Japanese and Koreans would have been kept in their respective feudal states, or they would have had to figure out things on their own. Certainly, one of the biggest disasters of the past two or three hundred years has been the sharing of every type of technology and expertise with the rest of the world from weaponry to sanitation and food and medicine. It turns out that once you enable people to live richer and breed more, they will do so and not thank you for it. The population of the Middle East and North Africa has increased by over 4 times since 1950. This was entirely thanks to various types of Western assistance and imports. They don’t seem happier or particularly thankful for it, especially when one sees them in Western Europe or North America preying upon European people.

Humanitarian retards deserve to be villainized going forward for the damage they wrought. Taking this to task properly will have to be addressed later, but suffice it to say that there are many culprits for the situation we find ourselves in right now – one of them is the general humanitarian impulse. Whether in the guise of secular humanism or Christian universal humanitarian platitudes it matters not, the end result is the same. To state the numbers makes the case simply enough: Europeans went from a high of about 30% of the planet to a present low of less than 9% and a projection in twenty-five years of 5%. This is the fruit of the humanitarian impulse.
            The Chicoms don’t have to wait long for American power to shit the bed. All they have to do in the meantime is try to accelerate that slide to mediocrity and avoid stupid and costly mistakes. A shooting war over coral islands or artificial land are examples of stupid mistakes. Moving to exercise control over Taiwan prematurely would also be a costly mistake. As long as they remain patient and willing, the Chinese merely have to wait, and in all likelihood by 2040 they will be able to step into full dominance of their neighborhood including the waters and coastal islands. This will put Japan in a difficult bind, as at this point they are facing a contracting population and declining US power at the same time as China is on the rise – and there is no way for Japan to catch up in military or demographic terms to come to remote parity to China. Australia and Japan both either have to come to a rapprochement with China, or hope that the decline of American power affects primarily other regions but not theirs.

            The Chinese throw up great engineering works simply to prove that they can. It reinforces the mandate of Heaven for the Communist Party of China. Meanwhile, most of the critical infrastructure in the US, including water retention works like dams and levees, was made before 1975 and very little of it has been made in the past 25 years. In the early 1900s, all of the tallest buildings built were in the West – that is, either in Western Europe or the United States. Now, they are virtually all in Asia, especially China and Dubai. Many of the architects, engineers, and high-skilled workers on these projects are Westerners, but nonetheless the fact that one can’t even build the greatest buildings in the West any longer is yet another thing heralding the decline that I’ve been waxing about for years at this point. Some of these projects are also built in shoddy or slapdash ways, but the point is that they’re even trying. For 40 years, Westerners haven’t tried much at anything other than scams and bullshit.

            I struggle to think of any great engineering or architectural work of the past hundred years. There are no golden monuments to modernity. Art deco towers look nice and have elegance and grandeur, but for some inexplicable and unnamable element they don’t fit the bill. Most modern cuboid, brutalist type shit completely falls flat aesthetically and spiritually, though it marks modernity well for its ugliness and triteness. St. Basil’s Cathedral, Pariser Platz, Versailles, the Cathedral of Our Lady Paris (RIP), Westminster, and similarly great buildings evoke the sense of awe and wonder that I’m thinking of. The only thing that comes close, aside from art deco towers, is the grid. I would argue that the grid is the great engineering work of our age; where the ‘grid’ here is the whole network of electrical and sanitation systems which keeps everything working. It’s an elaborate but ugly mess of partly old and obsolete and partly new replacement parts all working together; it lacks that sort of aesthetic vision or unity of any of the works of the older ages, but it does span entire countries, and sometimes entire continents. Most importantly, these services run every day uninterrupted except for rare breakdowns or catastrophic failures.

            We must even start throwing into question the fundamental sustainability of the FIRE economy and the notions that one can thrive purely based off a service sector driven market with relatively little production in a country of 340 million people. That is, questioning it on a deeper level than we have already. First, FIRE stuff all presupposes growth for success; production does not, at least not necessarily. As I said in the last piece, the mass consumption market is a questionable precept on its face, but setting that aside for the moment we see that the most growth-hungry sectors are in fact essentially FIRE. Real estate speculation isn’t viable without secular price increases. Second, things like R&D depend on expertise which is often quite practical and relies on production experience. The less production capacity the US and the West broadly has, in combination with secular dysgenics (declining g) and aging populations, the less innovative will we be. Third, much of the US economy is more or less sclerotic or stagnant and based on rents, client-patronage relations, and scams. This may dismay or disappoint certain readers, but it is truth – and to the extent it is truth, the more we can expect calcified interests to remain fixed in the presently dominant paradigms and to be more interested in extracting than creating value.

            We can note the decline of things like apprenticeships, trade union and professional association membership, and proper job training programs throughout large swathes of the West between 1950 and 1995. This pretty much perfectly tracked with credential and work experience inflation. I noted in The Great Lie the intergenerational chain that is supposed to hold elder to grandchild. A very simple remedy for what I mentioned there – high rates of unemployment for recent college grads – would be to only offer slots for programs in proportion to the employment viability of that program, and to assist graduates with finding work for five years after graduation. This along with bringing the cost of a four year degree to a bit less than half the average yearly American wage and raising quality and standard levels again to at least about 1970 (or preferably 1930) levels would go a long way toward instantly redeeming the Western university. Ideally one would also be more generally educated and then trained at the job rather than the hyperspecialization occurring at point of education. These things would also undo a lot of the New Left moves through the institutions without actually directly attacking them in name, although I think that directly attacking them would be a good idea as well.

            More jobs should have apprenticeships or proper job training programs attached to them. The dearth of this shows the degree to which we are in the throes of a loot-and-pillage system. I suspect that even some engineering and physician trades could be taught more like this, with some university (say, a 3 to 4 year degree) and the remainder of the trade learned via practicum. This is the way things used to be done, it makes a great deal of sense, and it allows prospective young engineers or doctors to get out and working when they’re 24 to 26 instead of 30 to 36. Some fields of surgery and specialization would require a bit more schooling and obviously specialized subject matter, but I think an extra year or two of university and an extra year or two of practicum would suffice, to the point where even new surgeons would be substantially younger per my recommendations than with status quo.

            As I mentioned in that essay, the value of going to Harvard or Princeton or one of the other Ivy Leagues is not really the school itself, but all of the networks and associations around the school that one can tap into by virtue of going there. Some of the professors and lecturers at these Ivy Leagues are no doubt high caliber, but I explained before why I think they are actually mediocre schools vis-à-vis technical matters now.

            The myth that Jews tell themselves and that they tell other people is that Jews don’t run everything and that they’re smarter and work harder than everyone else. None of this is true. They don’t run everything, but for 1.5% of the US and less than 1% of a place like the UK and a fraction of a percent in the whole of Scandinavia, to the point where one can basically say there are maybe about 30,000 Jews in that whole region – for such a vanishing minority in all of these places, they have a massively outsized influence in the same sectors. Those sectors tend to be finance, arts-media-entertainment, and academia. One finds Jewish individuals and influence elsewhere at times, but as I said above, I view the PE model and financialization and the FIRE gimmick as a fundamentally Jewish strategy. The point I’m driving at here is these are the places that they concentrate repeatedly throughout time as a means of securing power. In the US they also have a secure grasp of the legal profession, but that’s really secondary; even just by running those above mentioned sectors they can wield an enormous amount of influence, especially on modern politicians who track their performance fundamentally by their reception to interest groups, many of which are heavily infiltrated with Jews. Even a politician who thought themselves honest but gauged their performance by the stock market (or whose voters did) was engaging in the Jewish frame; the stock market is not the economy for 90% of people, because less than 10% of the population owns over 84% of the stock market and some of those 10% are likely foreign speculators.

            In a better country or a better world, everyone involved in the whole M&A business model, PE firms, and other financial tricks, scams, and Jewry would suffer something between severe censure and hanging by the neck or torture. Everyone involved in the process of decapitalizing Western countries without a viable transition plan would be made to suffer, just as everyone involved in the process of dispensing drugs or poisons which fuel nihilistic despair. At any rate, none of them would command vast sums of wealth and capital. The US and the West as a whole pretends to be a series of liberal free markets when the West is in fact captured markets where power politics and interpersonal connections matter far more than quaint notions of fair and open competition.





           

II.                Post-Colonial Landscape

It turns out in retrospect that Soviet conventional strength was vastly overblown basically at all points in the Cold War. Their economic strength was as well. Refer to my essay on strategy for why economic strength is vital to war capacity, but suffice it to say that it is. The Soviets had parked between 35 and 60 divisions in Europe outside of the USSR proper, with the average floating around 50 and an average man count of 500,000 with about as many conscripts available from all over the Soviet sphere in case of conflict as well. This sounds alarming, but one has to keep in mind supply and production difficulties the Soviet sphere faced, as well as the fact that the NATO sphere had nuclear supremacy. Many of their divisions were not at full strength, nor were they all fully equipped. NATO divisions were larger than Soviet sphere ones to the point that it took about 1.5 Soviet divisions to roughly equal NATO ones on purely numerical terms.

At times, there were fears of 170 to 175 Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions, including 90 to 96 parked in the Warsaw Pact nations or European Russia. These fears included ample reserves and readiness. As the extensive notes here show, the reality (circa 1960-68) was more like 30 divisions at NATO strength, give or take. The above caveats still apply. [11]

In terms of raw manpower and nominal strength in things like armor and aircraft, they never exceeded rough parity by much. They might have stood tall against NATO aggression, though even that is somewhat unclear since the Soviet sphere was never actually tested insofar as a military alliance, but they could not have projected force well especially on the scale of 80 divisions invading Central and Western Europe. A mass invasion on that scale is a huge logistic undertaking, and if the Soviets were stretched in 1946 (they were) then by 1970 they were that, tapped by geopolitical games, and without much of the logistical strength they built through bloodshed in WWII. The CIA and other Western intelligence-surveillance agencies, including MILINT, deliberately inflated Soviet sphere strength for the purposes of furthering the arms race and increasing tensions.

            One also has to include, as I did the analysis in my last military strategy post, the fact that other pretender powers use militaries for stability purposes. The Soviet sphere was no different. Thus much of the nominal manpower of the Soviet sphere were garrisons, military police, and other forces actively used for socio-political repression and enforcement of Communist Party dictates. As I hint above and in prior articles, it’s also not entirely clear that the Warsaw Pact countries would have put up much fight given how much resistance there was to Soviet rule, and the fact that once the Communist Party apparatus and Red Army enforcement both eroded, the Warsaw Pact as well as the rest of the Soviet sphere fell apart. Those countries (rightly) often saw themselves as occupied by a hostile or at least rival power in a way that thralls to American globohomo power do not. There has been a permanent post-war American garrison in Europe, especially in Central Europe and Britain, and while it’s waxed and waned it’s now far smaller than the Soviet sphere forces were.

            Yet there are more issues for the Soviet forces. As demonstrated both in Cold War era conflicts, but also in post-Cold War conflicts, they lacked the NCO and officer corps training of Western forces. They also lacked the degree of inter-branch or cross-domain cooperation that Western forces did. Russian Soviet forces could not achieve ultimate strategic goals in Afghanistan. Neither can Western forces between 2001 and 2019 (or later), but the Russian forces were far more limited in their operational scope and suffered far more losses than modern Western forces. Obviously one can also point to their various issues in the Caucasus wars (namely Chechnya and South Ossetia) as well as the proxy war in Ukraine. Russian special operations forces are high quality, but their conscript forces have roundly sucked shit going back to the Cold War. You have problems when your own officers are selling kit on the sly to the enemy, for instance in the Caucasus wars.

            The reason various C3I* groups would exaggerate Soviet strength is fairly obvious, and it basically revolves around principal-agent problems and trust issues. Usually powers only spend enough to just edge out their rivals in an arms race. Staying at an excessive state of alert, including readiness and military spending levels, means you’re spending money and resources on weapons and military programs that could be going toward anything else. These military-industrial and intel interests between 1950 and 1989 were in enlarging budgets, keeping a constant flow of procurements, and ensuring that they were constantly employed. Fair weather employment and shoestring budgets are kind of weak – go globohomo or go home. The anti-communist conservatives in the US and Europe bought into this misinformation campaign and bought into a compromise with the left coalition where the right ceded all sorts of administrative and cultural institutions in return for a freehand in nominally countering the Soviet sphere on a geopolitical and military space. It turned out the left deliberately would compromise various anti-communist efforts during and afterward like in Vietnam and in Africa, regardless of the efficacy or validity of these efforts. *(The whole suite of things which I subsume just under C3I is cumbersomely called C4ISR by others.)

            I wouldn’t get bogged down in a defense of the Vietnam War, but it’s clear that victory was possible if the strategy was pursued differently. The Western free capitalism-Eastern oppressive communism dichotomy was fake and gay. Anyone with eyes can see it now. I don’t do foreign policy on naïve ideological grounds either. Instead, what happened in Vietnam was it became a training ground for CIA to practice techniques like the PHOENIX Program and smuggle heroin while they were also doing MKULTRA back home.

            The rump right, often starkly anti-communist and pro patria, was easily duped by the nominal or plutocratic right and the general leftist coalition. The nominal or plutocratic right never had the interests of the rump right or the folk or nation at heart, certainly not in a long time; and since 1945 at the least, they’ve been firmly in the hold of plutocratic interests even in the cases of individuals who may have started of meagre means. The right ceded so much of the cultural landscape over the 20^th century in gradually vacating institutions and legitimacy that the left was increasingly determining the very framework within which the right operated. The right could discern no counter for reasons I’ll go into somewhat later. Thus a schizophrenic policy of American power tag-teaming post-colonial African countries with substantial numbers of white settlers along with the PRC, Cuba, and USSR came to be. Most of these countries, for instance Zimbabwe in the case of the Zanu PF or South Africa and the ANC, had communist guerillas fighting whites, and the US would often come to side with the communist guerillas. South Africa was strung along the longest of all, but by 1988 the signs were clear that Africa was no longer contested ground with the moribund USSR, and so suddenly the last bit of “international support” vanished and South Africa withered under intense sanctions and a massive anti-Afrikaner PR and marketing campaign.

            Note that I use ‘left’ and ‘right’ more as affective terms than as policy descriptions. They’re both general frames of mind, where the ‘left’ is the godless cosmopolitan suckling to power (who ironically believes themselves a rebel); ‘right’ is God, land, and guns. Leftists pretend to be anti-authority until they’re in power and then the mask slips. Someone on the genuine right who isn’t playing in the left frame is usually less concerned with whether their leader bears a crown or some republican office; the important thing is stewardship and doing what is right. One doesn’t have to be personally religious to belong on the right, but one should be at least promoting religion as a civic and social virtue, and anyone one the “right” who is seen undermining God, land, or guns, should thus be viewed with suspicion.

            When you combine the fact that one flank of the right was very ‘nominal’ and either an outright plutocratic guard or at beck of such people, and the other flank was hopelessly out of their element generally and often ensconced in all sorts of liberal pieties and moral misgivings despite their conservative or nationalistic leanings, you end up with a general right wing milieu in the West which was outflanked at almost every level. One might add that the genuine right wing was always less energetic than the left because these people had work, families, and churches and other community functions to which most of their time was dedicated. The left was secular, less fertile, and more personally atomistic – all trends which they have promoted as the default through technics and through culture – meaning that they devoted far more energy to political organization. Adding in the co-option/destruction/subversion cycle I’ve discussed before sealed the deal on the effect of the nominal right (which is to say, ultimately none).

            Bill Buckley was probably never co-opted given his Skull and Bones and CIA ties. However, he and the National Review were a vehicle by which others were co-opted and brought in line with the establishment ‘bipartisan’ consensus. National Review, journalists and popular authors, and various mainstream religious outlets circulated the new tenets of conservatism. Ironically the John Birch Society performed the same function, even though they were often a “fringe” dissident conservative group during much of the Cold War. Yet one notes that they never confronted Zionism, the Jewish question, or race more broadly and were funded substantially by Jewish donors. Other “think tanks” funded by plutocrats like the Kochs serve the same function. One notes, as many have, that they seemed to have changed every ten years or thereabouts, to adjust to the pace of leftward shift in American institutions. Any number of potential right wing politicians, polemicists or journalists, authors and so on have been co-opted by giving them certain privileges and status along with maintaining the establishment consensus. Co-option involves enticing groups or individuals with incentives to betray their natural group interests and either adopt a new group or simply ignore those interests altogether. Greed and a belief of inevitability or impossibility render co-option more palatable.

            Destruction is generally more obvious. The clearest examples of destruction are groups the nascent liberal international went to war with, namely the Axis powers in Europe. The Afrikaners and [white] Rhodesians suffered similar fates, along with most whites in post-colonial Africa. These colonists had to suffer the indignity not only of wretched conditions and economic hardships, but anti-white violence from Sub-Saharans and the international mob of hypocrites and the Other pointing the finger from afar roundly in condemnation (including often the governments of the home countries). Individuals like Francis Parker Yockey and George Lincoln Rockwell were also destroyed. Great Replacement theory charges [correctly] that the white Western middle is subject to this same dynamic at present. Destruction entails death, displacement, or total political defeat which leads to the ultimate victory of the political goals of globohomo or the relevant enemy.

            Subversion is one of the most insidious. It involves undermining opponents and signal boosting allies to undermine existing or fledgling systems of opposition. Almost inexplicably, certain segments of the media-arts-entertainment complex and other nodes of information and power understand how to respond to upstart threats. This ‘inexplicable’ response comes from substantial back channel coordination, where certain large numbers of these key individuals are included in circulating memoranda and mailing lists (now e-mail correspondence), and the rest take their cues from secondary establishment consensus sources. In this case in particular, I want to focus on the aspect of rallying against the opposition and tarnishing them or making them politically untouchable. People like Richard Nixon, Enoch Powell, and Ezra Pound are all examples; Pound was institutionalized in mental wards for many years, a political prisoner under the guise of ostensible mental health treatment. Mental health is one weapon also used by the enemy both in the US and USSR. The last method of subversion is one also widely used, and it is the means of infiltrating enemy organizations and either undermining their political potential or turning them into de facto leftist causes, as the left did with most of the major Christian charities and the major industrialist foundations (Ford, Carnegie, etc.). Managing dissent in this co-option, destruction, and subversion cycle has not been an accident or a purely ideological affair, but it has been the policy of the establishment and of intelligence-surveillance agencies (including FBI, CIA, and MI-6) as part of a ‘Continuity of Government’ protocol.

That explains the weakness of the right and why as the time stretched past 1945, the right found itself weaker and weaker, despite the fact that it had substantially assented to the destruction of the Axis powers. Within the next five years, we can expect the ‘establishment conservative’ wing will fully enshrine the values of homosexual marriage, transsexual mutilation, widespread divorce, technodystopia, and dysgenics. The Christian ‘moral majority’ people and Evangelicals still believe that they won something in bargaining with the establishment conservatives in agreeing to support various Jewish war lobby positions. They in fact got nothing of worth, and increasingly any stalwart Evangelical denominations which are not bending toward the globohomo positions are coming under various forms of fire and duress. Every deal with the devil in that ilk, like the one the anti-communist right made in the Cold War or which the ‘old conservative’ group including the America First party made during the Second World War, has amounted to dust and shit but ceded critical ground and wasted terrible amounts of energy.

The impact of the Progressive Era as a great time of centralization and consolidation not only to strengthen central governments in the West, but also oligarchic or plutocratic interests is highly misunderstood or underappreciated. The fortunes of families such as the Morgans, Rockefellers, Rothschilds, Schiffs, Warburgs, and others were made or expanded greatly in that period. The Progressive Era, and the epiphenomenon of American prohibition within that time, also represented an ascension of the Other in American life especially as represented by Jewish business elites and the Syndicate. Centralization has many side effects, but one of those is the fundamental transformation of the economy into one of abstracted financial rents, and also where success is ultimately highly dependent on permission from establishment parties and political elites.

Most conservatives go along with things as they are and affirm the rule of established elites. Only if they are made to see that their interests are threatened and if they are given permission will they act; most conservatives tend to adhere too closely to formal rules and party line to break away from habit. This is one of the reasons the center-right dialectic holds so strong in the West, because the prospect of defection despite one’s society decaying around them means that one might lose elections to the center- or radical left, despite having already lost many elections to the center-left in the past or having even won elections perchance in the ‘mainstream’ center right parties which somehow never seem to achieve anything of note and always slide further left themselves. The time to have won elections, if it was possible for most of the West, would have been in the 1970s or ‘80s, but this would have required breaking out of the centrist dialectic and projecting trends into the future. America, Britain or Belgium in 1989 had embryonic forms of the multicultural ills they suffer now, and an inability to diagnose it then made immediate or moderate response impossible.

Breaking that co-option, destruction, and subversion cycle would have required a large effort of push back by a counter-elite who was educated on realpolitik and had analyzed real elite networks and could target their vulnerabilities in the precise same way that the real elites had targeted potential rivals. Present elites “earn” their station through use of police, intelligence, and surveillance powers to cow, silence, and intimidate their rivals and enemies as much as through purchase of economic advantage. We’ll notice that very low on the list of actual elite credentials are skill at planning or group orientation.

Another period of history which is highly misunderstood or simply unknown is the broader post-colonial era. By the mid-1800s, Britain was evermore in thrall to various commercial interests which looked markedly different from those of a hundred years earlier. Cecil Rhodes, though a man of the Empire in conviction, was firmly in the pocket of Rothschild, Oppenheimer, and other Jewish or outsider merchant interests. So much so that he rallied along with other imperialists to war against Afrikaners largely on account of these commercial interests, during the 1880s and 1890s. For by the time of the Boer War, further refueling stations or penetration into the African continent were unnecessary for connecting the far-flung corners of the Empire, and the primary concern at that point was gaining a hold of the rich mineral discoveries recently found by Afrikaner workers in their lands. One must keep in mind the need of strategic depots essentially up to the 1940s, especially with the popularity of steam-powered ships which had to be fairly frequently supplied with coal. The Suez Canal opened in 1869, was fully operational a few years later and largely owned by French and British concerns, and allowed merchant and supply ships to shortcut the long and somewhat hazardous route around the South African cape. [12]

Even a hundred years before the Suez Canal was finished roughly, around 1780, the British Empire’s network of trade and various other contacts which included sailors and soldiers, diplomats, and all of the other integrated units - these things were a well-working machine and part of the maintenance of that machine was supply stops. Steam ships were adopted by the Royal Navy by the 1840s and thus coal became a huge supply concern. Every coaling station had to have a coal mine in relatively short proximity. One would not ship coal from Wales to stow on Madagascar. Even before the steam era, staging grounds for resupply were necessary for sailing from Britain to India as the voyage took too long to conceivably carry all of one’s supplies in the hold of a ship.

In 1600, the British Empire was an idea more than a thing. The first forays into America at Roanoke failed after the Gilberts and other plutocrats had tried to establish their own petty fief as viceroys. Sir Francis Drake and the Royal Navy had destroyed a substantial portion of the Spanish Armada in 1588. The Empire was largely in utero, as plutocrats, merchants, sailors, soldiers, and the lower elements of society would wet their beaks for what empire was exactly in Ireland. Some claim that it was this early naval expansion around 1600 and the debt that incurred that spurred the formation of the Empire. In 1630, there were two permanent settlements in America: Massachusetts and Virginia. Both relied heavily upon “servants under indenture” which is to say slaves nominally under contract. The terms of the contracts were often capricious or arbitrary, so someone with a seven year indenture could find themselves enslaved for ten to fifteen years as various fictive expenses or misdeeds were piled against them, or real costs (e.g. of transport) were overstated intentionally.

Most slaves (in North America) before 1800 were white, and fully anywhere from half to two-thirds of those who came to America before 1740 arrived as slaves. In the southern colonies like Georgia and the Carolinas, the number was even higher. These slaves came from all over Britain, Ireland, and Germany; they represented largely lower class laborers, criminals, urchins, and folk who had struggled after the Inclosure Acts in Britain or similar ills elsewhere. However, there were also among their ranks artisans and even lower gentry from time to time, for though most of them were either tricked into servitude or lured with promises of property, some were kidnapped outright and sold for profit either by strangers or family. Kidnapping was a great scandal and moral outrage in England and Scotland between 1620 and the 1670s when it more or less subsided. Mortality rates among white slaves averaged around half for the first five years in America, and were higher in the southern colonies particularly during early settlement. Mortality was particularly high during harsh winters, and in the south the mortality rates reflected the greater burden of disease as malarial swamps were somewhat common. 

Around 1650, the East India Company was gaining a deeper foothold in India and had two trading posts and at least 23 factories. It had been established 50 years prior. Jamaica and Barbados are established around this time, and though initially they grow tobacco they switch to sugar. The Caribbean colonies gain a reputation as a hellish place to work, as the vast majority of the white slaves sent there die, though some of them do return to Britain or become masters in turn as the colonies transition from white contract slavery to black chattel slavery after the first twenty years. By 1690, most of the eastern coast of America is settled and conflicts with various Amerindian tribes and confederations become more common. Death rates dropped during this time for settlers of all types, including for white slaves and freemen. The colonies are more or less self-sufficient and have gained a permanent foothold. Any hope the Amerindians had of repelling European settlement is, by 1690, banished from thought.

Settlement quickly intensifies over the next 40 years and the first major towns spring up around ports and rivers. Between 1652 and ’74, there were also three naval wars with the Dutch, the first of which ended inconclusively and the latter two of which ended in defeat for the British. These wars stopped after William III of Orange became king of England through marriage following the Glorious Revolution, as William brought Dutch and British interests together for a time but limited the naval forces of the Netherlands. The last Anglo-Dutch war in 1784 would end up with a decisive British victory. The East India Company was also basically a full arm of the British Empire at this point (1680-90), invested with most powers of state. They were humiliated by the Mughals after a Mughal attack on Bombay in 1689-90.

India largely fell into control of the East India Company by 1770 as a result of campaigns against the Kingdom of Mysore, the Marathas, and the Mughals. While half of North America would declare independence and fall out of the Empire essentially 10 years later, by then the British Empire was beginning to expand further and by 1800 would be expanding into China, Australasia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. By that point, both the trade and colonization aspects of the Empire were a master-crafted machine. The colonial machine would be used to efficiently settle Western Canada as well as Australia, New Zealand, and various other minor colonies.

By the late 1880s, Chaim Weizmann, Theodor Herzl, and other leading Zionists had secured support amongst at least some of the Rothschild branches and other prominent Jewish mercantile families of Europe. Some enterprising Jews around this time also established the doctrines of Christian Zionism, spreading it first in Britain and then in America. These mercantile and Zionist interests, who desired to maintain British imperial dominance, would lead to agitation behind the scenes for a continental war to check rising German industrial and military strength. That along with a general diplomatic stasis leading up to the Serbian crisis in the wake of the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand would set the stage for the war. The Balfour Declaration was decreed in 1917 while still in the midst of the war. It was addressed of course directly to one Lord Rothschild. This guaranteed that some portion of Ottoman territory would eventually be set aside for Jewish settlement, and it was heavily implied that it would be a Palestine mandate. Entry into the war was a first victory for mercantile and Zionist interests, and the Balfour Declaration was a second clear victory.

However, mid-way through 1916, it was clear as credit lines from the Western Allies stretched and the Eastern Front looked increasingly dire that American plutocratic interests were on the line. I’ve said in the past that Americans supplied vast quantities of war materiel and general supplies; the extent is difficult to capture, but credit gets at part of it. Apparently, “Between 1914 and 1918, the total amount of foreign credit taken out by the Entente totaled $16 billion.” [13] (That is, between $400 and $500 billion in 2019 USD.) If one figures that as much as a third was likely spent on imported war goods and materiel, especially from the US, one is getting some sense of the scale. By early 1916, British and French factories were having chronic issues in keeping up with production for artillery shells and rifles. They would look to American producers to shore up these shortfalls.

            If the Western Allies were having issues, of course the Russians were as well. Billions in 2019 USD were lent to Russians both in credit and kind. Once the October Revolution happened and the Bolsheviks began putting the social democrats to bed, they did two critical things that forced American involvement: they repudiated all war debts and left the war. Had America merely sat out at this point, it’s entirely possible that the warring parties would have fought to a stalemate around late 1918 or early 1919. Reinforcements arriving from the Russian front allowed the German army to prepare for the 1918 Spring Offensive, which they launched with great success (and cost). Yet they were also running into American reinforcements, who were just showing up in force in theater by the end of 1917 and early 1918.

            Austria by 1917 was on the ropes and teased surrender repeatedly. It surprised no one therefore that they were the first to fold in August 1918. Yet by July and August 1918, the German army was worn to a fragment of what they had been three years before. American forces on the other hand were still fresh, and although the French and British were in a similar state to the Germans, the Entente had a fresh and massive ally which would bolster their offensive and patch any holes in the line. The Central Powers did not have that luxury. Had Germany tried to hold out, they would have struggled just to hold fortifications along the German border for another six months.

Wilson for his part railed against the terms hashed out at Versailles. He attacked the whole process as unsettling vengeance and as unfairly one-sided, being more a dictation of terms than a negotiation. At the same time, it was American intervention (and Wilson himself) which was key to allowing the terms in the first place. Without American strength, the Central Powers would not have been overwhelmed and a brokered peace agreement would have been necessary. He desired to wash his hands of the thing, as he did of many of his mistakes, without doing anything to remedy the situation (however, he did have a stroke in 1919 which made him infirm).

On its face, the European empires were the strongest and largest they had ever been between 1919 and 1928. This was particularly true of Britain and France. Yet under the surface, social strife, political fracture, and economic and fiscal problems to include war debts threatened these empires. When one looks throughout history, usually empires loom largest when they are in fact either stretched taught or approaching an inflection point. Rome even amidst the Crisis of the Third Century would have seemed an invincible juggernaut, yet by 310 AD they were losing territory every ten years or so and not making up for it. The same would have held true for the Ottomans in 1750, yet by 1800 they were reeling and by mid-century had lost most of their European holdings and a substantial amount of North Africa.

The Interwar Years showed the first signs of failure. Morale in France dropped to a low as the costs of war dawned on a devastated generation of French men. France was an early pioneer in migrant labour, having allowed two million migrant workers into France within a few years after the war. The migrants came from the French colonies as well as from Eastern and Southern Europe. In the ‘50s and ‘60s of course, the majority of migrant labour would come from French North Africa. Various policies in France which seem incomprehensible in hindsight make a great deal of sense when viewed from the lens of a general morale slump, manpower shortage, and governmental instability following the conclusion of the war in 1918 and the subsequent influenza pandemic. [14]

France occupied the Rhineland from 1918 until 1930, and at times stationed colonial troops there. This, particularly immediately after the war and then during the economic depression of 1927-30 whence food and assets were in short supply in Germany, led to the humiliation of Rhenish Germans and the phenomenon of “Rhineland bastards” – mixed race bastards born largely in one of those two periods and equally likely to have been the spawn of rape as of need. They sought to enforce the terms of Versailles exactingly, including both the payments and arms limitations. Poincaré in 1923 was appointed over a less willing predecessor to force payment of war debts by marching into the Ruhr valley, and under his direction exactly this happened; Germany finished paying under the Dawes plan by 1927 under a regime of hyperinflation and fiscal instability. The right coalition lost in 1924 to the left, called Cartel des Gauches.

Economic crisis quickly hit the left coalition, particularly as the first signs of international business failures appeared and their own fiscal problems manifested in a highly inflationary franc. By 1926, and after failure to achieve results in the financial crisis, Poincaré returned to government with the right-wing coalition. Toward the end of their term, they worked with the German foreign minister to begin softening the terms of the Versailles treaty to include the end of the Rhineland occupation.

In Britain, Lloyd George had taken over the government in 1916 from Asquith. He would hold onto government until 1922. His government extended social welfare policies to include unemployment insurance, minimum wages, union negotiations especially as concerned railways and coal mines, and finally there was suffrage to include abolishing property requirements and allowing women the vote. They also negotiated with Sinn Fein (IRA front party) to partition Ireland between north and south, and to eventually allow the south independence. Britain resolved the Chanak Crisis in Turkey by pulling all troops out and allowing Turkey to retain Constantinople and Eastern Thrace. Skirmishes over territory ultimately not destined to remain in the empire were unpopular both in the military and in parliament.

Aside from a brief appearance by a PM named Law, Baldwin would lead the Conservative Party until 1937. Labour took to government in 1924 for the first time and thereafter quickly began edging out the Liberals as opposition to the Conservatives. Periodic strikes in the coal industry produced some economic problems in Britain, as there was a large strike in 1923 and again in 1926. Neville Chamberlain as Minister of Health would push for pensions for the elderly, for widows and orphans, and other popular reforms at the time. The Labour Party took government again in 1929, just before the international financial crisis struck. As with the US, Britain was struck very hard by the Great Depression and economic recovery struggled through the proceeding ten years.

Poincaré retired just before the financial crisis in 1929. The following year, French soldiers pulled out of the Rhineland occupation. By 1931, France was fully in the Great Depression along with everyone else despite earlier seeming to have dodged the worst effects for two years through monetary and trade policy. The right-wing coalition lost in 1932 to socialists and radicals. Herriot led the government at this time when Adolf Hitler rose to the chancellorship in Germany. The Stavisky Affair was a financial scandal where a Jew named Stavisky who was heavily connected to the Parti Radical was convicted of embezzling vast sums of money. Various Parti Radical people including the then-PM Chautemps protected Stavisky up until his untimely death (either suicide or murder). To Jews in France, this reeked of the Dreyfus Affair, in which they claim a Jew was unfairly charged of treason when (according to them) it was the goy accuser who was guilty. Right-wing demonstrations followed the Stavisky Affair breaking into news and the leftist government together with socialist activists killed 15 protestors and put down the demonstrations.

 Chautemps stepped down and was succeeded briefly by Daladier. Daladier in turn resigned a short time later and was replaced by Doumergue. A string of PMs each lasting six months or less would follow until Léon Blum, a Jew, took over government in 1936 and the government went back to the Parti Radical. He would serve a second term later. Throughout the thirties, leftist governments suppressed Action Française, Mouvement Françiste, and the other ‘radical right’ or ‘reactionary’ parties and youth groups. This included lobbying the Catholic church for excommunication (active Action Française members were excommunicated), targeted violence, and outright banning and proscription of certain opposition parties.

Blum’s government pushed through labour reforms and industry negotiations on the back of widespread protests and strikes. This was popular at first, but as unemployment remained high and economic crisis persisted, Blum’s popularity tanked. He was succeeded by Chautemps in a second term. The following year, 1938, would see two major crises. Various French radical leftists became alarmed at the boldness of the NSDAP and desired to reinforce the Versailles terms but couldn’t find sufficient strength to do so. In March, Hitler pushed Anschluss against Schuschnigg. Britain and France protested. In September, Hitler threatened Czechoslovakia over the Sudetendeutsch and the result was the Munich Agreement. In March of the following year, he annexed the majority of the remainder of Bohemia and made a small portion into the puppet state of Slovakia.

In the background of Hitler’s wild political gambles were various NSDAP figures panicking over the perceived threat of the Western Allies coming together and preemptively invading Germany over this aggressive posturing. At the same time, political crises in France’s own government repeatedly shattered their governing capacity. Britain for her part was substantially more stable than France.

Stanley Baldwin was PM from 1935 to 1937. The Conservatives at that time had a large majority in Parliament. He presided over the abdication crisis, which may have been the most major political scandal in Britain at that time. The abdication crisis is nominally a result of King Edward VIII marrying an American divorcee. There also seemed to have been behind the scenes pressure placed on the royal family and on the political elite to force the abdication on behalf of Jewish and Zionist actors who did not want to see influential figures with a favorable opinion of Hitler and the NSDAP, and a king who furthermore wanted the monarchy to retake actual power. Baldwin’s successor was Neville Chamberlain who would remain PM until May 1940.

I won’t bother to go into the war here. I might do at another time, but it’s been done to death elsewhere because it was a vortex of the world’s attention for many years, like the Great War was. Thus, the war ended between May and August 1945. Everything after is the Post-War Era.

The Indian Raj was let go shortly after the war. The Cripps Mission had secured Hindu nationalist support for the war effort in 1942 in exchange for a promise of independence following the war. The UK made good on that by 1947 amid an apparent weakening of British power projection, a mammoth debt spiral, and a desire for social welfare reforms which took energy away from empire. The Raj declared independence and then partitioned into three countries – India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh – with population transfers along ethno-religious lines. Part of a Japanese fallback strategy had been to support regional nationalist movements in Southeast Asia as their army and navy faced defeats starting in 1942 and 1943 at the hands largely of Americans and their war started to turn sour. All of this combined with American desires to humble the old European powers made the colonies increasingly untenable.

In 1947, the US recognized Israel, being one of the first countries to do so. This occurred after several years of open Jewish terrorism and hostility against the British. The British themselves were only the latest recipients of this terrorism, which had been an ongoing threat in the region since the ‘20s. Irgun (along with other militant Jewish factions) was employing smuggled weapons, to include surplus German WWII kit. They were funded and armed by American Jews, including Syndicate men like Meyer Lansky, as well as by British Jews. The following year the British pulled out of the Palestine Mandate and ceded the whole territory in essence to Jews despite initially wanting to keep Jewish settlement in check.

Pulling out of Kenya happened shortly after the Mau Mau Uprising. While the British Army prevailed, the post-colonial mood dictated that Brits had to go; the result, as above, is viscerally visible in the documentary Africa Addio. English families had to flee Kenya often in poverty as their land and houses became worthless and insecure, many having recently seen family or friends killed by rebels who openly targeted English. A similar story held true for other English in Nigeria and Rhodesia (latter of which had an ongoing civil war until 1980 amidst nigh total international sanctions and international support for the ZANU PF Chicom-supported rebels), for Belgians in the Belgian Congo (site of a tragicomic civil war which involved the only violent death of a UN Secretary General likely due to AA fire from Katanga rebels), Portuguese in Mozambique, and French in Algeria.

French soldiers left Indochina after Dien Bien Phu in 1954, which was part of an ongoing rebellion since 1946. Another war bogged French soldiers down in Algeria beginning in 1954 as well, and lasted until 1962 when they left North Africa almost entirely. The Algerian War was brutal, like many post-colonial conflicts, and the hotbed of international power politics as much as a petty local play for [perceived] sovereignty. The Netherlands had lost their colonies in the course of the war and could not reassert them in the Post-War International Order.

            The Suez Crisis is one of those key moments in the Post-War era that I think deserves more analysis. Outside well-read historical societies, plutocrats, and dissident circles, it is virtually unknown. Yet it was also a key point which served as a fulcrum where the balance of post-colonial power shifted. America was already the dominant global power by 1947-50, but how much the relation vis-à-vis the rest of the world and the colonial European powers had changed from just ten years before was unclear. [15]

            In short, Egypt was a new sovereign nation and wanted full control of the Suez Canal. They wanted to build a major work, a dam at Aswan, which would require immense funding. Nationalizing the Suez Canal and acquiring the tolls from it would be one source as otherwise Gamal Nasser could not find willing foreign funding (which was necessary). In July of 1956, he announced his plan. As a result, the French and British launched a limited military operation to recover the Suez Canal with Israeli support after diplomatic attempts to regain the canal failed. Israeli and Anglo-French units overran Egyptian forces in the area within days in August of ‘56. Shortly thereafter, back channel pressure mounted. The Soviets threatened the British and French. The US leveraged international institutions (IMF, UN, etc.) and threats of embargoes to get the British and French to step down. The British and French were impacted the most – what followed was full fire sale style decolonization. They also became vassals of the Post-War International Order which was centered in America, no longer able to flex an independent foreign policy. The Israelis suffered a short setback, losing rights to use the canal, but were not impacted long-term.

            Soft power as a concept had been agitated when the American Empire was still fledgling by men such as Andrew Carnegie and various early movers in what I like to call the liberal international. They realized that one could do away with overt hard power mechanisms of control and, through sophisticated social-cultural manipulation (‘social engineering’), leverage of credit and finance, labyrinthine diplomacy, and military force and covert intelligence on the margins one could effectively step into the shells of the old empires while maintaining an appearance of liberalism and self-rule for subjects. One should note the correlation of liberalism and Freemasonry. One should also note that Masons believe in separating public and private (exoteric and esoteric) creeds. Therefore the public propaganda of “independence, self-rule, and freedom” stands in stark contrast to the reality of soft power empire. Any subject who would try to break away from the project or exercise too much self-rule and freedom has to be brought in line either through financial and diplomatic pressures or through threat of military intervention, targeted assassinations, or coup d’état. [16]

            The Suez Crisis above is a phenomenal case of soft power trumping hard power. Soft power doesn’t necessarily win, and often times it doesn’t, but the Post-War International Order is built such that hard power is deliberately downplayed [rhetorically], concealed and excused while soft power is in the open but given plausible cover. America sided with Egypt not because of reasons of principle but because of wanting to avoid potential escalation with the Soviets and needing to build loyalty among minor nations so that they would more-or-less willingly go along with the Post-War International Order. The French and British had tag-teamed America into two wars to break the continental rival power (Germany), and the end result was total loss and undermining of all power that remained in their fragmented countries after 1945. That is the definition of a pyrrhic victory. Out of both World Wars, America did a minority of the actual fighting but was a decisive swing participant. America ended up assuming the old imperial institutions from the other European powers, chiefly France and Britain, but turned them toward global soft power empire rather than a hard empire.

            Some of the most powerful social controls in the Post-War International Order are in lies which make subjects, both subject states and people, believe that they are freer and smarter than they are. These are things I’ve mentioned before in the past but bear repeating. Elections in most states do not matter as elected officials are generally holders of nominal power. To the extent they are not, they are generally compromised by globohomo through one of several ways, be it morally, financially, socially, or ideologically into compliance. In most states, administrators, select actors, and various financiers and plutocrats are usually the key figures, whereas few among those who stand tall in public hold genuine power.

Still, despite all this, the US was strong in 1980, and it was de facto princeling of the dung heap in 1991. Nigh thirty years later and the vestiges of that strength are quickly fading – far quicker, in fact, than I would have suspected even a few years ago. The reasons for this are forthcoming.

III.             Intro to Small Unit Tactics

In tactical as in strategic thought one will find certain things rhyme. The reason is that, simply, tactics is a smaller scale application of similar principles. The biggest difference is that the tactical space is often more dominated by sort of formulaic or doctrinal thinking. Strategy especially at the higher levels does not adhere to the same formulas and so on.

I think unlike strategy, tactics are best illustrated and learned by war games and by example. One can go through dry lists of principles, ideas, mechanics, and the like, and one is to some degree well served by this. At the same time, examples are less dry and do more in the same space. That is one of the reasons why leaders historically have always been raised playing tactical and strategic games of various flavors. Even if they’re not directly applicable to the field of battle, they get one thinking in the proper mode.

Every tactical or strategic match whether in a game or in war is like wrestling or judo. One is constantly probing for enemy weaknesses while shoring up one’s own vulnerabilities. At the same time, when one finds opportunities one always tries to press the advantage in a timely fashion. Wrestling bouts have weight classes but wars do not of course. The closest things are power blocks, where hegemons at the helm of each block are the top of world geopolitical power. As mentioned in the last article, this is the post-war international order (USA) and the loose counter American sphere (China-Iran-Russia). Everyone else is either tied to one power block or in some nether region, and if the latter then they still have no real power. Like I made clear before, each of the countries in the counter American sphere is really a regional hegemon. China is trying to make their regional hegemony the biggest and most vital – which will directly threaten Iran and Russia long run, but in the short run both of those pretenders need to rely on China as much or more than China needs them.

We shall start off with something simple – with few moving parts. Two fire team elements going at each other. They start 600m apart behind cover and have to capture or kill the other team. The space is a relatively flat, grassy field with sparse tree cover and a few ditches, stones, and logs. Weather is fair and about noon time. Each team has identical composition – three riflemen, machine gunner, and team leader. They are also kitted out identically with ACOG-equipped M4s for the riflemen and team leaders and an M249 SAW for the machine gunners and headsets wired to encrypted radios for everyone.

The ideal would be to wait at the starting position behind the heaviest cover and wait for the enemy to come to one’s own team. The problem with this is that if both teams do this, nothing happens. It is probable that one has to apply some pressure. One way to do this is to keep the SAW gunner at the heaviest cover one can find, even if it is 250m or 300m away from the enemy, while moving the rest of the element forward.

The rest of the element should move by bounding; one holds while the other moves to ensure that if contact does occur, at least some can react quickly and the others can take cover. They should also proceed along a course where they can dash from cover to cover fairly quickly, with a preference given to cover over concealment. A ditch is better than a dead log for cover even though if the enemy closes the gap, the enemy can flush one out with grenades. Even relatively thick logs are often rotten, and at any rate a tree has to be stout and hard to stop a 5.56mm at 200-300m. They should get no closer than 100m from the suspected enemy position to prevent ambushes or grenade assaults. Once they have advantageous ground and know the location of the enemy, they should hold and wait to see what the enemy does. Putting oneself in a position that the enemy must attack is the ideal as attack is always more difficult than defense all things being equal.

Whichever team follows those thoughts closest will almost certainly win. Neither has a clear advantage from numbers, equipment, intel, or starting position. Advantage must be gained on the battlefield. Factoring in individual differences is fair and realistic in an actual scenario, but unnecessary for this illustration where the tactics are the main thing. If both have the same objective and neither can retreat or otherwise disengage when they realize they are at a disadvantage, the more tactically deft team will win. In a real scenario, one would disengage and retreat once one realized that one could not win the engagement (if one is smart).

For a second example, we will have a mechanized platoon marching into a city fighting an ‘asymmetrical’ force with about half again as many men (or 3:2 ratio favouring the militia type force). Usually this would be characterized as ‘BLUFOR’ versus ‘OPFOR’ but I’ll omit that for this piece. Picture the mechanized platoon armed in typical Western style, and picture the asymmetrical force armed in typical Soviet surplus style. For the sake of this scenario, the mechanized platoon won’t have access to things like airpower or field guns. They and the asymmetrical force only get the light weapons attendant to their units directly, things like mortars, AT missiles, and mounted machineguns. 

Starting with the asymmetrical force, their ideal tactic is to lay mines and IEDs in chokepoints and try to funnel the mechanized force into those routes. There are many ways of funneling the mechanized force, although preferably one should be aware of the preferred or regular routes that the enemy takes when doing street patrols or sweeps and avoid making an ambush site too obvious except as a diversion. These ways include everything from piling debris to burning tires to enlisting friendly noncombatants to block vehicle access to certain streets.

Once several of their vehicles are disabled, they should then bring out other light weapons such as medium machineguns, mortars, and RPGs and pour heavy effective fire on the hobbled mechanized force. Confining their range of motion is the first part, and then disabling some of their vehicles to further reduce their mobility and freedom of movement is the second part, and the ambush can only proceed in earnest once those two first parts are achieved. Mortars and other light weapons should be sighted in ahead of time for the ambush point and for potential fall back areas. Assuming it succeeds in limiting the mobility and freedom of movement of the opponent, and then in the subsequent ambush, the asymmetrical force can inflict substantial loss upon the mechanized force.

In contrast, the mechanized force should prefer mobility and distance at all times. Their biggest strength is precisely in mobility. When they enter the city for street sweeps or patrols, all emphasis should be placed on varying routes and being vigilant for potential chokepoints or ambushes. If an ambush is suspected, alternate paths should be taken or, if not available, one should try to exit the way one entered the city. If one is successfully funneled into a chokepoint, one must create an exit somehow, whether this means ramming barricades or explosives to clear debris. The crew served weapons mounted on mechanized vehicles add ample firepower to counter most immediate threats.

They would have to secure the entrance and exit to the city first, and then move deeper from there toward the objective. If the objective is a simple sweep or ‘mow the lawn’ mission, the ideal is to probe deep enough to encounter resistance but still allow oneself a relatively easy exit. Militia forces should be countered primarily while mounted except in cases where confined quarters or the like limit vehicle access. In those cases, men should quickly dismount and raid buildings suspected or known to hold militia forces, breaching with charges or shotguns generally and preferring to use hand grenades and shoulder-fired high explosive missiles to clear strongholds. Buildings which have to be cleared personally should be done with at least a fire team, including one man securing the entrance and two to three room clearing.

If the ambush can be executed, the mechanized force will at the least be thwarted and have losses to recoup. If the ambush is avoided, the mechanized force will likely succeed or at least avoid catastrophic loss.

Our third scenario will be a situation where one squad has to rescue another squad which is under fire in enemy territory. There are unknown numbers of enemies. The shortest route to the friendly squad is through disadvantageous ground like a valley where enemies could easily setup an ambush and not be spotted in time. A slightly longer but more optimal route would go along the hills or other elevated ground but beneath hilltops, giving better visibility but keeping the relief squad from ‘cresting’ and making themselves known well in advance. In any case, the path taken to relieve the squad under duress should be one with minimal contact along the way. Even five minutes of intense exchange can burn through a substantial amount of supplies and potentially incur losses, and thus minimizing contact is preferable until either on one’s terms or necessary. Once the rendezvous has occurred, ideally fire support of some type should be called on the heaviest enemy concentration while performing a retreat to safe ground under smoke screen or light cover/concealment and looking for an escape route.

As stated in the previous essay, the first priority is safety. The objective is second. If one places oneself in danger en route to helping comrades, one is neither helping them nor anyone else, and is in fact potentially placing a whole stream of allies in further danger by then likely requiring further assistance (and delaying relief to the squad who first needed it).

Fourth is an enemy in an entrenched position. The enemy is a platoon sized unit, and friendly forces only slightly outnumber them (by about one squad). How one approaches this depends. If one has plenty of time, the absolute best option is to surround them and put fire support on them. Then wait. Most positions will fall apart after two to three weeks of moderate fire and collapse of supply lines. If one hasn’t that sort of time, and if their position butts up to other enemy concentrations, one ought to soften them with whatever fire support is available and then probe. Then one can make a small hole in their line and exploit it to overtake their position.

The worst thing one can do is walking into their line with insufficient knowledge or preparation. If one doesn’t soften them in advance, fortified positions especially within distance of enemy supply and reinforcement will hold a huge advantage over any attacking force. One also has to be willing to exploit any small openings that are made, as the first breach is normally going to be limited until their lines begin to collapse. Desperate and cornered enemies may fight viciously, but the alternative is leaving them with intact lines of supply and communication. Severing those lines will increase the odds of enemy surrender. A platoon isolated is a small unit and as long as one looks for good opportunities (e.g. weaknesses in enemy routines, fortifications, communications, etc.) which may yield when pressed one is bound to have a good chance of a win.

Our fifth and last dream case will be a single fire team clearing a house or other structure. Regardless of how stiff the opposition inside is expected, there is a similar formula one applies. The fire team stacks up on the perimeter wall outside the front (and only) doorway to the structure. Three on one side, two on the other. The leader opens the door from the side of the wall nearest the handle and clears the entryway by ‘slicing the pie.’ That is, he remains in cover as much as possible while his weapon sweeps a narrow portion of the room.

After the entryway is clear, the fire team with the exception of one man remaining at the doorway goes onto the next room. It’s another closed door that opens to a meeting hall. This time, they stack up again and the fire team leader has one of the men ready a fragmentation grenade. The team leader opens the door slightly, the private tosses the grenade in, and they all step back with their rifles trained on the doorway and wait for the grenade to detonate. After it goes off, they enter the room and either end anyone inside or take them prisoner, in the process clearing the same way they did the entryway. One critical thing is for good communications: if one is taking a room by multiple entrances, good communications and planning is paramount to avoid friendly fire. Another is for quick and accurate fire: better to rapidly fire twelve to fifteen rounds in the area of a foe and walk them into him, even if only three hit, than to try to ensure everything lands on target.

And so on and so forth until the building is clear. Building clearing is similar to combat in an open field, only with more potential angles of attack and more obstacles blocking sight. One should still try to remain in cover or concealment as much as possible (and prefer cover). One should expose oneself as briefly as possible during movements room-to-room or in peeking outside. When looking out of windows, it’s generally better to stand back away from the window while looking out. While one has a smaller angle from which to look out and it may be harder to see, it also makes one harder to spot in turn.

IV.              China’s Rise, Intelligence and Counter-intel

American strength and consequently the Post-War International Order enjoyed a post-Soviet plateau where China was still developing and Russia was hobbled in the throes of Glasnost and Perestroika. China developed rapidly thanks to capital outflows and technical data from the West. Unlike other backward countries, China started with a modestly good hand after Mao’s death in the mid-70s, and Deng Xiaoping as Communist premier took the PRC from a still largely peasant backwater to substantially developing by his retirement in 1992. Foreign investment in China began in earnest through the ‘80s, expanded in the ‘90s, and exploded after their ascension to the WTO. The rise of Japan in some ways presaged China, but their impact in causing a decline of Western industry was more limited because they had a Western government and fairly quickly reached Western standards by the late ‘70s after rapid economic development in the ‘50s and ‘60s. One should also note the obvious demographic disparity, where even now Japan is a little under 130 million and China is 1.4 billion.

Japan reached the very early start of their demographic slump in the late ‘90s. China is reaching theirs essentially within the next five years, and if nCoVid-19 clears away some of their oldest people (as it likely is), it may give them another ten years of relative demographic health. Europe, likewise, is reaching the demographic slump now.

Since I’m on the subject of demography, one of the legacies of China since 1979 is the one child policy. This is their way of coping with what we might call a realization of the limits to growth to borrow the title from the book. This was an intentional policy, but with a limited scope; the point was to enforce fairly strict fertility limits on the cities, but to allow the hinterlands to more or less breed like normal. While this was a dysgenic policy, we will note that basically all of the population control policies in the post-war era have been dysgenic. Arguably, the Post-War International Order (“globohomo”) suite which prescribes abortion, contraception, family and community dissolution, secularism, transience, mass migration, and poisonous “Western” cultural hegemony is more disastrous for any polity which accepts those terms compared to the one child policy. The Chinese suffer a fairly lopsided sex ratio of 1.05 males to females, which is particularly bad when we look toward the 16-35 year demographic (skewing toward 1.1 or 1.15).

At the same time, this is actually exactly true of every Western country almost without fail now, and while we lack good official data because of the numbers of refugees and illegals in virtually every Western country which skew the sex ratio but usually aren’t counted in census data, we can surmise that it’s probably worse than China. China also has the benefit of still retaining a strong ethnic identity where Mandarin is the aspirational tongue and Han the aspirational ethnic, even if the reality of Mandarin being a single language with its many disparate dialects or Han being one united ethnic group with its wide gene clusters are all dubious questions. Contrast this with the deconstruction and demoralization to which the West has succumbed, and which the Chinese Communist Party refuses to allow within its borders (but will happily export as part of Maoist third-worldist strategy). Certainly in the US, the sex ratio in the 16-35 year demographic is almost certainly worse than China, probably in the 1.25 or 1.3 range, and I suspect numbers across the West are fairly similar. You can’t import millions of “migrants” or invaders or whatever under various names for tens of years running where the average is 60-70% male without vastly skewing the sex ratio of the whole country over time, especially as migrants skew disproportionately young as compared with natives basically everywhere. [17]

The one child policy is over in China as of 2016. The “globohomo” suite probably will not end in the ruin of the West until globohomo ends.

The Communist Party of China deftly negotiated the legitimacy crisis after Mao’s death and economic stagnation in a way which the Soviets did not and possibly could not have, as they were able to strategically exploit the Sino-Soviet split to open with the West and accelerate foreign investment. Critically, they did this with conditions set by the party because China was and is a huge consumer market and has the favorable marks of being fairly politically stable while having had exceptionally cheap labor costs. The PRC also provided tax breaks and lax regulatory restrictions (vis-à-vis labour and environment) on a wide range of industries in the halcyon days of Chinese outsourcing. That meant that they could set terms such as requiring companies who were offshoring from the West to give the Communist Party of China intellectual property and technical data.

The landscape has changed substantially since 1976 or 1990, and labour is no longer nearly as cheap as it was, but most Western companies are in a position where recapitalizing in the West would be too costly in the short-term and outsourcing firms can outcompete them until they have fully operational production lines. They still have to give substantial control of IP, technical data, and certain day-to-day operations to the Communist Party and whatever contractors are agreed upon. We have a converging situation; labour is declining in influence and compensation in the West while wages and standards are rising in China and to a lesser extent in other outsourcing havens as well. This includes quality control and overall expertise, which means there are actually probably some areas where Chinese manufacture is simply better than American or broadly Western manufacture now though their social ethics sometimes hamper further improvement. [18]

I alluded to the Sino-Soviet split above. This split happened because of a number of factors. The first was differing geopolitical aims. The Soviets were looking foremost to consolidate the Soviet sphere (the 2^nd World) and find ways of cutting into the American globohomo sphere (1^st world). The Chinese were interested in acquiring a proper sphere of influence after the ‘century of humiliation’ and a civil war which ravaged the country, and they would do this through Maoist third worldism. Secondly, Mao was perceived as an unstable leader. He was a loose cannon. This was clear in everything from the way he carried out the Cultural Revolution to his claims that Russia cucked during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Communist Party felt otherwise, and thought that Khrushchev actually partnered too much with Castro and the result was teetering on the brink of nuclear war for several months. Mao was belligerent with regards to conventional and nuclear force usage and escalation, and didn’t subscribe to MAD or cautious geopolitical strategies that avoided brinksmanship. Even in the Korean War, the Chinese wanted to escalate but had to be talked into sense and negotiations by the Russians. Lastly, as far as important things go was the Sino-Indian war where the Russians backed the Indians. This was a chicken shit border war over disputed territory near Tibet, but the Chinese prevailed under Mao’s hotheaded leadership. News of Russian aid to their border rival did not sit well with the Chinese obviously. [19]

Nixon’s meeting with Mao happened shortly after this split became official. It lasted to varying degrees until the mid-to-late ‘90s after the fall of the USSR and the Russian revival as a substantially leaner and humbler power. At this point, while China relies on trade with the West for consumer goods exports and capital or strategic goods imports – though it is increasingly turning toward domestic consumption and a relatively more autarkic market – and in terms of geopolitics there are no common interests with Western powers outside of trade. The counter-American sphere consisting of China, Iran, and Russia may not be terribly coherent, but it has the singular interest of undoing or altering the Post-War International Order in common. One has to realize that outside of figures like Mao, oriental ideologues are somewhat rarer among the ruling classes than in the West. Consequently they tend to rule more often on a basis of interests, realpolitik, and pragmatism.

This means that in addition to certain military industry partnerships with Russia, especially in armor, artillery, and aerospace – Western countries are themselves bequeathing a massive technology transfer to China and have done so since opening of relations. China has more industrial capacity in virtually everything that counts, from structural steel to concrete to microprocessors, and the only things that the US and the West more broadly has advantage in are things like production of quality alloys, plastics, and chemicals and some raw materials. The US petroleum and natural gas industry is one which far exceeds Chinese capacity of course. Even pharmaceutical capacity has largely been outsourced to China and India at this juncture. Outside of infusion or biologic drugs or other specialty therapies, increasing numbers of drugs are produced in China, India, and other outsource havens.

Meanwhile, Russia, China, and Iran have partnered in guided missile research and production. Russia does the heavy lifting in aerospace and missile research, but China is pitching in some at this point. They have developed sophisticated Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGM), and Anti-ship Missiles (ASM). All of these are designed primarily to counter the strongpoints of American power projection – aircraft, armor, and ships. Even though some of these are fairly expensive, especially ASM and full SAM batteries, they are far cheaper than Zumwalt-class destroyers or Nimitz-class carriers or F-35s. Deployed widely, they effectively limit where and when American forces will move. All of those three pretender powers are licensed to produce these pieces of kit, and all of them are producing and using them to varying degrees. At present, American forces are unsure about countermeasures like anti-missile defenses whether for nuclear or conventional missiles. They have some efficacy but aren’t foolproof, and if an area is saturated with enough SAM or ASM, countermeasures will not be able to keep up.

            Industrial or political and military espionage, all of which is essentially strategic at varying levels, cannot be well countered or preempted by globohomo. The precepts are such that Chinese agents can trivially be inserted to positions of influence, including ones with top secret and Special Access Program (SAP) access directly or by proxy, and only well after large sets of secret data has been compromised can these agents be stopped. In a coherent country, one could easily bar Chinese nationals or all yellow men (or yellow six-pointed star men) from sensitive positions in MILINT or military industries. This isn’t a coherent country and the ideology de jure prevents simple and sensible measures like that.

            In practical terms, you have tools for counter-intel. Two of them that immediately spring to mind are also useful for SIGINT. They are traffic and network analysis. To use a concrete example, traffic analysis is like sitting outside of a building and keeping an entry-exit log. You don’t get a whole lot of information beyond what time people go in and go out, and how many people are there or who is there if you’re lucky enough to have known identities, but sometimes if you do have info you can pair with the traffic analysis like metadata you can actually get quite a lot. Network analysis is like finding the information of everyone in a neighborhood or business. What level of detail you go to or what layer of the hierarchy you zoom in on depends on your purposes. You need a different part of the onion to leverage IT vulnerabilities as opposed to financial vulnerabilities. [20]

            Soviet counter-intelligence was rather phenomenal. They achieved this success largely by leveraging HUMINT assets who would side with them for reasons of money or ideology (or both). Globohomo political consensus always ran a deficit in coolness (and continues to do so), and while seeming reasonable at one time, it often lost the fiery and romantic youth to “radical” politics of some flavor or another. Soviets made up for their comparative weakness in SIGINT by getting buff in HUMINT and COINT. [21]

            This also feeds into cryptography. Keeping a network secure usually means keeping a certain amount of the network hidden from view, and it definitely means keeping sensitive communications hidden. It’s one of the reasons why many high level actions in society are negotiated or coordinated in obscure backchannel settings, whether for intelligence-surveillance purposes or public relations or arts-media-academia or some other form of social or economic control. As mentioned above, this is something inherent to governance. There is no government which can be truly open and also secure or stable. The closest things are sort of tribal governments but these are subject to charismatic leaders and scale can vary widely from generation to generation. A tribal government can form a confederation which, through clever imperial maneuvering, may span the better part of a continent – but these rarely last more than two generations. Even the Mongol Empire dissolved or fragmented into smaller units after two generations, partly because of the limitations of communications at the time and partly because of the sheer instability imparted by tribal governance.

            Tribal government is too open. Anyone with a large army, great willpower, or excellent charisma can challenge the standing ruler or fragment the confederation. On the flip side, present ‘democratic republics’ which characterize the West are probably ironically too closed. When I said previously that we live in the New Soviet, this is part of it. Part of the enclosure means a crackdown on useful information – the signal to noise ratio of the unkultur complex is awful. The obvious point is that these things are not meant to convey Truth and Beauty to subjects but to keep them compliant and producing and consuming products. The ironic part here is that recent propaganda is also trying to get people to adjust to a lower standard of living; that is part of the reason for the push for veganism and vegetarianism, bug burgers, cramped cities and small living spaces, and carbon credits. I can discuss each of those in turn shortly and why they represent declining living standards.

            I said in my previous essay that the open society is one of the Great Lies. That is patently obvious to anyone who looks into the matter. Extant elites are perfectly willing to kill or otherwise ruin people who threaten to expose vulnerabilities or dirty secrets. I view “whistleblower protection” laws basically as ways to smoke out genuine whistleblowers and ruin them. Ultimately, what is genuine “whistleblowing” and what is criminal is determined by the people about whom one is crying foul, and most whistleblowers and most people in society frankly have a horribly naïve or fragmented view of society. But the other part of enclosure has to do not just with information, although information is a big part, it is the ossification of society. When one is a child, one is cultivated deliberately with all sorts of unrealistic fantasies about society and about one’s own personal future; the purpose of this is to deliberately worsen the ‘thrownness’ of folks outside of the elite. That is, it makes worse that disorientation early in life and imbues a sense of deep dread and nihilism in most people upon learning more truths.

            Some amount of childhood optimism is good and proper. If one starts off at 14 years old with the jaded, bitter, cynical outlook I have adopted from years of research, one is likely to burn out or otherwise be tempted to self-destruction. Still, the fact is that elites are initiated into worldly truths and pathways of power. The rump middle are expected to stay content with fictions, and if they by chance learn too much they must then stay quiet or risk backlash should they speak the truth. Thrownness is a concept from Heidegger and describes concisely the feeling of being ‘thrown into the world’ and how smart folk are slowly initiated over time generally (if at all).

            Why do those things I mentioned before represent declining living standards? I’ll run down the list. Plants take less acreage of arable land per kilocalorie than meat. While they are also less energy dense foods, they are also less investment to grow. Thus if one can get most of one’s subjects to willfully agree to a largely vegan or vegetarian diet, this will increase the carrying capacity of an area even if it worsens health especially for children and strict vegans. It is difficult for strict vegans and children to get a wide range of nutrients on these diets from B12 to iron and zinc, and because soy is a staple men will often end up ingesting excessive xenoestrogens from their diet in addition to other environmental sources. One will note rulers don’t necessarily care too much about the median health of their subjects so long as the subjects can be net producers.

Insects as food is obvious; they are not traditionally worthy of eating unless one is in famine conditions. Most Europeans have a healthy disgust for insects and the idea of eating them. Cramped cities and small living spaces are also fairly intuitive; excessively high population density and smaller homes are ceteris paribus undesirable and indicators of lower standards of living. While I row against the incoherent suburban sprawl typical of America and certain other countries in the West, replacing it with an anti-human termite mound is obviously undesirable. Carbon credits lastly are a way of getting secularized people who long for religion to agree to pay a tithe to their rulers, in effect an extra tax for the layperson despite the majority of carbon emissions coming as a result of the global supply chain and heavy industry. It vectors their partly religious and partly consumerist impulse into a semi-voluntary tax which allows rulers to expand their margins while the median person must accept further declines in living standards.       

            I posed the question above: wherefore the dizzying fall of America? I suggest there are a few culprits at hand. The first, Jewish business and corporate culture to include the private equity firm. The second which is connected to the first, deindustrialization. The third, bringing of masses of scab labour to reduce wages and break bargaining power of native workers (as well as sundry social effects). The fourth, overuse of plastics, poisonous petrochem laden food (Monsanto Goyfeed ^tm), and other pollutants. Diabetes fuel like various sugars might be a good runner-up. The fifth, Jewish power and the nature of American globohomo soft power more broadly. That is, it relies upon deceit and trickery to function and thus lying as a cultural habit has gotten worse in the past hundred years to the point where the average Western person has no idea what truth is. Jews have no stake in the West being viable long term and their institutions are built to extract maximum value for them, right here and now.

The key about China in 2050 is that it doesn’t have to beat out the US at its height. It only has to be the best of whatever dregs of humanity crawl among the ruins at that stage, and at that point it becomes the undisputed master of East Asia, East Africa, and Australasia. The US in 2050 by contrast is slated to be a mediocre if not awful former powerhouse – wrecked by Luciferian ambition and Jewish rule and dashed on the rocks of its own greed and lust.

           

           





[1] https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0215_infrastructure-ranking-by-country-world-economic-forum

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/measuring-up-u-s-infrastructure-against-other-countries

https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/making-the-grade/report-card-history/

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/state-us-infrastructure

https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/USA/Capital_investment/

https://www.industryweek.com/capital-investment

https://qz.com/1269172/the-epic-mistake-about-manufacturing-thats-cost-americans-millions-of-jobs/





[2] https://www.postandcourier.com/business/airline-surveys-point-to-ongoing-production-problems-at-boeing-s/article_0e75f53a-b2d6-11e9-9606-0ffafccd055e.html

https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/the-coming-boeing-bailout

https://newrepublic.com/article/154944/boeing-737-max-investigation-indonesia-lion-air-ethiopian-airlines-managerial-revolution

https://leehamnews.com/category/bjorns-corner/ (technical analysis of the 737 MAX system failure in this blog.)





[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_equity#Private_equity_in_the_1980s

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leveragedbuyout.asp

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateequity.asp

https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/education/what-are-alternative-investments/private-equity-investing (this is basically the propaganda sell from a private equity/asset management firm on private equity, and it’s not really entirely accurate)





[4] From largest to smallest (Q4 2019): BlackRock, $7.4 trillion; Vanguard, $6.2 trillion; Berkshire Hathaway, $817.7 billion; The Blackstone Group, $554 billion; Brookfield, $385 billion; The Carlyle Group, $222 billion; Oaktree, $122 billion; TPG, $103 billion; Warburg Pincus $62 billion; Cerberus, $50 billion; SilverLake, $42.5 billion; Onex, $38 billion; Hellman & Friedman, $25 billion; the remaining PE/capital management firms are all <$25 billion in assets under management. In total I counted about $2 trillion in assets under these companies, and it’s probably more in reality. If you drive anywhere along the East Coast US, you’ll see Berkshire Hathaway real estate signs everywhere. They do both commercial and residential but most of it does seem to be residential real estate. The residential real estate market is only a fraction of the total assets under management, but it’s a decent fraction given how much real estate they have bought since at least 2009.





[5] https://larrylittlefield.wordpress.com/2020/02/14/the-commercial-real-estate-future-bankruptcy-foreclosure-workout-value-added-reinvention-and-redevelopment/





[6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Electric_timeline

https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/GE/general-electric/stock-price-history

https://www.investopedia.com/insights/rise-and-fall-ge/

https://www.economist.com/business/2002/10/24/solving-ges-big-problem





[7] https://www.courant.com/business/hc-xpm-2012-08-19-hc-colt-timeline-20120817-story.html

https://www.colt.com/timeline

http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/colt-s-manufacturing-company-inc-history/

http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/remington-arms-company-inc-history/

https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/cerberus-capital-management#section-overview

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cerberus_Capital_Management





[8] In 1980, that number went from just under 20 million to just over 10 million by 2019; this in a country which went from 226 million to 340 million in the same forty years, virtually all of that demographic growth from migrants. According to officials, the shell game somehow works out and we’ll get full employment with fewer jobs and less productive capacity – and more people to put to work. Projections show growth of about 10% every ten years not counting illegal migrants (‘invaders’ under nativist parlance). Meanwhile, percent urban went from 73% in 1980 to about 83% as of 2018-19. [continued in footing 8.1]

https://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h980.html

https://www.census.gov/newsroom/cspan/1940census/CSPAN_1940slides.pdf

https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/population

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html

https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-continues-to-rise/

https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/22/heres-how-much-ceo-pay-has-increased-compared-to-yours-over-the-years.html (article includes EPI as source)

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45090.pdf





[9] https://hbr.org/2005/02/strategic-sourcing-from-periphery-to-the-core (Harvard Business College was one of the culprits shilling early and often to outsource. There’s a graphic in this 2005 article basically telling business owners that no matter the state of their business, outsourcing was a good idea. Circa Current Year, it’s not so clear that there are as many unambiguous perks as they claimed especially as labour costs rise across the ‘developing world.’)

[other commentary in 9.1]

https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/final_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf



https://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/aerospace/military/a-qa-with-us-nuclear-weapons-expert

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=764766

https://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/us-manufacturing-decline-and-the-rise-of-new-production-innovation-paradigms.htm

https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/usacsl/publications/IP7_11.pdf

https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.32.2.47

https://www.mapi.net/sites/default/files/attachments/NABE_Meckstroth%20Award_FINAL_KliesenTatom.pdf

(For sake of argument, I’ll put in a paper by shills. These guys argue that productivity is up despite employment being down.  That’s almost impossible. When you combine declining inputs and employment, the claim of rising productivity becomes a joke. This paper is likewise a joke.)

[10] https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/06/12/the-pentagon-is-battling-the-clock-to-fix-serious-unreported-f-35-problems/

https://www.businessinsider.com/f-35-still-struggling-with-more-than-dozen-big-problems-2019-6

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/f-35-trouble-dispute-lockheed-martin-means-no-more-american-f-35-deliveries-66031

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/armys-m2-bradley-fighting-vehicle-old-what-replaces-it-could-be-revolutionary-34507

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/27/army-officers-accused-of-bribery-in-pentagon-acqui/

https://www.gao.gov/key_issues/national_defense_space_system_acquisitions/issue_summary

https://www.govexec.com/feature/slow-and-steady-losing-defense-acquisition-race/

https://www.thenation.com/article/heres-where-your-tax-dollars-for-defense-are-really-going/

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/merger-mania-should-the-pentagon-pay-for-defense-industry-restructuring/

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-littoral-combat-ship-is-a-disaster-and-this-is-the-1796783565

Daily reminder: we are in the loot and pillage phase of Globohomo Western civilization. I said before that defense acquisitions usually end up being solid, but it looks like they’re putting the lie to that.

[11] https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2007/N2859.pdf

https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/declassified_138256.htm

https://www.jstor.org/stable/24913704

https://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0006.pdf

[commentary in 11.1]

  



[12] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Beers

http://www.paulzimnisky.com/a-brief-history-of-de-beers

https://www.baunat.com/en/de-beers-eventful-history

(De Beers is a great case in point: sounds Dutch, but it’s a Jewish company.)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_South_Africa_Company#Commercial_activities

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Dutch_Shell#Origins

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rothschild_%26_Co#Late_18th_Century  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo_American_plc

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gencor

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_of_London

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balfour_Declaration

[13] https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_finance

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_history_of_World_War_I

https://www.thebalance.com/world-war-i-4173886

[14] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stavisky_Affair

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9on_Blum

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89douard_Daladier

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Communist_Party#History

https://www.britannica.com/place/France/The-interwar-years

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/britain_wwtwo/overview_britain_1918_1945_01.shtml

https://www.britannica.com/place/United-Kingdom/Britain-from-1914-to-the-present

[15] https://www.britannica.com/topic/Suez-Canal

https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/About/SuezCanal/Pages/CanalHistory.aspx

https://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-history/a-brief-history-of-the-suez-canal/

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez

https://www.britannica.com/event/Suez-Crisis

https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/dd10d6bf-e14d-40b5-9ee6-37f978c87a01/003be399-1fcb-4a0b-bf84-70781e403376





[16] https://www.unz.com/runz/american-pravda-mossad-assassinations/

https://www.mintpressnews.com/israel-mossad-fingerprints-assassination-qasem-soleimani/263923/

https://theintercept.com/2018/03/11/israel-mossad-assassination-book/

https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Qasem-Soleimani-spectacularly-blown-up-Difference-between-US-vs-Mossad-612980

https://www.mintpressnews.com/mega-group-maxwells-mossad-spy-story-jeffrey-epstein-scandal/261172/





[17] https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth

https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/world-population-charts-today-future/

https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/plastic-problem-recycling-myth-big-oil-950957/?utm_source=pocket-newtab





[18] https://www.thoughtco.com/the-sino-soviet-split-195455

https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/was-the-sino-soviet-split-borne-of-ideology-or-geostrategic-consideration/





[19] https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2016/01/china_related_export_control_risks_january_2016.pdf

https://magazine.ethisphere.com/illegal-exports-of-technical-data/

https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/23/technology/china-us-trump-tariffs-ip-theft/index.html

https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/china-forced-technology-transfer-and-theft

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-30/apple-worker-charged-with-secrets-theft-for-china-robocar-firm

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-knows-all-about-f-35-and-f-22-thanks-data-it-stole-61912

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-15/forced-or-not-why-u-s-says-china-steals-technology-quicktake



Apparently globohomo firms complain about this practice but continue to do business in China. Recent events notwithstanding, cost savings in China and elsewhere must outweigh IP and technical data theft. At least this was the case from, say, 1981 to 2014.

[20] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_network_analysis

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traffic_analysis

https://awakesecurity.com/glossary/network-traffic-analysis/

https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/sei_blog/2018/10/best-practices-in-network-traffic-analysis-three-perspectives.html

https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/traffic-analysis

https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/network-analysis

http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/G.Danezis/talks/TA-Amherst.pdf

(Most of this is in context of cyber security but works also in broader SIGINT or HUMINT.)





[21] https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/still-unexplained-cold-war-fbi-cia-180956969/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War_espionage

https://fas.org/irp/nsa/ioss/threat96/part03.htm (mostly post-soviet Russia)

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/russia-counter-intelligence-state

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/002200948702200403

https://fas.org/irp/world/russia/kgb/su0522.htm

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/national-security/cia-crypto-encryption-machines-espionage/

https://americanmind.org/essays/abolish-the-cia/ (Obligatory Codevilla. Not directly related to Soviets, Cold War, or counter-intel but worth reading)

[22] http://web.mit.edu/digitalapollo/Documents/Chapter5/saturnas501.pdf

https://www.industryweek.com/innovation/product-development/article/21936286/the-saturn-v-rocket-and-supply-chain-innovation

https://www.history.nasa.gov/MHR-5/part-1.htm

http://www.nucleartourist.com/basics/construct.htm

[8.1]   It’s important to note the ‘why’ of these things. Rural life depends heavily on farming, stock raising, and support industries related to food production or certain extractive industries like logging or mining. Most of the grunt labor for farming, i.e. farmhands, pickers, and meat and plant processing, has been handed to migrant or otherwise non-white [scab] labour. This is also increasingly true of manufacturing, construction, and maintenance, especially since about 1995, where the trend has a longer history in farming (particularly in the Southwest region). Above board employment in agriculture is at about 1% of the total workforce, and for white Americans these are primarily either small operations, stock raising farms, or ‘family’ contractors for agribusiness. Farmland is dominated by ‘family’ operations and they are overwhelmingly of the latter type, where an extended family in Iowa or Arkansas (or most of the lower 48 for that matter) usually rent certain expensive capital equipment (e.g. combine tractors) and buy seed and fertilizer/pesticide/other petrochemicals from agribusiness on credit and lean heavily on migrant labour for cost-cutting. Contacts with agribusiness give them pipelines to federal dollars which along with futures options insure some stability despite occasionally poor yields or market volatility.

Note that even with some of this automated technology and farming techniques, for instance the aforementioned combine tractors and ‘factory farm’ cattle corrals, there are still labour-intensive aspects of farming and food production and the 1% agricultural employment (and a bit higher than 1% if we’re including food processing) is highly misleading because migrant labour is not included in these official statistics. Just as they are not included in census head counts (~310 mil). The actual population of the US is at least in excess of 340 million, and might well top 350 million, when one counts the various categories of illegal migrants present.

If one is not engaged in farming and food production or processing or the other supporting industries, then one really has little place in rural areas. Historically, the raison d’être of cities was to enable firstly markets and secondly specialization and division of labour. Markets up until the 1900s were not some abstract thing but a physical place where one went and bought and sold whatever folks could cart into the town square or a fairground. Thus when eight in ten people were farming, if you weren’t farming or raising livestock, you lived in a city more likely than not. The only other things to do out in the wilds or the countryside were things like trapping and hunting, logging, and extractive industries which while important usually did not demand as many hands as farming. Most of the specialized labour from cobblers to tailors to smiths and shipwrights (and even sailors) lived in cities and towns. Burghers might not have lived in huge cities as we fancy today, as cities in the early modern age or ‘middle ages’ were often on a scale that we would consider rather small (five to fifty thousand permanent householders), but nonetheless that expanded division of labour was their function (permanent marketplace, specialized labour, things like docks and shipwrights to float bigger ships than fishing villages could).
            The question is, what do you do when four or five in ten rely on alms? What is the point of all the automation we have and all the ‘progress’ if we haven’t found a place for everyone such as they are? It was one thing when, as in the old days, only a few in the village relied on alms as a matter of course like between harvests, and a few begged or sought charity in addition to odd jobs merely to survive. But employment was normal and normative, and there were not active barriers to large swathes of the population in terms of a cognitive-behavioral floor or racial preferences and punish-reward policies.

It would make a lot more sense to move in the exact opposite direction of what has actually happened, to put native [European] folk to work and to shoot for employment that looks something like 1/10^th extractive industry, 1/5^th farming, and 1/5^th production, give or take (preferably give) five percent or some to each of those. Management and services (including professions, e.g. law, medicine) could make up the remainder and you could easily have nearly full employment. The plus side is that you won’t be eating petrol products, work in general could be structured such that it is more enjoyable and less hazardous simply because one can deign to employ more people and still pay them all a decent wage if they are productive, and some people could even work fewer hours and commute shorter distances. Rather than throwing people out of work with robots, we could use machinery to make people more productive and allow them to make the same annual pay or slightly better and work fewer hours.

All of this would require a major restructuring of how our gay quasi-communist “market” system conceives of production and society in general. It would mean coherent cities which don’t suffer blight from shit people. Segregation is a very shitty work-around, but it was better than what we have in the post-civil rights era; ideally we should not live around such obviously incompatible people at all. It would also mean not relying on migrant labor for everything from farm hands to construction contractors to hospitality in most of the country. I can allow for maybe bringing in Mestizos to pick stuff which we can’t pick with machines during harvest season in parts of the Sunbelt, but there is no reason why they should be farm hands in most of the country or why they should be here all year.

The problem, ultimately, is that because the US and the West broadly are the new Soviet, we have a form of communism. It’s globohomo gay communism. It isn’t particularly concerned with equality or with greatness, but with the appearance or simulation thereof. One notices that indeed while the actual Soviets were shit in a lot of crucial ways, they were much truer to Marxist-Leninist principles than we are, and indeed our communism serves the bugman cosmopolitan-Semitic elite foremost. With so many things in the globohomo west, Bio-Leninism (courtesy spandrell) is yet another simulacra, and the point of it is to obfuscate the oligarchy and their crimes and largesse.

[9.1]   This [chamber of commerce page] is substantially addressed at Made in China 2025. China is already the world manufacturing leader, even if we assume some number fudging, and has been since around 2008-2012 at latest depending on how you measure it exactly. I would actually push that back a few years, but even so they do have five times the US population. Regardless, the point of the MiC 2025 initiative is not, as they say in this report, “To make China a world manufacturing leader”; they already are.

The point is to edge the US and European nations out in the other parts of the process, in design, logistics, and retail so that China is a fully integrated system from top to bottom and can supply Eurasia with goods and materials from its factories and vendors. In a word, approaching Chinese autarky. Obviously these would have to move through local markets and supply chains in other countries, but for any given product this means that 60-80% of the end value of the good will be realized by Chinese firms. This means keeping more money in China and employing more people there as well. It is also a way, by the bye, of undercutting American strategic industries like communications, transportation, and food production. How successful will they be in that? We don’t know. Still, worth waiting and seeing I guess. Chamber of Commerce people are fucking retarded.)

(February-March 2020 addendum: the ‘novel corona virus’ outbreak is a potential mover. It may or may not be a bioweapon and it seems likely to have come out of a bioweapon research lab in any case. It’s threatening the productivity of China broadly, and especially of the Chinese hinterland. As of mid-March, their industrial output is down by at least a third and GDP is coasting on production and sales from previous quarters. Wuhan, the center of the outbreak, is in the eastern half of the country but deep inland. At this point, at least 300 million people are under quarantine or extended Lunar New Year holidays and factories are not reopening and resuming work at normal pace. This in combination with rising wages and fewer subsidies in China or elsewhere is starting to make outsourcing look like the horrible idea it really is, even to plutocrats. Unfortunately, the alternative given present elites and present assumptions is outsourcing somewhere less risky, or heavily automating or ‘insourcing’ domestic production.)

(One of the conclusions drawn herein [paper on aeaweb]: “US manufacturing plant survival and employment between 1977 and 1997 are negatively associated with increasing import penetration from low-wage countries. To identify a causal effect of trade, they use changes in US import tariffs and ad valorem trade costs over their sample period as instruments for import penetration. Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Song (2014) and Acemoglu, Dorn, Hanson, Price (2015) show that workers in industries with higher growth in Chinese imports experience unemployment between 1992 and 2007. Regions with higher initial shares of employment in exposed industries also exhibit [declines in public goods, marriage, and life expectancy along with increases in household debt and deaths from despair.]”

No shit. It’s rather like the ‘80s and ‘90s Rust belt – when the big industries like textile and steel mills and so forth left areas in the Northeast and upper Midwest, nothing replaced it. People feel awful because their families and communities are destroyed, they’re mired in debt, their wages are in the gutter and their job security is rocky at best. For the FIRE guys, this is improvement.

It has some good graphs too, and the take away is this: real decline in all regions from 1970 to 2012, but the sharpest decline was in the regions they coded as New England, Mid Atlantic, and East North Central – which is to say the Rust Belt from Maine to Illinois/Minnesota and down to Pennsylvania.)

[11.1]  Key finding in RAND Corporation document:

“Furthermore, official NATO public information releases were shown by later research to be so far off the mark when it came to actual Soviet force structures that they raise doubts regarding the credibility of Western analysis of this period (1945-1955). Either little Western intelligence was ever gathered on the state of the conventional balance or the Soviets were extremely successful in keeping nonnuclear forces concealed. […] The picture that does emerge is of a conventional balance in Europe overwhelmingly skewed in favor of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Time and time again, the figure of 175 active Soviet divisions was put forth as the definitive number for the size of the Soviet Army; furthermore, these divisions were perceived to be fully manned, fully armed, and combat-ready. All-in-all, Soviet forces were estimated at 5.5 million men under arms in the mid-1950s, ground forces approximately 2.5 to 2.8 million troops.

            […] To be precise, a total of 26 divisions or half a million soldiers, were deployed forward in Eastern Europe: 20 in the DDR, 2 in Poland, 4 in Hungary (particularly after 1956). Approximately 75 more divisions were based in European Russia for reinforcement. […] In 1950, NATO adopted goals for 18 active and 16 reserve divisions […] [NATO] never came close to meeting the goals laid down in Lisbon. […] The Warsaw Pact was seen to have a 10:1 superiority in standing divisions – an overwhelming advantage that only increased if one included the USSR’s supposedly better-trained and more quickly mobilized reserves. 25 NATO compared with 150 readily available Warsaw Pact divisions made a nonnuclear balance that decidedly favored the East in nearly every category […]

            As it later turned out, in fact, the US and NATO consistently overestimated the size and strength of the USSR’s ground forces. In actuality, a good deal of their 1950 forces consisted of paper divisions, manned at extremely low strengths and states of readiness – including some forward deployed divisions in East Germany. […] [It turned out Soviet divisions were consistently much smaller than NATO divisions and moreover,] many Western leaders and analysts tended to ignore or downplay major Soviet troop cuts instituted by Khrushchev during the late 1950s and early ‘60s.

            This analysis also lacked qualitative comparisons of manpower and weapon systems. […] This ‘population paradox’ could also be seen in comparing US and Soviet ground forces alone. In 1961, according to Enthoven and Smith, the US Army totaled 961,000 in 16 divisions while Soviet forces totaled just under two million in 175 divisions. This raised an important question: how could the Soviets, with just over twice as many ground troops as the US, have over 10 times as many divisions?

            […] In fact, some analysts came to the conclusion that only those 22 divisions stationed in Poland and the DDR, plus a handful in European Russia, were truly combat-ready. It was further felt that it would take weeks, not days, to reinforce them in any military action. Finally, there was a tendency to doubt the reliability, contribution, or effect of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, especially in the event of a Soviet short-warning attack. Therefore, taking these factors into account, some analysts argued that 40-45 divisions total for all Warsaw Pact forces was more realistic. [Emphasis added.] In fact, if counted at NATO division strength these would only number about 30 NATO-sized divisions.

[Further paragraph notes consistent NATO advantages throughout duration of Cold War in ATGM, artillery, human capital i.e. training and staffing, supply, naval assets, and tactical and strategic airpower.]”

[13.1]  From first source: “American entry into the war transformed the inter-Allied credits from a hybrid public-private network into a set of intra-governmental relations of indebtedness with the United States at its core as the ultimate global creditor. [...] When the loans came due, European countries faced the costs of domestic reconstruction and foreign debt repayment in tandem.

Britain was in some sense helped by the fact that its claims on France, Russia, Italy, and other countries almost equaled its obligations to the United States.^[58] France faced a much bigger debt problem since the mismatch between its assets and liabilities was almost $1.4 billion, and even larger once its lost Russian assets were considered. French governments in the 1920s were often exasperated at the unwillingness of Republican administrations in Washington to cancel or at least freeze war debts. The war debts issue thus became a major weakness in the material foundations of the liberal international order during the 1920s. The Allies’ failure to resolve it satisfactorily before the Great Depression commenced was a pre-figuration of further coordination failures in the response to the economic slump itself. This portended the deterioration of global economic relations amidst mutual suspicion and distrust in the 1930s—a precondition for the political instability that in due course made a second world war possible.”

[15.1] From the various sources: “In Suez, the Third World won an important diplomatic victory.

Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, [a participant at the conference in] Bandung in 1955, was seeking to unify the Arab world around Egypt, of which he became President in June 1956. [A short-lived project called the UAR.] In order to stimulate the economic and agricultural transformation of the country, he planned the construction of a huge dam at Aswan. [The US refused to help pay for it. The Suez Canal, of course, was funded mostly by French and British sources.] On 26 July 1956, Nasser announced his intention to nationalise the Suez Canal Company. […]

[France and Britain] decided to launch a joint military attack with a view to regaining control over the administration of the canal. They were supported militarily by Israel […] On 29 October 1956, Israeli forces took the Sinai Peninsula, a vital area for the protection of the Jewish state. One week later, Anglo-French troops disembarked in Port Said. The operation was entirely successful — the Egyptian army was defeated in a few days […]

However, the world powers did not appreciate the actions of France and Britain in the slightest. The Soviet Union, which was in the process of forcibly putting down the insurrection in Hungary, threatened Paris and London with nuclear reprisals. The United States, despite being traditional allies of the European powers, complained that they had not been consulted beforehand […] and exerted enormous financial pressure on the United Kingdom through the United Nations […] the Anglo-French force had to withdraw despite its military success. Israel also evacuated Sinai. […]

[…] The European powers were forced to recognise once and for all that they were not world powers and that their role on the international stage could not be more than that of supporting the United States. Indeed, it became difficult for them to pursue an independent policy on the world stage. Their influence in the Middle East became almost non-existent. The Suez Crisis therefore ended in a moral defeat and a diplomatic fiasco for the former colonial powers […]”

“The Suez Crisis was provoked by an American and British decision not to finance Egypt’s construction of the Aswan High Dam, as they had promised, in response to Egypt’s growing ties with communist Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Nasser reacted to the American and British decision by declaring martial law in the canal zone and seizing control of the Suez Canal Company [...] When diplomatic efforts to settle the crisis failed, Britain and France secretly prepared military action to regain control of the canal and, if possible, to depose Nasser. They found a ready ally in Israel […]

On October 29, 1956, 10 Israeli brigades invaded Egypt and advanced toward the canal, routing Egyptian forces. Britain and France, following their plan, demanded that Israeli and Egyptian troops withdraw from the canal, and they announced that they would intervene to enforce a cease-fire ordered by the United Nations. On November 5 and 6, British and French forces landed at Port Said and Port Fuad and began occupying the canal zone. This move was soon met by growing opposition at home and by U.S.-sponsored resolutions in the UN (made in part to counter Soviet threats of intervention), which quickly put a stop to the Anglo-French action. On December 22 the UN evacuated British and French troops, and Israeli forces withdrew in March 1957.

Nasser emerged from the Suez Crisis a […] Israel did not win freedom to use the canal, but it did regain shipping rights in the Straits of Tīrān. Britain and France, less fortunate, lost most of their influence in the Middle East as a result of the episode.”

“[In response to the Anglo-French occupation of the Suez Canal zone,] the Eisenhower administration, concerned about dissociating the United States from European colonialism—especially in light of its strident condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Hungary the same week—as well as the possibility that the Soviets would intervene to assist Nasser, pressured Britain and France to accept a United Nations ceasefire on November 6. Moreover, the United States voted for U.N. resolutions publicly condemning the invasion and approving the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping force. Washington’s public censure of two of its most important allies temporarily soured relations with London and Paris and helped contribute to the resignation of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden in January 1957. Concurrently, U.S. worries about the continued viability of European (particularly British) political and military power in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis prompted the creation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which gave the administration increased power to aid countries in the region. By March 1957, however, the U.S.–U.K. bilateral relationship had recovered under Eden’s successor, Harold Macmillan.”

[16.1] Mossad, like other intel agencies from MI-6 to CIA to the former KGB, does a variety of operations from assassination to what we might call ‘asset management.’ ‘Asset management’ is basically cultural subversion, public relations, and propaganda and disinformation which is done through a combination of agency personnel and assets. These ‘assets’ are important people in media, business, ‘culture’, etc. who cooperate with the aims and wishes of the intel agency, in this case Mossad. Mossad has a particularly deep network to tap as there is the entire network of Jewish and Zionist advocacy organizations which all provide varying degrees of cover and assistance for Israeli operations. Everything from B’nai Brith to the ADL to the World Jewish Congress and ‘Friends of Israel’ orgs (and all the Jewish/Zionist/Israeli orgs in between) have all provided funding and direct material support to Mossad or other cover Israeli operations.

There are a handful of good books which illustrate Mossad, most of which are discussed in the links above. They include Robert Maxwell: Israel’s Superspy and a book Unz reviews by a former Mossad agent (Rise and Kill First). The case of Mordechai Vanunu is also illustrative. The point of using Mossad here is they’re the most obvious ZOG enforcers, but most Western intelligence agencies ultimately work for the same people.